联 合 国 S/2019/691*

安全理事会

Distr.: General
30 August 2019
Chinese
Original: English

安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会在第 2464(2019)号决议第 2 段中请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交附有结论和建议的中期报告。

据此，主席谨分发专家小组提交的报告(见附件)。

* 由于技术原因于 2019 年 12 月 4 日重发。

19-13211 * (C) 041219 041219

附件

2019 年 8 月 27 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨依照安全理事会第 2464(2019)号决议第 2 段，随信转递关于小组工作的中期报告。

后附报告已于 2019 年 7 月 31 日提交安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2019 年 8 月 26 日审议了该报告。

请将本函及其附文提请安全理事会成员注意并作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议
所设专家小组

附文

2019 年 7 月 31 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨依照安全理事会第 2464(2019)号决议第 2 段，随信转递关于小组工作的中期报告。

请将本函及其附件提请安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会成员注意为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议
所设专家小组

第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组的报告

摘要

在本报告所述期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国虽未进行核试验或洲际弹道导弹发射，但继续加强其核计划和导弹计划。2019 年 5 月和 7 月的导弹发射增强了其总体弹道导弹能力。包括最高层参与的外交努力仍在继续，力求以和平方式实现可核查的朝鲜半岛无核化，并普遍缓解半岛紧张局势。同时，专家小组开展的调查显示，违反决议的行为继续存在。例如，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反制裁，持续进行非法船对船移交并采购与大规模毁灭性武器有关的物项和奢侈品。该国利用在世界各地运营的银行代表和网络进入全球金融系统，藉此开展上述和其他违反制裁行为。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还利用网络空间发动日益复杂的攻击，从金融机构和加密货币交易所窃取资金，以创造收入。

会员国在执行金融制裁方面持续存在的缺陷以及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的欺骗性做法使该国得以继续进入国际金融系统。包括被指认银行在内的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构维持了 30 多名海外代表，控制银行账户并协助交易，其中包括非法移交煤炭和石油。该国银行代表和被指认实体利用同谋的外国国民来混淆他们的活动。专家小组还调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国广泛和日益复杂地利用网络手段，逃避金融制裁，从金融机构和加密货币交易所非法强行转移资金，清洗盗窃所得并创造收入。特别是，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对加密货币交易所的大规模攻击使其得以利用较难追查的手段创造收入，而且所受政府监督和监管少于传统银行业。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的网络行为体多在侦察总局的指导下开展运作，为该国大规模毁灭性武器计划筹集资金，迄今总收入估计数高达 20 亿美元。

朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司、胜必公司和南川江公司等被指认实体的代表继续利用外交掩饰等手段在海外活动，企图移交常规武器和专门知识并为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大规模毁灭性武器计划采购设备和技术。军需工业部和其他被指认实体继续为上述计划筹集资金，包括为此向海外派遣信息技术工作人员。侦察总局和万寿台海外开发会社等其他被指认实体还从事奢侈品进口，并企图在海外出售冻结资产。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续不见减少地违反决议，进行船对船移交。专家小组查明了新的规避技术，包括接驳船使用 B 级自动识别系统以及使用小船进行多次移交。专家小组收到了美利坚合众国和其他 25 个会员国提交的报告，其中载有图像、数据、计算和一项评估，说明在 2019 年的前四个月已超过安全理事会所设 2019 年向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国移交 50 万桶成品油的年度总量上限。专家小组还收到了俄罗斯联邦对此的答复，称在目前阶段，安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会作出结论性决定并停止成品油进口为时尚早。专家小组也收到了中国的答复，认为需要更多的证据和信息，以便对该问题作出判断。

专家小组指出，制裁措施无意对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民或在该国开展援助和救济活动的国际组织和非政府组织的工作产生不利的人道主义后果。虽然处理豁免请求的平均时间减少，但银行渠道均未恢复，阻碍了联合国和人道主义组织的持续行动。

专家小组建议采取一系列指认和实践措施，为安全理事会、1718 委员会和会员国提供更多工具，用于应对在执行各项决议方面的当前挑战和不足。

目录

* 附件只以来件所用语文分发且未经过正式编辑。

一. 导言

1. 安全理事会第 2464(2019)号决议第 2 段请专家小组按照第 2321(2016)号决议第 43 段的要求，向委员会提交一份载有调查结果和建议的中期报告。本报告所述期间为 2019 年 2 月 2 日至 8 月 2 日。

二. 部门制裁和海上制裁

船对船移交

船对船移交和直接运送石油产品

2. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反多项决议，将非法船对船移交作为进口成品油的主要手段。

3. 专家小组收到了一份报告，其中载有 2019 年 1 月 1 日至 4 月 23 日期间利用油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送成品油产品的最新数据。上述来文是 2019 年 6 月 11 日美利坚合众国向安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会提供的，并得到 25 个其他共同签署国[1] 的支持，内请委员会立即确定石油“上限已被违反，并在其后将上述违反行为通知联合国会员国，同时确认必须立即停止此后向朝鲜进行的所有成品油移交”(见附件 1)。2019 年 6 月 18 日，俄罗斯联邦作出答复，称“在目前阶段，委员会就美国提案作出结论性决定并停止向朝鲜出口成品油为时尚早”(见附件 2)。2019 年 6 月 18 日，中国表示需要“更多的证据和信息，以便对这一问题作出判断”。

4. 根据美国提供的报告，截至 2019 年 4 月 23 日，根据涵盖所报 70 次交付的以下三种计算情景中的任何一种情景，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国已实际超过 50 万桶进口上限(第 2397(2017)号决议，第 5 段)：油轮满载、油轮半载或油轮载货三分之一。[2] 在最后一种情景下，假设每艘油轮在港口停靠期间仅交付该船确定运力的三分之一，如果加上中国和俄罗斯联邦提交给委员会的石油交付量，到 4 月 23 日的总量已超过 2019 年的年度上限。[3] 根据报告，在第一种情景下，即假设油轮满载，估计总量为 109.3 万桶，将已超过进口上限至少 100%。除估计数外，美国还向专家小组提供了向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口交付非法石油产品的指示性卫星图像(见图一)，另一个会员国则提供了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行非法船对船移交的信息(见图二)。俄罗斯联邦指出，它“仍在审议美国就指称通过船对船移交向朝鲜运送成品油产品案件提供的资料，以及计算机建模结果”(见附件 2)。

[1] 大韩民国和大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国也加入了 23 个共同提案国(见附件 1)。


[2] 这一情景基于油轮可能的最低经济可行货运量。

[3] 截至 2019 年 4 月，中国向 1718 委员会通报，自 2019 年 1 月以来累计向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口成品油产品 4 194.43 吨。俄罗斯联邦提交的同期累计量为 18 974.616 公吨。5 月，中国和俄罗斯联邦分别报告了 1 536.03 吨和 3 208.969 吨的额外出口量。

5. 专家小组还继续记录了油轮和共谋方广泛使用掩盖和混淆技术的情况，并认为这构成躲避禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法船对船移交石油的禁令。存在违反石油产品进口报告要求的未申报直接交付(见第2397(2017)号决议，第5段)。反映朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内汽油和柴油价格总体稳定的经济指标表明，尽管受到国际制裁，该国的供应并不匮乏。

图一

2019 年 2 月至 4 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口交货情况



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

图二


非法船对船移交

2019 年 3 月 20 日，“Yu Son”轮与一艘身份不明船只进行船对船移交




资料来源：会员国。

2019 年 3 月 27 日，“Un Pha 2”轮与一艘身份不明油轮进行船对船移交



资料来源：会员国。

2019 年 4 月 15 日，“Mu Bong 1”轮与一艘身份不明油轮进行船对船移交



资料来源：会员国。

建议：

6. 会员国应根据决议的要求，向委员会报告任何已知的移交情况。

7. 会员国应促进国际商品贸易商、油轮船队所有方和经营方以及船舶承保方之间的信息共享，以核实油轮的实际目的地，从而防止通过操纵自动识别系统传输进行规避的行为。

8. 专家小组建议 1718 委员会指认下列船只违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段，非法移交石油产品：

(a) “UN Pha 2”轮(海事组织编号：8966535)，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，2019 年 3 月 27 日与未知油轮进行船对船移交；

(b) “Mu Bong 1”轮(海事组织编号：8610461)，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，2019 年 4 月 15 日与未知油轮进行船对船移交。

新的规避办法

9. 专家小组注意到正在使用已有充分记录的规避技术，包括关闭自动识别系统；物理伪装；使用没有海事组织编号的小船、改名、夜间移交以及其他形式的身份欺诈。此外，专家小组在本报告所述期间发现，使用了以前未报告的规避办法来逃避制裁。

悬挂外国旗的船只向南浦直接交货

10. 一个会员国观察到，有悬挂外国旗的船只向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国直接交付未报告的成品油产品。此类船只的例子包括被摘旗的“New Regent”轮(海事组织编号：8312497)、悬挂越南国旗的“Viet Tin 01”轮(海事组织编号：8508838)和悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的“Sen Lin 01”轮(海事组织编号：8910378)。这些船只于 2019 年 1 月至 4 月期间在南浦卸下石油产品。“Viet Tin 01”轮在南浦港进行了一次停靠，而“Sen Lin 01”轮则分别 10 次到访南浦。2019 年，被指认摘旗并遭受全球港口禁令的“New Regent”轮两次向南浦交付石油(见图三)。[4] 据该会员国称，指认“New Regent”轮可能促使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国决定将该船从接驳船改为交货油轮。

[4] Mega Glory 控股公司在 2019 年 7 月 8 日给专家小组的一封电子邮件中表示，该公司已于 2018 年 4 月将“New Regent”轮出售给另一家公司。专家小组注意到，截至 2019 年 7 月 21 日，海事数据库仍将 Mega Glory 控股公司列为该船的注册船东、船舶经营方和管理方。专家小组的调查还在继续。

图三

"New Regent"轮首次停靠南浦



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

11. 2 月 26 日，"Viet Tin 01"轮驶往南浦，交付一批成品油并于次日离港。专家小组发现，该船自 2019 年 1 月 4 日以来一直在光船承租的基础上经营。[5] 中国福建的"幸福船运有限公司"(Happy Shipping Co Ltd)通过新加坡的"KLJ Marine Services Pte"有限公司承租了这艘船。(见附件 3)。越南向专家小组通报，"Viet Tin 01"轮的船东(越南信托航运公司)未能联系到光船承租人以收回船只。一个会员国向专家小组通报，船东与幸福船运有限公司通过个体经纪人 K.S.Kwek 进行联系。[6] Kwek 先生向专家小组表示，他仅提供个人翻译服务。专家小组的调查仍在继续。


12. "Viet Tin 01"轮的最后停靠港记录是 2019 年 1 月 30 日至 2 月 2 日停靠新加坡。文件显示货物的卸货港是大韩民国蔚山港(见附件 4)，但"Viet Tin 01"轮的自动识别系统在 2019 年 2 月 2 日先是显示下一个港口是南浦，一小时后改为高雄。该船其后于 2 月 13 日至 16 日在高雄附近徘徊，然后驶往南浦(见图四)。在停靠南浦港前的一个月里，该船的自动识别系统在航行期间大多处于关闭状态。越南政府正在调查，新加坡根据自己的调查提供了有关港口停靠以及 5 108 桶石油货物的信息。

[5] 这一承租安排规定不提供船员或给养，而是由承租人自行负责。

[6] Kwek 先生的公司不是 KLJ Marine Services Pte 有限公司。Kwek 先生否认与 KLJ Marine Services Pte 有限公司有任何业务或个人关系。

图四

“Viet Tin 01”轮的航行路线以及 2019 年 2 月 26 日南浦石油码头(38° 42′ 55″ N 125° 22′ 04″ E)的卫星图像，其中显示南浦停有一艘尺寸相似的船只



资料来源：Windward。




资料来源：Planet Labs 有限公司。

船只伪装技术

13. 一个会员国向专家小组提供了证据，显示 2019 年 3 月 19 日一艘商业油轮在东海作业，在自动识别系统处于关闭状态时与另一艘身份不明的小型接驳船进行船对船移交。大船部分涂抹了海事组织编号，但依然可见“8916293”，与被指认的“Saebyol”轮(亦称“Chong Rim 2”轮)相符。该船的名字同样被涂抹，涂抹后写有“Venus”的名字。图五显示一艘重载船只(接驳船 1)驶近“Saebyol”轮，而另一艘看似未载货船只(接驳船 2)在船对船燃料移交后脱离。接驳船 1 显示做好了船对船移交的准备，甲板上备有软管，护舷外挂。附近浮油表明刚刚完成与接驳船 2 的船对船移交。

图五

2019 年 3 月 19 日，“Saebyol”轮进行船对船移交，接驳船 2 发出“渔船”信号，可能充当伪装定位器



资料来源：会员国。

14. 接驳船 2 采用了一项新技术，似乎利用 B 级自动识别系统转发器将自己伪装为渔船，以模糊身份并限制探测范围。接驳船 2 也可能是代表关闭自动识别系统的“Saebyol”轮，为潜在移交船充当自动引导定位器。[7]

返回的接驳船

15. 2019 年 5 月 13 日和 14 日，接驳船返回东海，并与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮“An San 1”(海事组织编号：7303803)连续进行船对船移交。上述移交平均持续 1.5 小时，连续数日使用没有识别信息的小船在黎明和黄昏进行(见图六)，可能是为了躲避空中监视。

[7] 自动识别系统 B 级应答器用于低于《1974 年国际海上人命安全公约》要求强制安装自动识别系统(A 级)门槛的船舶，例如小型渔船。虽然 B 级装备的功能较少，功率和射程较小，但可与总吨位 300 吨或以上的船只所用 A 级装备通信。

图六

连续两天与“An San 1”号油轮进行船对船移交的不明国籍船只



资料来源：会员国。

16. 不同会员国提供的关于“Saebyol”轮和“An San 1”轮的上述信息表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮正与多艘船只会合，以确保在返回本国卸下非法货物之前尽量满载。

船东、营运方和管理方

17. 进行船对船移交或直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付成品油的船只通常是载重吨位在 1 000 至 20 000 吨之间的小船以及船龄在 30 至 35 年之间的老船。此类船只的注册船东一般拥有最多四艘船的小型船队，似乎多是不同辖区第三方船舶经营方旗下最近成立的空壳公司或幌子公司。

煤炭运输

海上运煤

18. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反第 2371(2017)号决议规定的煤炭出口禁令。据一个会员国称，2019 年的头四个月期间，据信该国通过至少 127 次交货[8]共出口 93 万公吨煤炭。


19. 该会员国向专家小组提供了显示宁波-舟山港区附近载有煤炭的船只图像，这些船只被其确定为与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关(见图七和图八)。中国答复

[8] 根据每公吨 100 美元计算，提供信息的会员国所计算的煤炭估计值约为 9 300 万美元。

称，“专家小组提供的信息缺乏时效，无法据此开展现场调查。有关船只的资料含糊不清，缺乏准确性，不能构成完整证据链或进一步调查的依据”(见附件 6.1) 。

图七


悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Jang Jin Gang”轮在宁波附近借助浮吊准备进行船对船移交



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

图八

同日在宁波地区与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的五艘船和与该国有关的另外三艘船



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

20. 专家小组收到的图像显示，2018 年 9 月至 10 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只“Paek Yang San”轮(海事组织编号：9020534)、“Ka Rim Chon”轮(海事组织编号：8314811)、“Pho Phyong”轮(海事组织编号：8417962)和“Tae Yang”轮(海事组织编号：8306929)在北部湾将煤炭船对船移交至驳船(见附件 5)(见图九)。该会员国还提供了关于停泊在企沙的驳船(见图十)以及煤炭码头周围的锚区(见图十一)的照片。中国答复称，“专家小组提供的信息缺乏时效，无法据此开展现场调查。有关船只的资料含糊不清，缺乏准确性，不能构成完整证据链或进一步调查的依据。”；并称“停泊在企沙港的所有煤船均有合法进口证件，而且煤炭产地不是朝鲜。事实上，大多数散货船的形状非常相似，仅凭卫星图像就将进行船对船移交的船只与停泊在企沙港的船只联系起来是轻率的”(见附件 6.1) 。

图九


在北部湾船对船移交煤炭



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

图十


向企沙港运送煤炭的驳船



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

图十一

驳船的特定锚区



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

建议

21. 鉴于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只使用驳船避免港口停靠，港口当局应通过核实原产地证书、载货舱单和提单等文件，对此类船只进行更严格的审查，并扣押、检查和查封任何涉嫌运输违禁物品的船只(第 2397(2017)号决议，第 9 段)。

22. 专家小组建议 1718 委员会指认下列朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只违反第 2371(2017)号决议第 8 段：

(a) 2018 年 9 月 5 日进行船对船移交的“Paek Yang San”轮(海事组织编号：9020534)；

(b) 2018 年 9 月 21 日进行船对船移交的“Ka Rim Chon”轮(海事组织编号：8314811)；

(c) 2018 年 10 月 24 日进行船对船移交的“Pho Phyong”轮(海事组织编号：8417962)；

(d) 2018 年 10 月 25 日进行船对船移交的“Tae Yang”轮(海事组织编号：8306929)。

在第三国对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭的调查

23. 2019 年 3 月，大韩民国向委员会报告，它还起诉了参与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2017 年通过霍尔姆斯克违禁出口煤炭的一名个人和两家公司(S/2019/171，第 37 段)。大韩民国还报告，该国基于对 2017 年 12 月至 2018 年 6 月期间朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违禁出口煤炭的另外两起案件的调查，向检察官办公室提交了 6 名个人和 5 个实体。经第三国转运后共计运入了 14 840 公吨煤炭。大韩民国对与上述案件有关的更多船只实施了国家入港禁令(见下表)。

表
大韩民国自 2018 年 8 月以来实施的国家入港禁令

Vessel Name	IMO Number	Flag	Date of the National Port Entry Ban
Yu Yuan	9358694	Togo	18 August 2018
An Quan Zhou 66	8742240	Stateless	28 December 2018
Tai Xin	9088598	Togo	28 December 2018
Xin Yang 688	8657809	Belize	28 December 2018
Lucky Star	9015278	Togo	28 December 2018
East River	9109952	Panama	28 February 2019

资料来源：会员国、专家小组。

来自“Wise Honest”轮的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭

24. 专家小组继续调查并追踪最初由悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Wise Honest”轮(海事组织编号：8905490)运载的非法煤炭，该船于 2018 年 4 月 4 日被印度尼西亚扣留，原因是谎报旗帜为塞拉利昂国旗。自那以后，船长 Kim Chung

Son 因违反航运规定被罚款，[9] 并与船员一起被印度尼西亚驱逐出境。专家小组还继续调查了列为“Wise Honest”轮所载煤炭买方的 Enermax 公司(见第 52-53 段)。据美国称，“关于“Wise Honest”轮 2018 年 3 月运输的煤炭，通过一家美国金融机构的账户转账了超过 75 万美元。”[10]

25. 据美国称，[10] “Wise Honest”轮是朝鲜 Songi 航运公司(Korea Songi Shipping Company)注册的唯一船只(有关煤炭付款的信息见第 52 段)。美国还报告说，该船由朝鲜 Songi 贸易总公司(Korea Songi General Trading Corporation)(亦称 Songi 贸易公司(Songi Trading Company))控制，该公司“隶属于人民军[朝鲜人民军]并参与朝鲜煤炭出口。” [10]

26. 根据印度尼西亚巴厘巴板地区法院 2018 年 11 月的法院令，[11] 煤炭被“归还”给印度尼西亚经纪人 Eko Setyamoko，此人最初参与了“Wise Honest”轮运载煤炭的经纪业务。26 500 公吨非法煤炭从“Wise Honest”轮移交到悬挂巴拿马国旗的“*Dong Thanh*”轮(海事组织编号：9180035)。“*Dong Thanh*”轮随后根据营运方青岛环球航运有限公司(Qingdao Global Shipping Co.Ltd)(见附件 7)的指示，于 4 月 13 日驶向马来西亚甘马挽港，并于 2019 年 4 月 19 日抵达，但被拒绝入港。马来西亚当局向专家小组提供了文件，显示托运人 Bara Makmur Sadayana 有限公司(Pt. Bara Makmur Sadayana)(该公司也是 Setyamoko 先生的公司(见附件 8))，[12] 将煤炭虚假标注为原产于印度尼西亚(见图十二)。[13] 专家小组对“Wise Honest”轮煤炭交易的调查显示，签发的各种原产地证书含有欺诈信息(见附件 9)。

[9] 设定的罚款数额为 400 000 000 卢比，约合 28 500 美元。

[10] 见案 1：19-cv-04210，2019 年 5 月 9 日提起诉讼，美国纽约南区联邦地区法院。


[11] 见案件编号：682/Pid.B/2018/PN.BPP，2019 年 11 月 22 日裁决，巴厘巴板初审法院。

[12] S/2019/171，附件 19，另据印度尼西亚法院文件。

[13] Setyamoko 先生向法院上诉要求批准出售煤炭，理由是煤炭价格不断下降(裁决编号：682/Pid.B/2018/PN Bpp)第 3 页)。合同价值为 2 990 000 美元。

图十二

将煤炭虚假标注为印度尼西亚原产煤的文件


BILL OF LADING

TO BE USED WITH CHARTER PARTIES

Shipper
PT. BARA MAKMUR SADAYANA

Consignee
TO ORDER

3rd ORIGINAL

Notify address
EASTERN STEEL SDN. BHD.LOT 6293 AND 6294,
KAWASAN PERINDUSTRIAN TELUK KALONG,
MUKIM TELUK KALONG,
24000 KEMAMAN TERENGGANU DARUL IMAN, MALAYSIA

Vessel
MV. DONG THANH VOY.03-19

Port of loading
TELUK BALIKPAPAN, INDONESIA

Port of discharge
KEMAMAN PORT, MALAYSIA

Shipper's description of goods

INDONESIAN COAL

SAID TO WEIGHT
26,400 MTS

FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY

资料来源：专家小组。

27. 地区法院裁定对非法煤炭实施放行并批准由协助非法交易的同一经纪人进行再出口，这再次表明，会员国显然需要优先关注把安全理事会决议纳入国家法律。此类法律框架的缺失使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国及其同谋行为体有机可乘。印度尼西亚已开始审查其法律框架，以确保履行决议规定的义务。此案还突出表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆及其外交人员持续参与规避制裁措施。[14]

28. “*Dong Thanh*”轮的定期承租方告知专家小组，由于该船运载来自“Wise Honest”轮的煤炭，所以无法入港，并驶向越南头顿港，等待货物处置决定(第2397(2017)号决议，第 9 段)。越南证实，该船于 2019 年 6 月 6 日抵达越南巴地头顿地区内水，越南海关当局已拦截该船并正在调查此案。专家小组确定了“*Dong Thanh*”轮营运方青岛环球航运有限公司(现称青岛环球航运集团有限公司(Qingdao Global Shipping Group Ltd))[15] 与“Wise Honest”轮之间的联系。2018 年，从一个用于为“Wise Honest”轮交易出资的账户向青岛环球公司支付了一笔款项。青岛环球公司告诉专家小组，这笔付款是因 “*White Honest*”轮[原文如此]未向其“*Ken Orchid*”轮(海事组织编号：9598153)交付煤炭而提供的补偿。青岛环球公司提供的单据显示，“*Ken Orchid*”轮被租用来将“Wise Honest ”轮运载的煤

[14] 第 2270(2016)号决议第 13 段以及第 2321(2016)号决议第 17 段。另见 S/2019/171，第 36 段。

[15] 青岛环球公司告知专家小组，它知道“*Dong Thanh*”轮运载的货物来自“Wise Honest”轮，但根据法院令可以合法出口，且“可被视为来自印度尼西亚的出口货物，而不是原产于俄罗斯的货物，在那时，我们没有任何信息表明这些货物是可疑的受联合国制裁的货物……(can be treated cgo from Indonesia to export instead of Russian cgo origin, and by that time we hv no any info that such cgo suspected saction cgo under UN on watch..)”(原文如此)。

炭转运到大韩民国浦项(见附件 10)。单据详细信息与一份将 Enermax 列为收货人的合同的内容相符。[16]

建议

29. **专家小组建议 1718 委员会指认“Wise Honest”轮船长 Kim Chung Son、船东朝鲜 Songi 航运公司(Korea Songi Shipping Company)(海事组织编号：5607043)和朝鲜 Songi 贸易总公司(Korea Songi General Trading Corporation)参与违反制裁的活动。**

违禁捕鱼活动

30. 两个会员国向专家小组提供了显示继续转让捕鱼权的资料，包括悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发放的捕鱼许可证号码牌的第三国渔船的图片(见图十三)。

图十三

悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国捕鱼许可证号码牌的渔船，显示船名为“琼东渔 12122”



资料来源：会员国。

31. 一个会员国还报告说，它曾遇到驶向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国捕鱼区的第三国渔船，这些渔船没有捕鱼许可证号码牌。在与上述船只交流时，船员答复说，他们已向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发送了捕鱼权证书申请，将在抵达该国捕鱼区时收到许可证。船员还说，上述许可证将由第三国的指挥船在海上交给他们，指挥船提前在元山港拿到了许可证号码牌。他们还说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国巡逻艇有时会直接把捕鱼证书交给他们的船只，可能是为了躲避国际监督。对于专家小组的询问，中国答复说：“中国有关部门已禁止在朝鲜海域进行海洋捕捞作业”，“琼东渔 12122 不是在中国合法注册的渔船。不能仅根据涂写的船名来核实船旗国和船只身份。”(见附件 6.2)。

[16] 单据显示，安排从“Wise Honest”轮转运到“*Ken Orchid*”轮的煤炭数量和价值与 Enermax 和香港诺瓦国际商贸公司(Hong Kong Nova International TradeCompany)之间的合同数额相符(S/2019/171，附件 17)。

三. 禁运、被指认个人和实体

32. 尽管专家小组注意到，随着更多会员国遵守各项决议，军事合作事例似乎一直在减少，但专家小组注意到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和第三国个人违反决议的非法活动仍在继续。

33. 专家小组尚未收到刚果民主共和国、厄立特里亚、利比亚、缅甸、乌干达、坦桑尼亚联合共和国和也门等国对专家小组索要军事合作信息的答复。

伊朗伊斯兰共和国

34. 关于正在进行的对与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国开展军事合作的调查(S/2019/171，第 72 段)，一个会员国向专家小组指出，朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司和胜必公司这两个被指认实体仍在伊朗伊斯兰共和国设有开展运作的办事处，至少有 3 名朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司代表仍在外交身份掩饰下留驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国。2019 年 7 月 30 日，伊朗伊斯兰共和国向专家小组作出答复，否认该会员国所述内容(见附件 11)。

纳米比亚

35. 一个会员国向专家小组报告，“万寿台海外开发会社建筑和技术服务公司(纳米比亚)”(M.O.P. Architectural & Technical Service (NAMIBIA))[17] 前代表 Kim Tong Chol[18] 可能曾赴纳米比亚，试图出售在该国的资产。纳米比亚答复专家小组说，Kim 在 2017 年 9 月离境后，曾两次持新的公务护照以旅游签证返回纳米比亚，后于 2019 年 5 月离境(见附件 12)。

建议

36. **会员国应利用过往记录和生物特征数据，加强对为被指认实体工作的个人再次入境的监测。**

卢旺达

37. 一个会员国表示，在卢旺达的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在 Gabiro 的军营进行特种部队训练。专家小组已请卢旺达提供资料。

阿拉伯叙利亚共和国

38. 关于对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的活动以及叙利亚军火中间商企图在中东和非洲出售朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产军事装备的调查(S/2019/171，第 86-92 段)，专家小组继续收到会员国提供的资料，称这些活动仍在进行。专家小组仅在 2019 年 1 月收到阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的一般性答复，但没有实质性信息。

---

[17] 出生日期：1968 年 8 月 7 日。

[18] 万寿台海外开发会社纳米比亚子公司(S/2018/171，第 108 段；S/2019/171，第 79 段)。

乌干达

39. 会员国指出，朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司依然在乌干达驻留人员，提供特种培训的活动继续进行，该国仍有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工作人员(S/2019/171，第 93-94 段)。专家小组正在等待乌干达对多项询问作出答复。

扣押万寿台绘画

40. 2019 年 1 月，大韩民国统一部表示，韩国仁川机场海关没收了韩国商业协会世界联合会一些成员在 2018 年 11 月对平壤进行商务访问期间购买的万寿台创作社画作。对于专家小组的询问，大韩民国答复说，在 19 幅画作中，10 幅被没收，9 幅已转至第三国。

军需工业部和信息技术工作人员

41. 一个会员国告知专家小组，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军需工业部利用下属贸易公司(见附件 13)将软件程序员和开发人员等信息技术工作人员派驻到国外以赚取外汇，军需工业部是被指认实体，原因是其负责监督该国核计划和弹道导弹计划的发展。

42. 据该会员国称，数百名信息技术工作人员被部署到欧洲、亚洲、非洲和中东海外各地，平均每月收入 3 000 至 5 000 美元，并将大部分收入付给控制工作人员的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体。他们为掩盖国籍和身份采用了一种运作模式，即由一个当地公民担任公司的名义负责人，而公司实际上由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国开发人员经营，他们反过来向公司支付掩护费。这些工作人员还掩盖自己的身份，利用外国网站获得自由职业工作。在进行非恶意信息技术工作的同时，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工作人员还从事非法工作，窃取加密货币等资产，支持朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体逃避金融制裁(见第 57-68 段)。

核计划采购：压力传感器

43. 专家小组发现，有其他零售商在推销外观和型号与专家小组上次报告(S/2019/171，第 65 段)中调查和报告的产品非常相似的压力传感器。当产品不直接出口时，制造商最终用户管制可能不适用。专家小组继续调查可能的采购路线。

奢侈品

44. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反制裁进口奢侈品。

45. 先是在平壤，然后在河内(2019 年 2 月美国-朝鲜民主主义人民共和国首脑会议期间)，观察到一辆梅赛德斯-迈巴赫 S 级豪华轿车。戴姆勒股份公司向专家小组证实，图片显示的车辆由该公司生产，并经另一方改装。戴姆勒在没有更多信息的情况下无法确定生产或销售日期，并表示，该公司遵守所有适用的相关禁运措施，与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国没有业务往来。

46. 关于为在河内举行的美国-朝鲜民主主义人民共和国首脑会议而运至越南的梅赛德斯-迈巴赫 S 级车辆、梅赛德斯-奔驰 S-600 级车辆和至少一辆丰田兰德酷

路泽车辆，越南答复说，它提出的关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国代表团进入越南参加首脑会议的请求得到了 1718 委员会的批准。越南表示，它数次要求提供关于带入越南的车辆数量和型号的信息，但朝鲜民主主义人民共和国以安全为由从未提供上述信息。最近的一份调查报告[19] 强调，两辆原产于德国的梅赛德斯-迈巴赫 S-600 装甲防弹车通过不同国家进行运输，其后可能是在 2018 年 10 月被运至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。

47. 一个会员国告知专家小组，两批最终要运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的伏特加被扣押，因为伏特加在该会员国被列为奢侈品。专家小组的初步调查结果见附件 14。

48. 专家小组获得的信息表明，平壤 Taesong 百货商店(Taesong Department Store)在翻修后于 2019 年 4 月重新开业并出售奢侈品，Taesong 百货商店属于 Taesong 集团(Taesong Group)，该集团包括被指认实体朝鲜 Taesong 贸易公司(Korea Taesong Trading Company)(KPe.041)和朝鲜大成银行(Korea Daesong Bank)(KPe.035)，并由 39 号室(KPe.030)领导，此前与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹计划的扩散和采购有关联。

四. 金融

49. 专家小组的调查表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一直可以进入国际金融体系，其网络继续以令人难以发现其非法活动的方式逃避金融制裁，会员国也依然没有采取各项决议所要求的措施，包括驱逐在国外开展业务活动的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行代表。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为窃取金融机构和加密货币交易所资金而发起的网络攻击的范围越来越广，复杂程度越来越高，这也使该国能够逃避金融制裁，创造收入，其手段更难以追踪且受到的政府监督和监管更少。一个会员国告知专家小组，相对于其他活动产生的收入，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体攻击活动所得收入的比例有所增加。

海外的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行代表

50. 专家小组继续调查 30 多名在国外开展业务的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构的代表，包括端川商业银行、朝鲜金刚银行、外贸银行、第一信贷银行、大成银行、日心国际银行、东方银行、大同信贷银行、统一发展银行和柳京商业银行的代表。专家小组发现上述银行通过在中国、印度尼西亚(见第 52 段)、利比亚、俄罗斯联邦、阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和阿拉伯联合酋长国的代表开展业务(见附件 15 和 16，其中载有从相关会员国收到的答复)。专家小组指出，上述所有会员国必须根据第 2321(2016)号决议第 33 段驱逐代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构行事的所有个人。

[19] 见 C4ADS，Lux & Loaded: Exposing North Korea’s Strategic Procurement Networks(2019 年 7 月)。

51. 海外的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行代表继续利用第三国中介和其他金融规避方法，发挥积极作用，协助中介网络开展船对船移交和其他相关违规行为。其中一名代表此前曾因军火和有关物资的非法金融交易受到专家小组的调查。[20]

煤炭和石油移交的金融和合同安排

52. 专家小组调查了在合同和金融安排及交易中使用的规避方法，包括“Wise Honest”轮所载煤炭的转运。这次移交的转运费由 Jinmyong 联合银行(Jinmyong Joint Bank)一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外银行代表支付，此人安排通过 Huitong 矿业(Huitong Minerals)并经由一家美国金融机构转账 760 000 美元(见附件 17)。在大韩民国 Enermax 公司(作为最终收货方)和香港诺瓦国际商贸有限公司(作为卖方)的合同约定船只所载价值 2 990 000 美元煤炭货物销售的相关金融安排中，可以看到类似的规避方法。虽然 Enermax 向专家小组声称，它曾同意从“一家印度尼西亚当地经纪人”处购买“印度尼西亚煤炭”，但该公司无法证实上述说法，称所有相关电子邮件通信均已被“删除”。[21] 此外，对于“印度尼西亚当地经纪人”通过香港一家专门从事完全不同领域业务(销售卷烟制造机械)的公司为煤炭采购出具所有合同、文书和融资的行为，Enermax 也没有发现任何可疑之处。Enermax 未设法进行任何尽职调查，就签署了一份要求其向香港诺瓦国际商贸有限公司香港银行账户汇款 300 万美元的合同(对该公司来说是前所未有的交易)，而且无法确认为该公司签署合同的代表。

53. 仅 7 个月后，Enermax 再次作为收货人出现在一张提货单上，这张提货单涉及 2018 年 11 月 1 日从纳霍德卡运到浦项港的 2 588 公吨煤炭，运载船只为“*DN5505*”轮，当时该船在运输了两辆梅赛德斯-奔驰装甲防弹车后返航，据报，这两辆车最终被运抵朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，违反了制裁。[22] 装甲防弹车的发货人与 Enermax 所购煤炭的发货人相同，即 Do Young 航运公司(Do Young Shipping)，它是一家马绍尔群岛空壳公司，也是“*DN5505*”轮的船东和船舶管理方。关于煤炭的原产地，大韩民国在浦项扣留了“*DN5505*”轮，理由是其在 2 月从纳霍德卡进口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭，大韩民国还提到了“*DN5505*”轮在 2018 年 11 月的煤炭进口活动(见附件 18 和 19)。与购买“印度尼西亚煤炭”的解释相似，Enermax 在一次新闻采访中声称，它相信了另一当地经纪人关于煤炭原产于俄罗斯联邦的说辞。[23] 专家小组最近询问了 Enermax 参与向大韩民国出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭案件的情况，但没有收到 Enermax 的答复。

---

[20] 例如，朝鲜大成银行的 Ko Il Hwan。见 S/2019/171，第 21 段，以及附件 32；S/2017/150，第 225、227 和 230 段。

[21] Enermax 的首席执行官没有答复专家小组的问题，即他如何得知这笔交易并为此与印度尼西亚当地经纪人取得联系(他已多年未去过印度尼西亚)。Enermax 在公司层面对如此规模的交易极为低调。它没有公司网站，自 2014 年以来也没有报告年度销售数据。

[22] C4ADS，Lux & Loaded: Exposing North Korea’s Strategic Procurement Networks(2019 年 7 月 16 日)，第 41 至 42 页。

[23] 见 Edward Wong 和 Christoph Koetti，”How North Korea’s leader gets his luxury cars”，纽约时报，2019 年 7 月 16 日。在关于该案的另一次采访中，一名 Enermax 官员试图为 Do Young 航运公司和“*DN5505*”轮辩解，称根据他亲眼所见的船只结构和设计，该船无法运输车辆。见“Vessel

被指认实体和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官的金融活动[24]

54. 关于侦察总局特工 Kim Sou Gwang(亦称 Kim Sou-gwang、Son-kwang KIM、KIM Son-gwang、KIM Su-kwang)先生、Kim Su Gyong(别名 Kim Su Kyong)女士、Kim Yong Nam 及其家人正在进行的金融活动和资产，专家小组调查了 Kim Sou Gwang 在巴黎和罗马所拥有公寓的租金收入的付款情况。虽然 Kim Sou Gwang 在巴黎的公寓租金收入已被冻结，但房地产公司获准汇出一定数额以用来纳税(但不汇给 Kim Sou Gwang 本人)。这些付款被汇给一名居住在中国并为一家中国公司工作的法国国民。后续信息显示，这位法国国民与 Kim 有联系，这些付款可能仍到了后者手中。法国正在调查此案，以确保有效执行资产冻结。此案凸显了会员国冻结代表被指认个人和实体行事的所有个人和实体的资产的重要性。

55. 关于 Kim Sou Gwang 在罗马的公寓，[25] 意大利 2018 年 7 月向专家小组表示，每月 850 欧元的租金收入被转入 Kim 在一个意大利金融机构的账户，当时该账户余额为 4 071.16 欧元。意大利还表示，意大利财政部已通知承租人，不应再把租金支付给 Kim，而应支付给由国家财产办公室确认和指定的该房产的管理人。

56. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官 Kim Chol Yong 曾于 2016 年试图安排通过东亚向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运输 4 台发电机组(被荷兰拦截)，他多年来一直担任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻法国外交官，并使用多种规避方法在欧洲联盟开设了多个银行账户(S/2019/171，第 120-123 段)。虽然法国已根据第 2321(2016)号决议第 16 段，下令关闭 Kim Chol Yong 的账户以及其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官的账户，但专家小组获悉有报告表明 Kim 最近代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体开展商业活动，并向法国进行了询问。[26] 此外，专家小组就调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻维也纳大使馆试图从朝鲜 Ungum 公司(Korea Ungum Corporation)冻结帐户中放款以支付一名据称为该公司工作的个人的未付工资提出了询问，奥地利就此作出了答复。奥地利证实，上述要求已遭到拒绝，所称的该公司雇员是大使馆的一名派驻行政和技术工作人员，此人从事任何此类工作将违反各项决议和《维也纳领事关系公约》第 42 条(见附件 20)。

通过网络手段逃避金融制裁

57. 专家小组继续调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过网络手段从金融机构和加密货币交易所非法强行转移资金、清洗盗窃所得并创造法定货币或加密货币收

seized by South Korea exported armored limos, imported coal: report”，朝鲜新闻网，2019 年 7 月 16 日。

[24] 专家小组有关这一问题的此前报告，见 S/2019/171，第 126 段；S/2018/171，第 169 至 172 段；S/2017/742，第 50 段。

[25] 地址：罗马 Via Mar della Cina 179/ Viale della Grande Muraglia Cinese 484。该公寓自 2016 年 11 月 15 日起一直处于租赁状态。

[26] 专家小组欢迎法国提供的资料，显示法国一直在与其金融机构开展外联活动，说明与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官有关的风险，包括按照专家小组就此向会员国提出的建议，分享派驻法国和其他欧洲联盟国家的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官名单(S/2019/171，第 161 段)。

入等逃避金融制裁的行为。[27] 专家小组正根据会员国提供的资料和公开报道，调查至少 35 起有关朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体攻击金融机构和加密货币交易所以及通过“挖矿”赚取外汇的所报案件，这些案件发生在以下会员国：孟加拉国(2 起案件)、智利(2 起)、哥斯达黎加(1 起)、冈比亚(1 起)、危地马拉(1 起)、印度(3 起)、科威特(1 起)、利比里亚(1 起)、马来西亚(1 起)、马耳他(1 起)、尼日利亚(1 起)、波兰(1 起)、大韩民国(10 起)、斯洛文尼亚(1 起)、南非(1 起)、突尼斯(1 起)和越南(1 起)(见附件 21)。[28] 专家小组正在调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体企图违反第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段、第 2094(2013)号决议第 8 和 11 段及第 2270(2016)号决议第 32 段所述制裁的攻击行为。专家小组的调查表明，包括违反金融制裁的攻击在内的网络活动范围显著扩大，复杂程度大幅提高。根据一些估计，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的非法所得金额高达 20 亿美元。

58. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体开展的主要网络活动包括：通过环球银行间金融电信协会(SWIFT)网络实施攻击(进入银行员工的计算机和基础设施，发送欺诈信息并销毁证据)、窃取加密货币(攻击交易所和用户)以及加密货币“挖矿”，将其作为军方的一个专业分支的资金来源。在一个广为人知的案例中，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体进入了某一会员国管理整个自动付款机网络的基础设施，植入修改交易处理的恶意软件，从而在 5 小时内强行将 10 000 笔现金汇给在 20 多个国家为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国效力或代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工作的个人。[29] 上述行动需要大批实地人员，意味着与在国外工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民开展了广泛协调，可能与有组织犯罪团伙存在勾结。

59. 关于网络攻击获得的外汇，据一个会员国称，“这些活动推动了朝鲜大规模毁灭性武器计划”。实施此类攻击的风险低，但收益高，[30] 通常只需极少资源(如一台笔记本电脑和互联网接入)。该会员国表示，日益复杂的攻击加上全球技术和数字化的进步，使这些行为体的攻击面不断扩大，目标可选性不断增加，导致易受影响的国家和部门增多，因为网络防御从来无法保证绝对安全。

60. 专家小组此前确定了侦察总局在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络攻击中发挥的作用(S/2019/171，第 109-118 段)，并得到了一个会员国的进一步证实。该会员国指出，许多朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体隶属该局。该会员国补充说，

[27] 利用网络工具创收以及通过网络手段进行掩护和洗钱的行为构成逃避制裁。关于专家小组此前的报告，见 S/2019/171，第 109-118 段。据一个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体将网络空间用作一种非对称手段，违反军火禁运窃取军事技术、开展创收行动、进行网络勒索和敲诈活动、黑客索款、转移资金。

[28] 会员国迄今对专家小组问询的答复载于附件 20 和 23。专家小组请所有相关会员国提供调查结果资料，包括关于攻击者所用战术、攻击模式、归咎的技术信息以及关于可归咎于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或以类似方式实施的其他网络攻击，或为应对攻击和防止今后发生此类攻击而采取的任何措施的信息。

[29] 见“FASTCash: How the Lazarus Group is emptying millions from ATMs”，Symantec，2018 年 10 月 2 日。可查阅 www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/fastcash-lazarus-atm-malware。

[30] 被发现和惩罚的机率低，但潜在效益高。调查和归咎进程复杂，而且，由于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的互联网接入有限，报复机率低。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为其网络单位建立了精心设计的甄选流程，被招募者在幼年就被选中，并接受主要由军方和特勤局提供的专门培训。专家小组注意到，不同会员国和公司对与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的高级持续威胁采用了各自的命名法。[31]

61. 一个会员国强调，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体的攻击还表明在社会工程方面的复杂程度越来越高。在对智利银行间网络 Redbanc 的攻击中，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国黑客通过“领英”(LinkedIn)接近一位目标员工，提供就业机会，之后通过 Skype 用西班牙语进行完整面试以建立信任，然后要求目标员工下载恶意软件。[32] 有关攻击模式和方法的信息，见附件 22。

62. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体窃取加密货币，用以清洗所得来逃避金融制裁，并通过“加密货币劫持”攻击来挖矿创收。据一个会员国称，加密货币攻击使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国能够更容易使用国外攻击所获资金。为了掩饰其活动，攻击者使用数字版分层法，通过一次性使用加密货币钱包来实时创建数千笔交易。据该会员国称，在 2018 年的一次攻击后，通过至少 5 000 次单独交易转移被盗资金，进而汇入多个国家，最后兑换为法定货币，使得追踪资金变得极为困难。

63. 另一个会员国向专家小组通报，“朝鲜主要从本国境内攻击韩国加密货币交易所”。自 2008 年以来，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对大韩民国目标的网络攻击数量、复杂性和范围持续增加，[33] 包括在 2016 年明显转向侧重于创造财政收入的攻击。2019 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体将重点转向加密货币交易所。有些加密货币交易所已遭到多次攻击。据报，Bithumb 被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体至少攻击了四次。前两次攻击发生于 2017 年 2 月和 7 月，各造成约 700 万美元损失，后两次攻击发生于 2018 年 6 月和 2019 年 3 月，分别造成 3 100 万美元和 2 000 万美元损失，表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体的能力和决心更强。同样，Youbit(前为 Yapizon)遭受了多次攻击，2017 年 4 月损失 480 万美元，2017 年 12 月损失总资产的 17%，交易所被迫关闭。上述攻击以及 2019 年 5 月 28 日对 UpBit 实施的攻击与此前归咎于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的对安全和国防目标的网络攻击所用工具、代码和攻击载体(包括鱼叉式网络钓鱼和水坑式攻击)类似。[34] 除了大韩民国，专家小组还调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对其他五个国家的加密货币交易所的攻击(见附件 21 B)。

[31] 这些包括 APT 37、APT 38、Hidden Cobra、Lazarus Group、Reaper Group、Labyrinth Chollima、Stardust Chollima、Velvet Chollima、Kimsuky Group、Lab 110 和 Bureau 121。

[32] 见“Así fue El intento de ciberataque a Redbanc en diciembre”，*TrendTIC*，2019 年 1 月 10 日。

[33] 自 2008 年起，大韩民国遭到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体实施的数十次攻击，目标包括银行、政府和军事目标、发电厂、企业实体和媒体。

[34] 这包括 5 月早些时候实施的 Operation Fake Striker 攻击以及 2019 年 1 月 7 日对 77 名此前与统一部有联系的记者的攻击。

64. 在用加密货币清洗攻击所得方面，2017 年 5 月的全球 WannaCry 勒索软件攻击事件影响了 150 个国家的 20 多万台计算机，并要求用比特币加密货币支付赎金。一个会员国的调查认定，利用 WannaCry 恶意软件所获加密货币是采用多种虚拟货币在多个辖区清洗的，目的是掩饰交易。

65. WannaCry 受害者支付的比特币赎金通过加密货币交易所从比特币钱包转出，最终在瑞士的加密货币交易所 ShapeShift 兑换为另一种加密货币门罗币(Monero)。[35] 门罗币是一种匿名性更强的虚拟货币，因而与比特币、莱特币(Litecoin)或以太币(Ethereum)等标准加密货币相比更难追踪，延长了归咎时间。2018 年 6 月对 Bithumb 的第三次攻击所得是通过 YoBit 转移的。[36] 到 2018 年 8 月，即攻击之后不到两个月，这些资金通过一系列的数百次复杂交易送至 YoBit，目的是兑换和兑现盗取的所有加密货币(而非用所得加密货币直接购买商品和服务)。上述案例显示，与早先朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对大韩民国网购商城 Interpark 的客户发起的旨在获取外汇的网络攻击相比，这些攻击有了明显的变化。

66. 专家小组注意到，除了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对加密货币交易所和个人用户的网络攻击之外，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体还参与了加密货币挖矿。一个会员国向专家小组通报，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军方的一个专业部门正在从事此类挖矿活动。一份公开报道指出，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内的比特币和门罗币挖矿活动显著增加，并将此归咎于朝鲜国内有互联网接入的精英和其他人。[37] 鉴于加密货币的匿名性增强，新挖的加密货币可用于协助逃避制裁的活动。

67. 专家小组还调查了“加密货币劫持”指称事件，其中使用了恶意软件感染计算机，非法使用计算机资源生成加密货币。有一份报告分析了一款旨在挖到门罗币并将任何挖得的货币送至位于平壤金日成综合大学的服务器的恶意软件。[38] 另外，据另一份报告称，大韩民国金融安全研究所将一家大韩民国公司电脑遭遇的类似加密货币劫持攻击明确归咎于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国黑客。[39] 根据报告，该恶意软件据信为部署该软件的黑客创造了价值约 25 000 美元的门罗币。鉴于门罗币的匿名性更强，难以确定朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可从此类攻击中创造的收入总

---

[35] 见 Thomas Brewster.“WannaCry hackers are using this Swiss company to launder $142 000 Bitcoin ransoms,”*Forbes*，2017 年 8 月 3 日。

[36] 黑客的目的似乎是将盗取的大量加密货币全部兑换和兑现，而非将所得加密货币直接用于购买商品和服务。见 David Carlisle and Kayla Izenman,“Closing the Crypto Gap”, RUSI Occasional Papers, 2019 年 4 月 14 日。另见 Thomas Brewster.“WannaCry hackers are using this Swiss company to launder $142 000 Bitcoin ransoms”，*Forbes*。2017 年 8 月 3 日。WannaCry 攻击所得也是通过 ShapeShift(瑞士)转移的。

[37] 见 Priscilla Moriuchi, “North Korea’s ruling elite adapt Internet behavior to foreign scrutiny”，*Recorded Future*，2018 年 4 月 25 日。

[38] 见 Chris Doman,“A North Korean Monero cryptocurrency miner”, *AlienVault*，2018 年 1 月 8 日。

[39] 见 Sam Kim,“North Korea’s ruling elite adapt Internet behavior to foreign scrutiny”，*Bloomberg*，2018 年 1 月 1 日。

额。尽管如此，这一加密货币劫持事件表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国加密货币劫持手段日益复杂，并且有意利用恶意软件，通过挖矿为政权获取加密货币。

68. 专家小组积极注意到会员国提供资料，说明为应对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体攻击所致损失而采取的行动(见附件 23)。

资产支持的加密货币公司使用区块链技术创收

69. 2018 年 4 月 12 日在香港注册的海洋链平台有限公司(Marine Chain Platform Limited)[40] 是一家借助区块链进行船舶交易的平台，用海洋船舶的部分所有权换取数字代币。[41] 据一个会员国称，海洋链公司与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有联系，至少有一名该公司员工与从在线公司勒索比特币的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体有关联。该会员国还表示，海洋链公司的启动资金可能来自勒索所得的网络货币。专家小组对海洋链公司逃避金融制裁以及违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段关于合作实体禁令的行为进行了调查。

70. 专家小组的调查发现，虽然冯家强(Jonathan Foong Kah Keong)船长[42] 被正式列为海洋链平台有限公司(香港公司注册号：2679578)的首席执行官，但 Julien Kim 才是公司的实际所有者、唯一投资者和事实上的首席执行官，通过向冯和其他咨询人下令来指导公司的所有活动。Kim 以“Tony Walker”的化名签发所有文件和来文，但有一份公司内部电话名单将“Julien Kim，别名 Tony Walker”称为“策划人和主要投资者”，2018 年 1 月 18 日 Kim 与冯签署的一份咨询合同详列了冯作为 Kim 的外部代言人和协调人的职责，其中包括处理与设立公司和银行账户以及签署所有官方文件有关的多项任务(见附件 25 至 28)。

71. 在公司的财务运营方面，冯代表 Kim 从其在新加坡一家金融机构的公司账户多次转账。冯表示，“我会在收到 Tony 的款项并在 Tony 发出付款指示之后用我的新加坡船级社(Singclass)帐户(这是我在海洋链公司以外的另一家公司)支付部分款项。因为新加坡船级社账户是我拥有的唯一美元账户。”Kim 向该账户的汇款(金额在 30 000 至 150 000 美元之间)均通过香港的幌子公司完成，每笔交易都使用一家不同的公司。冯通过新加坡船级社国际私人有限公司(Singclass International Pte Ltd)处理的一些付款看似可疑(见附件 29)。有关此案的进一步调查结果摘要载于附件 27。

[40] 海洋链平台有限公司于 2018 年 9 月 17 日关闭。来自投资者平台的材料以及描述公司业务计划和活动的其他文件资料载于附件 24。

[41] 据一个会员国称，通过数字代币化进行的此类船舶买卖可为相对匿名的船舶拥有和管理提供便利，并使投资者能够将股份转至其他加密货币平台。

[42] 几十年来，冯一直活跃在新加坡海事产业，其公司新加坡船级社曾担任两艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只“Hung Tae 1”轮(海事组织编号：8604541)和“Pyong Hua”轮(海事组织编号：8510518)的船级社。2017 年 10 月，Kim 首次接触冯，自称区块链专家，冯称，Kim 表示“需要我关于航运问题的专业知识，以确保这家初创企业取得成功。”

建议

72. 专家小组建议安全理事会今后在起草金融制裁措施时，强调指出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络攻击、非法为本国创造收入以规避相关决议的严重性。

73. 会员国应确保其监管范围涵盖虚拟货币和非银行金融机构及货币服务企业，包括加密货币交易所。在适当的情况下，会员国应针对金融实体(包括加密货币服务)采取监管行动，以促进加强在线安全，降低朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体今后实施潜在网络攻击的风险。

74. 会员国应确保其包括银行和加密货币交易所在内的金融机构采取独立步骤，防范朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的恶意网络活动。这些步骤包括通过金融服务信息共享和分析中心等组织与其他金融机构共享威胁信息，设计分隔式计算机系统以阻断任何攻击，定期对数据进行备份，就常见社会工程策略开展提高意识培训，实施管理信息共享和系统访问的政策，以及制定发生攻击时的应对计划。

75. 会员国应确保加密货币交易所承担与银行相同的防范洗钱义务，如监测可疑交易，在遭遇攻击后向政府提供账户信息，冻结控制之下的受制裁实体的资产，以及切断据信来自恶意行为体控制或与恶意行为体有关的账户的交易。

76. 会员国应提升能力，在国家层面(通过成功的机构间协作)和国际层面(关于金融部门威胁的信息共享倡议和协作)促进强有力的信息交流，以发现并防止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络能力逃避制裁的企图。各国政府应分享最佳做法，并传递给相关私营实体。

五. 与核计划和弹道导弹计划相关的近期活动

核

77. 尽管朝鲜民主主义人民共和国没有进行核试验并已关闭丰溪里试验场，但其核计划仍在继续运作。在本报告所述期间，没有观察到宁边 5MW(e)反应堆运行的迹象。多个会员国向专家小组报告说，无法确定燃料棒是否已转移至后处理设施。轻水反应堆的建设在继续进行。据观察，在九龙江沿线进行了多次疏浚。还观察到放射化学实验室偶有活动，一个会员国表示可能是在维修。另一个会员国认为宁边铀浓缩设施仍在运作。

78. 第一个会员国报告说，平山的铀浓缩厂和铀矿仍在运作。专家小组继续对其他核设施进行监测。

79. 此外，专家小组正在进一步进行“隘口”物项调查(S/2019/171，第 66 段)(见附件 31)。

加强弹道导弹计划的自主、综合和威慑能力

80. 2019 年 5 月 4 日和 9 日发射的新型短程弹道[43] 导弹(S/2019/171，附件 84.4)以及 2019 年 7 月 24 日发射的两枚被朝鲜中央通讯社称为“新型战术制导武器”[44] 的导弹都证明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有能力掌控弹道导弹系统的关键组成部分，包括固体火箭燃料生产，使用不同类型的运输竖起发射装置获得机动性，并穿透弹道导弹防御系统。[45] 2019 年 6 月，会员国向专家小组提供了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国综合弹道导弹计划的全面自主性评估，其中短程弹道导弹计划的进步提高了整个弹道导弹计划的实效。尽管受到制裁，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还是设法将整个导弹生产链本土化(附件 32，第 4 段以及 S/2019/171，附件 84.5)。尽管如此，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国仍继续开展海外活动，包括销售、采购和技术合作，以推动弹道导弹计划，并获得财政收益(附件 32，第 6 段)。

81. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在不断完善弹道导弹计划的分散、隐蔽的地下基础设施，包括其依赖的铁路网络(附件 32，第 5 段以及 S/2019/171，附件 84.3)。

图十四

2019 年 5 月 4 日从元山虎岛半岛发射短程弹道导弹[46]



资料来源：朝鲜中央通讯社(左)；Planet Labs, Inc(右)。

六. 制裁的意外影响

82. 根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 25 段，制裁措施无意对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成不利的人道主义后果，或对在该国为造福平民而开展援助和救济活动的国际组织和非政府组织的工作产生负面影响。驻地协调员在 2019 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的需求和优先事项报告中指出，“在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(朝鲜)，数百万人民的处境依然艰难。该国最脆弱的民众粮食无保障、营养不良且无

[43] 一些专家表示，2019 年 5 月 4 日和 9 日发射的射弹是“战术制导武器”，而非短程弹道导弹，且与 2019 年 7 月 24 日发射的射弹相似。

[44] 朝鲜中央通讯社，2019 年 7 月 26 日。

[45] 附件 32，第 1-3 段。朝鲜中央通讯社 7 月 22 日报道的新潜艇可能是潜射弹道导弹的平台。

[46] 2019 年 5 月 4 日短程弹道导弹发射点(39°24'32.25"N 127°31'53.63"E)，烟迹时间为协调世界时 01:54:39。

法获得基本服务。因此，约 1 090 万人仍然需要人道主义援助，以满足食物、营养、健康和水以及环境及个人卫生需要”。[47] 专家小组注意到，不断有报道称联合国制裁造成了意外的不利人道主义后果(如在医疗保健、水和环境卫生及弱势群体营养方面)。

83. 专家小组在上一次最后报告中确定了联合国机构和人道主义行动通报的六个主要关切领域，其中的意外后果对他们在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义方案运作产生了不利影响(S/2019/171，第 176 段)。两大首要关切是获取委员会豁免的拖延及银行渠道的崩盘。2018 年 8 月 6 日，委员会通过了“第 7 号执行援助通知：获得向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供人道主义援助豁免的准则”。[48] 从收到至核准豁免请求的平均用时已大幅减少，[49] 但银行渠道尚未恢复。这种情况，加上金融机构拒绝与高风险辖区开展任何交易，继续对联合国机构和人道主义组织的方案形成阻碍，给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成了不利后果。

建议

84. 专家小组建议，联合国有关机构每半年向委员会通报制裁对朝鲜平民及各机构在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内行动产生的意外影响。

七. 会员国报告

85. 关于会员国最近就各项决议提交报告的统计数字，见附件 33。专家小组指出，会员国报告的数量和质量均需全面提高。专家小组还回顾所有会员国根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段提交关于遣返朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人的中期报告的最后期限。此外，考虑到仅收到的 37 份中期报告质量参差不齐，专家小组强调，会员国在报告中必须载列所有的相关详细资料。

[47] 见《2019 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的需求和优先事项》，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻地协调员的报告(2019 年 3 月)。

[48] 可查阅 www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1718_implementation_assistance_notice_7.pdf。

[49] 2019 年 2 月至撰写本报告之时，委员会共批准了 16 份请求。关于委员会已批准豁免的信息在网站发布，见 www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests。

八. 建议

1. 会员国应根据决议的要求，向委员会报告任何已知的移交情况。

2. 会员国应促进国际商品贸易商、油轮船队所有方和运营方以及船舶承包方之间的信息共享，以核实油轮的实际目的地，从而防止通过操纵自动识别系统传输进行规避的行为。

3. 专家小组建议 1718 委员会指认下列船只违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段、非法移交石油产品：

(a) “**Un Pha 2**”号(海事组织编号：8966535)，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，2019 年 3 月 27 日与未知油轮进行船对船移交；

(b) “**Mu Bong 1**”号(海事组织编号：8610461)，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，2019 年 4 月 15 日与未知油轮进行船对船移交。

4. 鉴于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只使用驳船避免港口停靠，港口当局应通过核实原产地证书、载货舱单和提单等文件，对此类船只进行更严格的审查，并扣押、检查和查封任何涉嫌运输违禁物品的船只。

5. 专家小组建议 1718 委员会指认下列朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只违反第 2371(2017)号决议第 8 段：

(a) 2018 年 9 月 5 日进行船对船移交的“Paek Yang San”轮(海事组织编号：9020534)；

(b) 2018 年 9 月 21 日进行船对船移交的“Ka Rim Chon”轮(海事组织编号：8314811)；

(c) 2018 年 10 月 24 日进行船对船移交的“**Pho Phyong**”轮(海事组织编号：8417962)；

(d) 2018 年 10 月 25 日进行船对船移交的“**Tae Yang**”轮(海事组织编号：8306929)。

6. 专家小组建议委员会指认：“Wise Honest”轮船长 **Kim Chung Son**、船东朝鲜 **Songi** 航运公司(**Korea Songi Shipping Company**) (海事组织编号：5607043)以及朝鲜 **Songi** 贸易总公司(**Korea Songi General Trading Corporation**)参与违反制裁的活动。

7. 会员国应利用过往记录和生物特征数据，加强对为被指认实体工作的个人再次入境的监测。

8. 专家小组建议安全理事会今后在起草金融制裁措施时，强调指出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络攻击、非法为本国创造收入以规避相关决议的严重性。

9. 会员国应确保其监管涵盖虚拟货币和非银行金融机构及货币服务企业，包括加密货币交易所。在适当的情况下，会员国应针对金融实体(包括加密货币服务)

采取监管行动，以促进加强在线安全，降低朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体今后实施潜在网络攻击的风险。

10. 会员国应确保其包括银行和加密货币交易所在内的金融机构采取独立步骤，防范朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的恶意网络活动。这些步骤包括通过金融服务信息共享和分析中心等组织与其他金融机构共享威胁信息，设计分隔式计算机系统以阻断任何攻击，定期对数据进行备份，就常见社会工程策略开展提高意识培训，实施管理信息共享和系统访问的政策，以及制定发生攻击时的应对计划。

11. 会员国应确保加密货币交易所承担与银行相同的防范洗钱义务，如监测可疑交易，在遭遇攻击后向政府提供账户信息，冻结控制之下的受制裁实体的资产，以及切断据信来自恶意行为体控制或与恶意行为体有关的账户的交易。

12. 会员国应提升能力，在国家层面(通过成功的机构间协作)和国际层面(关于金融部门威胁的信息共享倡议和协作)促进强有力的信息交流，以发现并防止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络能力逃避制裁的企图。各国政府应分享最佳做法，并传递给相关私营实体。

13. 专家小组建议，联合国有关机构每半年向委员会通报制裁对朝鲜平民及各机构在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内行动产生的意外影响。

附件

Annex 1: United States submission to the 1718 Committee of 11 June 2019

June 11, 2019

Dear Ambassador Christoph Heusgen,

On behalf of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Malta, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Peru, Spain, Slovak Republic, Ukraine, and the United States, I have the honor to submit to the 1718 Committee a request for the Committee Secretary to take the actions described in paragraph 5 of UNSCR 2397 because the DPRK has breached the 2019 annual cap for refined petroleum products. Attached, please find a report detailing observations of illicit North Korean refined petroleum imports. When these observed illicit refined petroleum imports and the reported imports are combined, the aggregate amount of refined petroleum imported into the DPRK is in excess of the 500,000 refined petroleum cap set in UNSCR 2397. Specifically, we request the 1718 Committee Secretary take the following actions:

- We request the 1718 Committee Secretary issue a public note verbale to all UN Member States, and for the Chair to issue a Committee press release to inform the general public that the DPRK has breached the UNSCR 2397 OP5 refined petroleum product quota for 2019 and order an immediate halt to all transfers of refined petroleum products to the DPRK until the end of the year.

- We further request the 1718 Committee Secretary update the website to include the illicit refined petroleum imports and show that the 2019 quota has been breached.

- We further request the 1718 Committee to include in this note verbale and press release a call on all member states to immediately exercise enhanced vigilance against the DPRK attempting to procure additional refined petroleum products and to prevent illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to vessels owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of or working in cooperation with the DPRK.

We request the Chair circulate our report to the 1718 Committee and our proposals for Committee action by today, June 11, 2018 under the regular 5-day NOP process. We thank you in advance for your assistance.

Sincerely,

David Yardley
Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations

Philipp Charwath
Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations

Mathias Bogaert
Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations

Julanar Green
Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations

Hani Stolina
1st Committee Expert
Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic
to the United Nations

José Singer
Special Envoy of the Dominican Republic
to the Security Council
Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic
to the United Nations

Antoine Michon
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Christoph Heusgen
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic
of Germany to the United Nations

Mr. Zoltan Varga
Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations

Ludovico Serra
Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of Italy to United Nations

Kosuke Amiya
Counsellor/ Alternate Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Agnese Vilde
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Latvia
to the United Nations

Ambassador Audra Plepytė
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Lithuania to the United Nations

Giovanni Buttigieg
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malta
to the United Nations New York

H.E. Ms. Amatlain E. Kabua
Ambassador & Permanent Representative of the
Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
to the United Nations

Ms Jane J. Chigiyal
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Federated States
of Micronesia to the United Nations

Joost van Dieren
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Renée Yap
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of New Zealand
to the United Nations

Kamil Mielus
Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of Poland to the United Nations

Enri Prieto
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations

Maria Palacios
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations

Peter Pindjak
Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic
to the United Nations

Olena Syrota
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Ukraine
to the United Nations

David Lee
Deputy Political Counselor
United States Mission to the United Nations

His Excellency
Christoph Heusgen,
Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)
New York, NY.

REPORT TO THE UN 1718 COMMITTEE:

NORTH KOREA'S BREACH OF THE UNSCR 2397 REFINED PETROLEUM CAP

(UNCLASSIFIED) The United States and its partners remain gravely concerned about the degree of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) violations that are occurring in relation to North Korea's (DPRK) import of refined petroleum products. UNSCR 2397 operative paragraph 5 restricts the DPRK to 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum imports per year subject to a mandatory reporting requirement. Any Member State supplying, selling, or transferring refined petroleum volumes to the DPRK is required to submit reports to the UNSC 1718 Committee informing it of these transfers within 30 days of the transfer in order to allow the Committee to maintain an accurate accounting of the DPRK's imports.

(UNCLASSIFIED) UNSCR 2375 operative paragraph 11 requires that UN Member States prohibit their nationals, entities and individuals subject to their jurisdiction, and their flag vessels from engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of goods or items being transferred to or from the DPRK with DPRK-flagged vessels. Nevertheless, the DPRK continues to conduct STS transfers as its primary means of importing refined petroleum. This report finds that the DPRK has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 500,000 barrel quota for 2019.

(UNCLASSIFIED) As STS transfers to DPRK-flagged vessels are explicitly prohibited by UNSCR 2375, the perpetrators involved in supplying refined petroleum products to DPRK-flagged tankers fail to report these volumes to the relevant UN Member State to avoid self-incrimination. Separately, there are observed deliveries occurring in select cases from non DPRK-flagged tankers. These deliveries are made by vessels likely under the control of the DPRK and whose associated volumes are not reported to the UN 1718 Committee by any Member State. These vessels include the NEW REGENT (IMO 8312497), the SEN LIN 01 (IMO 8910378), and the VIET TIN 01 (IMO 8508838) – see Table 1. The cumulative effect of these deliveries is that the UN 1718 Committee's official accounting of the DPRK's imports vastly underrepresents the volume of refined petroleum products that actually enter the DPRK via its fleet of oil tankers and other associated vessels. UNSCR 2397's provision limiting the DPRK's ability to import refined petroleum products is intended to tighten sanctions in response to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that threaten international peace and security and are prohibited by numerous UNSCRs. The restriction on the DPRK's refined petroleum imports is critical to maintaining pressure on the DPRK, including those parties responsible for its WMD program, to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of the DPRK. As long as the DPRK continues to import refined petroleum products with no accountability at the UN, UNSCR 2397 operative paragraph 5 does not have its intended effect.

(UNCLASSIFIED) In order to ensure the full and effective implementation of UNSCR 2397, there must be an established methodology to evaluate the volume of illicit refined petroleum products that enter the DPRK as a result of its UN-prohibited STS transfers with DPRK-flagged vessels or deliveries by non DPRK-flagged tankers that Member States fail to report to the UN

-2-

1718 Committee. As stated, the responsible Member States supplying this refined petroleum to DPRK-flagged tankers and vessels working on behalf of the DPRK via STS transfers are failing to report these volumes to the 1718 Committee, so an alternative methodology must be established. UN Member States now have one full calendar year of evidence that these volumes are not integrated into the 1718 Committee's official accounting of the DPRK's refined petroleum product import volumes.

(UNCLASSIFIED) This report seeks to once again establish the best possible methodology for an official accounting of the DPRK's refined product imports procured via illicit STS transfers with DPRK-flagged vessels and other delivery volumes that are not reported to the UN 1718 Committee. The DPRK imports refined petroleum products primarily via STS transfers. The DPRK operates a fleet of oil tankers capable of carrying and transiting petroleum and engaging in STS transfers. This tanker fleet is identified in a series of U.S. government maritime advisories released by the Departments of State and Treasury, and the U.S. Coast Guard. These tankers are constantly in transit seeking counterparties with which to conduct STS transfers in order to procure refined products to deliver to the DPRK. These tactics and patterns of behavior are well documented in the aforementioned U.S. government advisories.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Following the procurement of refined petroleum products via STS transfer, DPRK-flagged tankers and tankers working on behalf of the DPRK return to ports located in the DPRK that are equipped with oil unloading infrastructure in order to lift the refined petroleum products from the tankers so that they can enter circulation into the DPRK for consumption. The Nampo port in the Taedong River is the primary port used for tanker deliveries as it is outfitted with the necessary tanker unloading infrastructure, maintains substantial refined petroleum product storage facilities, and is serviced by rail lines that enable the transit of refined petroleum products to petroleum demand centers throughout the DPRK. It can be confidently assessed that this infrastructure, and the tankers utilizing it, carry only refined petroleum products given that any contamination of petroleum poses significant risk of damage to end use equipment of petroleum such as vehicles, electricity generators, and other machinery. As a result, this infrastructure is not utilized to transit other substances as it would pose a significant risk of contamination. The United States provided images of this infrastructure to the 1718 Committee and Panel of Experts on September 17, 2018 as part of a previous report on this matter. Those images are being resubmitted to accompany this report.

- The first image (Report Image 1) shows an overhead view of the Nampo port, the DPRK's largest marine import terminal, and the associated onshore refined petroleum product storage infrastructure. In the image, Nampo's offloading infrastructure can be seen clearly. On the right side of the image, a DPRK-flagged tanker can be seen anchored at Nampo's offloading buoy that connects to subsea pipelines to bring the refined petroleum products from tankers into Nampo's storage infrastructure prior to distribution. On the left side of the image, Nampo's piers can be seen where tankers also have the ability to unload directly into onshore pipelines feeding additional storage facilities for refined petroleum products.

-3-

- The second image (Report Image 2) shows the DPRK-flagged M/T YU JONG 2 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo petroleum products storage west port facility in the Taedong River on July 21, 2018 in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via illicit STS transfer.

- The third image (Report Image 3) shows the DPRK-flagged M/T AN SAN 1 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo petroleum products storage west port facility in the Taedong River on August 17, 2018 in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via illicit STS transfer.

- As with all STS transfers, the YU JONG 2 and AN SAN 1 shipments were not reported to the 1718 Committee as UNSCR 2397 requires.

(UNCLASSIFIED) This report submits additional imagery and data that thoroughly document the activities of the DPRK-flagged tanker fleet and tankers working on behalf of the DPRK in their pattern of sailing from the DPRK's territorial sea to areas of commercial vessel traffic to conduct STS transfers, and subsequently delivering the illicitly procured refined petroleum products to DPRK ports to unload. These images and maps demonstrating DPRK-flagged tanker movements clearly establish that the DPRK is undertaking these activities on a vast basis.

(UNCLASSIFIED) The United States and Japan have documented at least eight instances of STS transfers this year in which DPRK-flagged tankers received refined petroleum products from feeder tankers that have not been reported to the 1718 Committee for its official accounting of the DPRK's imports. Each of these STS transfers is described below.

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 2 January 2019, the North Korean-flagged tanker JI SONG 6 (IMO: 8898740) was observed moored alongside Sierra Leone-flagged TIANYOU (IMO: 8817007) in the Korea Bay (38-27N 124-22E) to conduct an STS transfer (Report Images 4-5). Following the STS transfer, the JI SONG 6 returned to Nampo for delivery; its transit path is demonstrated on the map in Report Image 4. On 7 January 2019, JI SONG 6 returned to Nampo and unloaded its refined product cargo.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 18 January 2019, the North Korean-flagged tanker AN SAN 1 (IMO: 7303803) was observed moored alongside an unidentified tanker of unknown nationality conducting an STS transfer of refined petroleum products (Report Images 6-7). On 11 February 2019, AN SAN 1 was observed at the Nampo offloading buoy discharging its refined product cargo into Nampo's storage facilities (Report Image 8).

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 24 January 2019, the North Korean-flagged tanker KUM JIN GANG 2 (IMO: 8708684) was observed moored alongside Cook Islands-flagged HONG MAN (IMO: 9170949) in the East China Sea conducting an STS transfer (Report Images 9-11). Following the STS transfer, the KUM JIN GANG 2 returned to for Nampo for delivery; its overall transit path is demonstrated on the map in Report Image 9. On 13

-4-

February 2019, KUM JIN GANG 2 was observed at the Nampo Buoy discharging refined petroleum (Report Image 12).

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 2 March 2019, the North Korean-flagged tanker SAEBYOL (IMO: 8916293) was observed moored alongside an unidentified tanker of unknown nationality conducting an STS transfer of refined petroleum products (Report Image 13). Following the STS transfer, the SAEBYOL returned to Nampo for delivery. On 8 March 2019, SAEBYOL was observed at the Nampo offloading buoy to lift its refined product cargo into Nampo's storage facilities (Report Image 14).

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 20 March 2019, the North Korean-flagged tanker YU SON (IMO: 8691702) was observed moored alongside an unidentified tanker of unknown nationality conducting an STS transfer of refined petroleum products (Report Images 15-17). Following the STS transfer, the YU SON returned to Nampo for delivery of its refined product cargo by 29 March (Report Image 18).

6. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 27 March 2019, North Korean-flagged UN PHA 2 (aka KUM GANG 3, IMO: 8660313) was observed moored alongside an unidentified tanker at coordinates 43-02N 131-54E conducting an STS transfer of refined petroleum products (Report Images 19-20). Following the STS transfer, the UN PHA 2 returned to Wonsan for delivery; its overall transit path is demonstrated on the map in Report Image 19. On 2 April 2019, KUM JIN GANG 2 was observed anchored at the Wonsan port to deliver its refined petroleum cargo (Report Image 21).

7. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 31 March 2019, North Korean-flagged CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313) was observed moored alongside Sierra Leone-flagged TIANYOU (IMO: 8817007) in the Korea Bay (38-28N 124-24E) conducting an STS transfer of refined petroleum products (Report Images 22-23). Following the STS transfer, the CHON MA SAN returned to Nampo for delivery; its transit path is demonstrated on the map in Report Image 22. On 3 April 2019, North Korean-flagged CHON MA SAN was observed at a pier in Nampo discharging its refined petroleum cargo (Report Image 24).

8. (UNCLASSIFIED) On 15 April 2019, North Korean-flagged MU BONG 1 (IMO: 8610461) was observed moored alongside an unidentified tanker in the Korea Bay (38-19N 124-19E) conducting an STS transfer of refined petroleum products (Report Images 25-26). Following the STS transfer, the MU BONG 1 returned to Nampo for delivery; its transit path is demonstrated on the map in Report Image 25. On 23 April 2019, North Korean-flagged MU BONG 1 was anchored in Nampo waiting to discharge its refined petroleum cargo (Report Image 27).

9. (UNCLASSIFIED) The DPRK also continues to evolve its tactics in order to maintain a consistent flow of illicit volumes of refined petroleum products into its ports. Report Image 28 depicts the formerly Panama-flagged and UN-sanctioned STS feeder vessel NEW REGENT (IMO 8312497; imagery of NEW REGENT – KUM UN SAN 3 STS transfer on June 7, 2018 previously shared with the Panel of Experts and 1718 Committee) docked in Nampo. As of April 23, the vessel delivered petroleum to Nampo on two occasions (March 28 and April 10) as listed in Table 1. The addition of the tanker

-5-

NEW REGENT to the DPRK's fleet indicates its continued efforts to maintain a network of feeder vessels under its control and which it uses to interact with DPRK-flagged or controlled tankers until action is taken by the UN 1718 Committee. Its designation for a global port entry ban likely resulted in its conversion from a feeder vessel to a delivery tanker.

(UNCLASSIFIED) As each of these STS transfers and deliveries of refined petroleum products into DPRK ports make clear, the DPRK continues to utilize illicit methods to procure volumes as it did in 2017 and 2018. Given that these import volumes remain unreported, it is necessary to account for these volumes in order to ensure that UNSCR 2397's import quota is properly implemented.

(UNCLASSIFIED) This report cannot provide an exact figure for each delivery, as that information is not readily available to any UN Member State other than DPRK, but instead seeks to establish three scenarios that track the degree to which a given tanker unloading refined petroleum into the DPRK is laden – one third laden (33 percent full), half laden (50 percent full), or completely laden (90 percent full). Given the relative scarcity of refined products in the DPRK, it is highly unlikely that every tanker deployed in search of fuel via STS transfer would return to DPRK ports with less than one third of its cargo capacity filled. The expenditure of resources and fuel consumption by the tanker itself during these journeys would not be justified if the tanker in question failed to fill above one third of its cargo capacity. Therefore, a one third laden scenario is employed as the floor baseline for this report.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Each of the above listed cases of documented STS transfers and subsequent delivery are assigned three values based on the capacity of the tanker involved. In addition to these nine cases, the United States has information indicating that an additional 70 instances of DPRK-flagged and controlled tanker deliveries were detected between the January 1, 2019 and April 23, 2019 period. Similarly, each of these deliveries is assigned three values for each of the scenarios.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Table 1 below documents each of these 70 deliveries and provides an associated volume for each of the three scenarios.

-6-

Table 1: 2019 DPRK and Other Tanker Deliveries and Associated Volumes (in barrels)						
Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	1-Jan-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	4-Jan-19	1,998.00	659.00	999.00	1,798.20
Nampo	Ji Song 6	7-Jan-19	1,250.00	413.00	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	8-Jan-19	1,665.00	549.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	8-Jan-19	1,966.00	649.00	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	11-Jan-19	2,100.00	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	12-Jan-19	1,250.00	413.00	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	12-Jan-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	14-Jan-19	1,665.00	549.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	14-Jan-19	2,507.00	827.00	1,253.50	2,256.30
Najin	Song Won	16-Jan-19	2,101.00	693.00	1,050.50	1,890.90
Nampo	Nam San 8	17-Jan-19	3,150.00	1,040.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	18-Jan-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	19-Jan-19	3,003.00	991.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Kum Un San	19-Jan-19	2,070.00	683.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Pu Ryong (Kum Un San 3)	22-Jan-19	3,279.00	1,082.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Chon Ma San	23-Jan-19	3,565.00	1,176.00	1,782.50	3,208.50
Nampo	An San 1	23-Jan-19	3,003.00	991.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	23-Jan-19	1,998.00	659.00	999.00	1,798.20
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	24-Jan-19	817.00	270.00	408.50	735.30
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	25-Jan-19	3,003.00	991.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Songnim	Yu Phyong 5	26-Jan-19				

-7-

			1,966.00	649.00	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	28-Jan-19	1,665.00	549.00	832.50	1,498.50
Songnim	Yu Phyong 5	30-Jan-19	1,966.00	649.00	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Yu Son	4-Feb-19	3,398.00	1,121.00	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	4-Feb-19	2,100.00	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Pu Ryong (Kum Un San 3)	5-Feb-19	3,279.00	1,082.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Najin	Song Won	5-Feb-19	2,101.00	693.00	1,050.50	1,890.90
Chongjin	Nam San 8	6-Feb-19	3,150.00	1,040.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Najin	Kum Un San	7-Feb-19	2,070.00	683.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Saebyol	9-Feb-19	1,150.00	380.00	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	22-Feb-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	25-Feb-19	817.00	270.00	408.50	735.30
Nampo	Viet Tin 01	25-Feb-19	5,453.00	1,799.49	2,726.50	4,907.70
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	4-Mar-19	1,966.00	649.00	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Mar-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Saebyol	8-Mar-19	1,150.00	380.00	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	10-Mar-19	2,100.00	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	11-Mar-19	817.00	270.00	408.50	735.30
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	11-Mar-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	12-Mar-19	1,966.00	649.00	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Chon Ma San	16-Mar-19	3,565.00	1,176.00	1,782.50	3,208.50
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	19-Mar-19	1,998.00	659.00	999.00	1,798.20
Chongjin	An San 1	20-Mar-19	3,003.00	991.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Nam San 8	22-Mar-19	3,150.00	1,040.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	22-Mar-19	2,507.00	827.00	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	23-Mar-19				


-8-

			1,665.00	549.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Mar-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Chongjin	Kum Jin Gang 3 (aka Wan Heng 11)	25-Mar-19	4,983.00	1,644.00	2,491.50	4,484.70
Chongjin	Kum Jin Gang 3 (aka Wan Heng 11)	27-Mar-19	4,983.00	1,644.00	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	New Regent	28-Mar-19	4,999.00	1,649.67	2,499.50	4,499.10
Nampo	Yu Son	29-Mar-19	3,398.00	1,121.00	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	29-Mar-19	2,100.00	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Wonsan	Un Pha 2	2-Apr-19	1,205.00	398.00	602.50	1,084.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	3-Apr-19	817.00	270.00	408.50	735.30
Nampo	Chon Ma San	3-Apr-19	3,565.00	1,176.00	1,782.50	3,208.50
Nampo	Kum Un San	3-Apr-19	2,070.00	683.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Apr-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Saebyol	8-Apr-19	1,150.00	380.00	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	8-Apr-19	1,665.00	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Chon Ma San	8-Apr-19	3,565.00	1,176.00	1,782.50	3,208.50
Nampo	New Regent	10-Apr-19	4,999.00	1,649.67	2,499.50	4,499.10
Nampo	Pu Ryong (Kum Un San 3)	10-Apr-19	3,279.00	1,082.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	11-Apr-19	2,507.00	827.00	1,253.50	2,256.30
Chongjin	Nam San 8	17-Apr-19	3,150.00	1,040.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	17-Apr-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	18-Apr-19	1,998.00	659.00	999.00	1,798.20
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 3 (aka Wan Heng 11)	18-Apr-19	4,983.00	1,644.00	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	19-Apr-19	1,665.00	549.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Apr-19	1,159.00	382.00	579.50	1,043.10
Total (Barrels)				**401,057.10**	**607,736.25**	**1,093,925.25**

-9-

(UNCLASSIFIED) In the scenario in which all of the 70 deliveries included fully laden tankers, the DPRK has more than doubled the UNSCR 2397 import quota as of April 23 with 1.093 million barrels of imports. If all the DPRK deliveries included only half-laden tankers – a rather unlikely scenario – the DPRK is still already in breach of the UNSCR 2397 import quota with illicit import volumes of more than 607,000 barrels. Finally, even in the highly unlikely scenario that every single tanker delivery that has taken place in 2019 only included a one-third laden vessel (a scenario in which DPRK imports constitute over 400,000 barrels), the DPRK would still be in breach of the UNSCR 2397 import quota when the year-to-date UN reported volumes are combined with the DPRK's illicit imports – see Table 2. As of submission of this report, China and Russia collectively have reported 92,229.66 barrels of refined petroleum product transfers to the UN 1718 Committee for the months of January and February, which would bring the DPRK's overall total of refined product imports in 2019 to over 493,000. When China and Russia report transfers for March and April, the one-third laden scenario would surpass the 500,000 barrel quota presuming these reports are within even a fraction of monthly averages from the prior 14 months or reporting.

-10-


Table 2: North Korea's Total Refined Petroleum Import Volume
1,100,000.00
1,000,000.00
900,000.00
800,000.00
700,000.00
600,000.00
500,000.00
400,000.00
300,000.00
200,000.00
100,000.00
-
UNSCR 2397 Quota
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
Delivery Volume at 33% Laden
Delivery Volume at 50% Laden
Delivery Volume at 90% Laden
UN Reported Volumes
Cumulative Total (33% Laden, UN-reported Volumes)
Cumulative Total (50% Laden, UN-reported Volumes)
Cumulative Total (90% Laden, UN-reported Volumes)

-11-

(UNCLASSIFIED) Given the evidence provided herein, and that all three scenarios of illicit import volumes demonstrate that the DPRK has breached the UNSCR 2397 import cap, we ask for the support of the Panel, the 1718 Committee, and Member States in seeking the 1718 Committee's immediate determination that the cap has been breached, and to subsequently notify UN Member States of the breach and confirm that all subsequent transfers of refined petroleum to the DPRK must immediately halt. Similarly, the Panel of Experts is requested to review this report's analysis and underlying evidence in order to include this assessment in the 2019 mid-term report on the volumes of imports to the DPRK and the associated implications for the implementation of UNSCR 2397's refined product import quota.

Source: Member State

Annex 2: Communication of the Russian Federation to the 1718 Committee of 18 June 2019

Dear Chair, colleagues,

On the issue of refined petroleum cap Russia would like to recall the provisions of UNSCR 2397, which stipulates that the Committee notifies all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75, 90 and 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts of 500 000 barrels have been reached, and only in the latter case (95 per cent), such notification is accompanied by an information about the requirement to immediately cease further deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year.

In the absence of the aforementioned notification of the Committee, export of refined petroleum products to the DPRK is fully in line with the requirements of the 1718 sanctions regime.

We are still considering the information provided by the US regarding the cases of alleged ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to the DPRK, as well as the results of the computer modeling. We've also noticed that out of 79 cases of alleged STS transfers only 9 imagery sets were provided. We believe that at the current stage it is premature for the Committee to make a conclusive decision regarding the US proposal and to cease refined petroleum export to the DPRK.

It is with this understanding we suggest the US provide the 1718 Panel of Experts with appropriate information regarding reported cases of STS transfers and with the methodology of petroleum calculations to study it thoroughly and impartially.

Upon receiving the results of such a study we are ready to return to the consideration of this issue with a view to eventually making an objective decision.

In the meantime Russia would like to put the US proposal **on hold**.

Alexey

Source: Member State

Annex 3: Bareboat charter agreement of the *Viet Tin 01*

CÔNG TY CỔ PHẦN VẬN TẢI VIỆT TÍN

BAREBOAT CHARTER

---o0o---

Singapore, 04th January 2019

REGISTERED OWNERS	: VIET TRUST SHIPPING CORPORATION 62C VO THI SAU ST. TAN DINH WARD, DIST 1, HOCHIMINH CITY, VIETNAM.,
BROKER	: KLJ MARINE SERVICES PTE LTD 27 WEST COAST HIGHWAY, #02-22 WESTWAY, SINGAPORE 117867.
CHARTERERS	: HAPPY SHIPPING CO., LTD NO 16 EAST, XIHUA VILLAGE LONG TIAN TOWN, FUQING CITY FUJIAN PROVINCE CHINA
VESSEL	: M/T "VIET TIN 01" - AS PER ATTACHED Q88
TENTATIVE ITINERARY	: VESSEL CURRENTLY IN STRAITS
LAST 3 CARGOES	: CPP/CPP/CPP
SPEED & CONSUMPTION	: AS PER ATTACHED

THE SAME, ARE ABOUT, UPTO MAXIMUM BEAUFORT SCALE 4, NO ADVERSE CURRENTS OR HIGH SWELL, EXCLUDING PERIODS IN SHALLOW OR CONGESTED WATERS, EXCLUDING ALL CANAL TRANSITS, EXCLUDING ALL SHORT SEA VOYAGES OF LESS THAN 48 HOURS IN DURATION, PILOT STATION TO PILOT STATION, EXCLUDING ANY HEATING REQUIREMENT AND ANY TANK CLEANING REQUIREMENTS

DELIVERY	: AFPS SINGAPORE/PORT KLANG MALAYSIA/ BATAM INDONESIA
RE-DELIVERY	: DLOSP SINGAPORE
LAYCAN	: **18TH-20TH OF JANNUARY 2019**
HIRE	: **USD 4,600 PDPR**
PERIOD	: MINIMUM 6 MONTHS, FOLLOWED BY AN ADDITIONAL 6 MORE MONTHS IN CHARTERERS' OPTION THEREAFTER DECLARABLE 30 DAYS PRIOR REDELIVERY, ~~FOLLOWED BY AN ADDITIONAL 3 MORE MONTHS IN HARTERERS' OPTION THEREAFTER DECLARABLE 30 DAYS PRIOR REDELIVERY, FOLLOWED BY AN ADDITIONAL 3 MORE MONTHS (+/- 15 DAYS) IN CHARTERERS' OPTION THEREAFTER DECLARABLE 30 DAYS PRIOR REDELIVERY~~
TRADING RANGE	: SOUTH ASIA TO NORTH ASIA RANGE ONLY, HENCE INCLUDING INDONESIA, SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA, BRUNEI, TIMOR-LESTE, MYANMAR, THAILAND, CAMBODIA, VIETNAM, PHILIPPINES, CHINA [redacted]

Page 1 of 5

TRADING EXCLUSION : EXCLUDING ANY UN OR US OR EU SANTIONED OR EMBARGOED AREAS, VESSEL NOT TO TRADE IN ANY ICE OR ICE BOUND PORTS/BERTHS/PLACES, NOR VESSEL TO FORCE ICE OR FOLLOW ICE BREAKERS, AND NOT TO TRADE IN ANY WAR OR WAR-LIKE PLACES OR PORTS.

IN THE EVENT OF VESSEL BEING ARRESTED/DETAINED/BOYCOTTED/DESTROYED BY A THIRD PARTY DUE TO THE CHARTERERS FAULTS TO SEND THE VESSEL TO THE SANTIONED OR EMBARGOED AREA AND IN ANY WAR OR WAR-LIKE PLACES OR PORTS, **THE CHARTERERS OBLIGED TO BUY THE VESSEL FROM THE OWNERS** AT PRICE :USD 1,200,000 (ONE MILLION, TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND UNITED OF AMERICA DOLLARS)

CARGOES : ALL CLEAN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS PLUS ALL OTHER PRODUCTS AS PER VESSEL'S CERTIFICATE OF FITNESS (AS ATTACHED)

PRESENTATION : CARGO TANKS TO BE WATER WHITE STANDARD ON DELIVER CARGO TANKS TO BE WATER WHITE STANDARD UPON RE-DELIVERY

COMMISSION : **NONE**

CHARTER PARTY : SHELL TIME 4 ISSUED DECEMBER 1984

OTHERS

- ALL TRANSHIPMENT EQUIPMENTS INCLUDING FENDERS,HOSES,REDUCERS ARE TO BE ARRANGED AND PROVIDED BY CHARTERERS AT CHARTERERS' ACCOUNT. OWNERS WILL COOPERATE, BUT WITH NO GUARANTEE, IN SUPPLY OF ANY SHORTFALL OF EQUIPMENTS, PROVIDED THAT SUCH EQUIPMENTS ARE AVAILABLE ON OWNERS' VESSEL.

- IF REQUESTED BY CHARTERERS, CHARTERERS ARE ALLOWED TO LIAISE WITH/SEND WRITTEN OR VERBAL ORDERS TO THE MASTER/VESSEL/AGENTS DIRECTLY FOR ALL LOAD/DISCHARGE OPERATIONS, WITH NO OFFICIAL VOYAGE ORDERS/DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVIDED TO THE OWNERS FOR THE ENTIRE B.B CHARTER PERIOD. OWNERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DELAY/DIRECT COSTS/INDIRECT COSTS INCURRED FOR ALL MISCOMMUNICATIONS DONE IN THIS MANNER.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS TO BE AS PER SHELLTIME 4 ISSUED DECEMBER 1984 WITH LOGICAL AMENDMENTS AS PER BELOW:
CL 1 (A) LINE 7 ADD AT THE END "VIETNAM REGISTER (VR)"
(B) LINE 8 DELETE "CRUDE PETROLEUM AND/OR ITS PRODUCTS" AND REPLACE AS PER MAIN TERMS
(E) LINE 14 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "380"
(H) LINE 22 DELETE "FORM B" INSERT "VESSEL'S Q88"
LINE 23 DELETE "FORM B" INSERT "VESSEL'S Q88"

CL 3 (III) LINE 56 DELETE "30" INSERT "7"

CL 4 LINE 65 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "MINIMUM 6 MONTHS, FOLLOWED BY AN ADDITIONAL 6 MORE MONTHS IN CHARTERERS' OPTION THEREAFTER DECLARABLE 30 DAYS PRIOR REDELIVERY, FOLLOWED BY AN ADDITIONAL 1 MORE YEAR (+/- 15 DAYS) IN CHARTERERS' OPTION THEREAFTER DECLARABLE 30 DAYS PRIOR REDELIVERY"

Page 2 of 5

LINE 66 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE AS PER MAIN TERMS
LINE 68-72 DELETE "IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD,......AS A CONSEQUENCE OF SUCH ORDER."
LINE 80-81 DELETE "THAT" INSERT "THE SAFETY OF THE VESSEL FOR"
DELETE "SHALL CONFORM TO STANDARDS NOT LESS THAN THOSE SET OUT IN THE LATEST PUBLISHED EDITION OF THE ICS/OCIMF SHIP TO SHIP TRANSFER GUIDE"
LINE 82 DELETE "A PORT IN" INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "ARRIVAL FIRST PILOT STATION SINGAPORE"
LINE 83 DELETE "AT OWNERS' OPTION"
DELETE "A PORT IN" AND INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "DROPPING LAST OUTWARDS SEA PILOT SINGAPORE"
ADD AT THE END OF THE CLAUSE "OWNERS ARE TO GIVE CHARTERERS IMMEDIATE APPROXIMATE NOTICE OF DELIVERY UPON FIXING. FOLLOWING THIS OWNERS ARE TO GIVE CHARTERERS DEFINITE NOTICE OF DELIVERY INCLUDING DATE AND PLACE 10, 7, 5, 3, 2, 1 DAY PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO CHARTERERS. OWNERS ARE TO ADVISE CHARTERERS IMMEDIATELY IF THERE IS ANY CHANGE OF MORE THAN 12 HOURS TO THE ACTUAL NOTICES."

CL 5 LINE 85-86 ADD IN BLANK SPACES AS PER MAIN TERMS

CL 7 LINE 97 DELETE "(EXCEPT FUEL USED FOR DOMESTIC SERVICES)"

CL 8 LINE 105 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "USD 4,600"

CL 9 LINE 107 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "OWNERS' DESIGNATED BANK ACCOUNT"
LINE 108 DELETE "ACCOUNT"
INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "UNITED STATES DOLLARS"
DELETE "PER CALENDAR MONTH IN ADVANCE" INSERT "HIRE TO BE PAID FROM TIME OF DELIVERY UNTIL THE LAST DAY OF THE MONTH, AFTERWHICH HIRE TO BE PAID ON MONTHLY BASIS ON 1ST DAY OF EVERY CALENDAR MONTH"

CL 10 LINE 132 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "85"

CL 11 DELETE ALL
DELIVERY AT THE LAST PURCHASED PRICES, TO BE SUPPORTED BY BUNKER SUPPLIER'S INVOICE(S). OWNERS TO PAY FOR BUNKERS ROB ON RE-DELIVERY AT LAST PURCHASED PRICES, TO BE SUPPORTED BY BUNKER SUPPLIER'S INVOICE(S)."

CL 17 LINE 180 AFTER "UNDER THIS CHARTER" ADD "AT CHARTERERS' ACCOUNT'
LINE 181-182 DELETE ", OWNERS FINDING PROVISIONS......WHILE ON BOARD THE VESSEL"

CL 22 LINE 258 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "EVERY TWO (2) YEARS"
LINE 259 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE " SIX (6) MONTHS"
LINE 259 AFTER "CHARTERERS SHALL" INSERT "ON BEST ENDEAVOUR BASIS"
LINE 261 AFTER "PRACTICABLE." INSERT "FOR SAKE OF CLARITY, THE VESSEL JUST FINISHED HER DRYDOCK THIS YEAR (2016), THE NEXT DRYDOCK SHOULD BE SOMETIME IN 2018."

CL 24 LINE 303-320 DELETE "AVERAGE SPEED......AS THE CASE MAY BE" AND REPLACE AS PER MAIN TERMS

CL 29 LINE 391 INSERT IN BLANK SPACE "180"

CL 33 DELETE ALL

Page 3 of 5

CL 41 LAW AND LITIGATION: DELETE ENGLAND AND INSERT SINGAPORE

CHARTERERS' ADDITIONAL CLAUSES (CL 43-51):

CL 43 PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL CLAUSE

THIS TRANSACTION IS TO BE KEPT STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL BY ALL PARTIES DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED AND NO DISCLOSURE OF THE SAME TO ANY THIRD PARTY SHALL BE PERMITTED.

CL 44 BILL OF LADING/INDEMNITY CLAUSE

DISCHARGING PORT(S) OR RANGE(S) AS SHOWN IN BILL(S) OF LADING NOT TO CONSTITUTE A DECLARATION OF DISCHARGING PORT(S) OR RANGE(S) OR LOCATION (S) AND CHARTERERS TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO ORDER THE VESSEL TO ANY PORT WITHIN THE TERMS OF THIS CHARTER.

CL 45 VESSEL'S TAXES CLAUSE

ALL TAXES AND DUES ON THE VESSEL, AND ANY ADDITIONAL TAXES AND CHARGES DUE TO VESSEL'S FLAG ARE TO BE FOR OWNERS' ACCOUNT.

CL 46 THIRD-PARTY ARREST CLAUSE

IN THE EVENT OF VESSEL BEING ARRESTED/DETAINED/BOYCOTTED BY A THIRD PARTY DUE TO OWNERS' FAULT, OWNERS AGREE TO ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL PENALTIES AND THE VESSEL SHALL BE CONSIDERED OFF-HIRE DURING ANY DELAY OR DETENTION ARISING THERE FROM.

CL 47 EXCESS BERTH OCCUPACY CLAUSE

IF AFTER DISCONNECTION OF HOSES VESSEL REMAINS ALONGSIDE BERTH EXCLUSIVELY FOR VESSEL'S PURPOSES, OWNERS SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL DIRECT AND/OR INDIRECT COSTS INCURRED.

CL 48 CREWS CLAUSE

CHARTERERS WILL APPOINT THEIR OWN CREWS TO SAIL WITH THE SHIP. THEREFORE WILL TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR SALARY AND COMPENSATION. CHARTERERS SHALL COMMIT THE OWNERS TO CONTROL THEIR CREWS FOR KEEP THE SHIP IN GOOD CONDITION, ELSE CHARTERERS WILL TAKE RESPONSIBILITY IF IN ANY LOSSES/DAMAGES OF THE SHIP CAUSING FROM THEIR CREWS.

CL 49 TANK CLEANING CLAUSE

OWNERS SHALL CLEAN TANKS, GAS FREE AND HAND OVER THE SHIP TO CHARTERERS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVE TO INSPECT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THAT THEY ARE IN ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS TO PERFORM THE CARRIAGE OF THE CARGO DURING THE ENTIRE TC PERIOD. IF ANY TANKS ARE, UPON INSPECTION, DEEMED UNSUITABLE BY CHARTERER AND/OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. ALL ADDITIONAL CLEANING REQUIRED SHAL BE CARRY OUT BY OWNERS AT THEIR EXPENSE AND TIME.

UPON COMPLTION OF BB PERIOD, CHARTERER SHALL CLEAN TANKS, GAS FREE AND HAND OVERTHE SHIP TO OWNER OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVE TO INSPECT THE TANKS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THAT THEY ARE IN ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS.IF ANY TANKS ARE, UPON INSPECTION, DEEMED UNSUITABLE BY OWNER AND/OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. ALL ADDITIONAL CLEANING REQUIRED SHAL BE CARRY OUT BY CHARTERER AT THEIR EXPENSE AND TIME.

CW

CL 50 INSOLVENCY CLAUSE

IN THE EVENT THAT OWNERS FILE FOR AND/OR SUFFER INSOLVENCY OR OTHER FURTHER PROTECTION, REHABILITATION, WINDING UP, BANKRUPTCY OR ANY OTHER SIMILAR OR EQUIVALENT PROTECTION, THE CHARTERERS HAVE THE OPTION OF CANCELLING THIS CHARTER PARTY WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

THE CHARTERERS	THE OWNERS
HAPPY SHPPING CO., LTD. Authorised signature	CÔNG TY CỔ PHẦN VẬN TẢI VIỆT TÍN DIRECTOR NGUYEN THI MAI LAN

Page 5 of 5

Source: The Panel

Annex 4: Manifest of cargo loaded onto the *Viet Tin 01*

51 Banyan Avenue
Singapore 627812

Telephone +65 68967300
Fax No: +65 65152943
Website: www.vopakasia.com

Vopak

MANIFEST

Order Number: 202680

Date: 01/02/2019

MV/SS: VIET TIN 01
FROM: SINGAPORE
TO: ULSAN, SOUTH KOREA

CONSIGNEE: TO THE ORDER OF TO THE ORDER OF "T ENERGY INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD."

Product		KL @ OBS	KL @ 15C	Metric Ton	Barrels@60F	Long Ton
UNLEADED GASOLINE 92R		820.270	811.530	595.574	5,108	586.170
	Total:	820.270	811.530	595.574	5,108	586.170

Remarks: CLEAN ON BOARD

Vessel: VIET TIN 01
Port of Registry : Sai Gon
Official No : VNSG-1880-TD
Call Sign : 3WBO
GRT : 2998
NRT : 1599
M.E.P : 2100Kw

Master/Agent Signature

Document Number: MFT-507710-008785

02241901022019

Scanned by CamScanner

Source: Member State

Annex 5: Vessels documented through imagery conducting ship-to-ship transfers of coal off the Gulf of Tonkin and offloaded at Qisha

#	STS Transfer Date	Vessel	Offload Date
1	5 September 2018	*Paek Yang San* IMO: 9020534 DPRK-flagged	By 23 December 2018
2	21 September 2018	*Ka Rim Chon* IMO: 8314811 DPRK-flagged	
3	23 September 2018	*Pho Phyong* IMO: 8417962 DPRK-flagged	
4	24 October 2018	*Pho Phyong* IMO: 8417962 DPRK-flagged	By 27 December 2018
5	25 October 2018	*Tae Yang* IMO: 8306929 DPRK-flagged	
6	15 February 2019	*Asia Honor* IMO: 8405220 Unknown-flagged (formerly Comoros-flagged)	By 7 March 2019

Source: Member State

Annex 6.1: Response from the People's Republic of China to the queries from the Panel

1. S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC. 26

China attaches great importance to the ship-to-ship transfers and smuggling issue. The competent Chinese authorities including the Coastal Guard has taken a series of measures to strength the patrolling and monitoring in relevant sea areas and fully implement the Security Council resolutions. The information provided by the Panel lacks timeliness and cannot lead to on-site investigation. The information of relevant vessels is ambiguous and lacks accuracy, which does not constitute a full evidence chain or basis for further investigation.

Based on China's investigation, all of the coal vessels berthed at Qisha port have legal importing documents, and the origin of the coal is not the DPRK. In fact, most of the bulk cargo ships are very similar in shape, and it is imprudent to make association between the vessels involved in the ship-to-ship transfers with the ones berthed at Qisha port merely based on the satellite images.

Source: Member State

Annex 6.2: Response from the People's Republic of China to the queries from the Panel

2. S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC. 49

China has seriously implemented relevant provision of the Security Council resolutions that prohibits procuring fishing rights from the DPRK. The competent Chinese authorities have prohibited ocean fishing operations in the DPRK sea areas, strengthened control and law-enforcement on illegal fishing activities in the sea areas between China and the DPRK, and urged fishing companies to conduct fishing operations in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. According to our investigation, "琼东渔 12122" is not a fishing vessel legally registered in China. The flag state and vessel identification could not be verified simply based on the painted ship name. We hope the Panel does not include such fragmented information in the report.

Source: Member State

Annex 7: Document showing Qingdao Global Shipping Co Ltd as *Dong Thanh's*

TO: THE CAPTAIN OF MV DONG THANH

FM: METRO OCEAN LIMITED

MV. CAPTAIN GEORGE K – VOYAGE INSTRUCTION DD 3RD APRIL 2019

DEAR CAPTAIN:

WE ARE QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED AS THE APPOINTED/AUTHORISED OPERATOR FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE CHTRS/METRO OCEAN LIMITED AND WELCOME YOU AND YOUR CREW TO THIS FIXTURE.

PLS NOTE THAT YR GOOD VSL WL BE DELIVERED TO CHTRS/ METRO OCEAN LIMITED ON DLOSP DAVAO PORT WITHIN LAYCAN 0001LT 3RD ~ 2359LT 4TH APRIL 2019.

PLS INFORM THE BUNKER ROB ON DELIVERY.

CHTRS:
METRO OCEAN LIMITED
ADD: FLAT/RM A20/F KIU FU COMMERCIAL BLDG 300 LOCKHART ROAD, WAN CHAI, HONG KONG.

CHTRS VSL OPERATOR:
QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED
ATTENTION: MR. LIMAO ZHANG MBL: +86-18866421365 E-MAIL: op@globalqd.com

VOYAGE INSTRUCTIONS:

AA: TCT MAIN TERMS:

01. DELY: DLOSP DAVAO PORT ATDNHINC

02. LAYCAN: 0001LT 3RD ~ 2359LT 4TH APRIL. 2019.

03. 1 TCT VIA SP(S), SB(S), SA(S), AAAA,AWIWL WITH HARMLESS, LAWFUL CARGO ALWAYS W/I INL (INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATIONAL LIMITS). TRADING FIRM INTENTION: VIA INDONESIA WITH LAWFUL & HARMLESS COAL TO MALAYSIA.

DURATION ABT 17 DAYS WOG.

04. REDEL: DLOSP 1SP MALAYSIA, INT. KUANTAN PORT.

05. BUNKER CL:

B.O.D.: IFO/380CST AND MGO, **PLS ADVISE:**

vessel operator

Note: Metro Ocean is the sub-charterer of the *Dong Thanh*, and is located in the same building as Qingdao Global Shipping Group Ltd (former Qingdao Global Shipping Co, Ltd).
Source: The Panel

Annex 8: Eko Setyamoko and Pt. Bara Makmur Sadayana company

[Official Translation]

[logo]

PT. BARA MAKMUR SADAYANA

COAL & MINERALS TRADING COMPANY

Number : 268/BMS-MBSS/IV/2019

Enclosure : -

Re : Request for the Replacement of the Coal Carrier for Ship-to-Ship Transshipment

Head, the Office of Customs and Excise Supervision and Service,
Customs-B Mid-level Type (KPPBC TMP B), Balikpapan
in Balikpapan

In reference to the letter from the Head of KPPBC TMP B Balikpapan under number: S-624/WBC.16/KPP.MP.01/2019 dated 02 April 2019 re: Approval of the Supervision of the Ship-to-Ship Transshipment, we would like to convey that the motor vessel MV. First Bridge has cancelled its departure for Indonesia because of cancellation by the ship owner. Accordingly, we would like to notify you of the replacement of the motor vessel that will be conducting the Ship-to-Ship Transshipment with the following data:

No.	Data	Previously	Replaced with
1.	CARRIER		
	a. Name	MV. WISE HONEST	MV. WISE HONEST

- 1 -

[redacted]
SWORN & AUTHORIZED TRANSLATOR
[redacted]

	b. Ship-to-ship Unloading	MV. FIRST BRIDGE	MV. DONG THANH
2.	ESTIMATED DATE OF SHIP-TO-SHIP UNLOADING	02 April 2019	06 April 2019

This request has, therefore, been submitted truthfully.

We declare our willingness to comply with prevailing laws and regulations.

Jakarta, 02 April 2019

PT. BARA MAKMUR SADAYANA

[*signed*]

Eko Setyamoko

[redacted] a sworn and authorized translator, by virtue of Jakarta Capital Territory Governor's Decree No. 2228/2001, practicing in Jakarta, do solemnly and sincerely declare that the foregoing document is a true and faithful translation from Indonesian into English of the original version.

- 2 -

Jakarta [redacted]

[redacted]


SWORN & AUTHORIZED TRANSLATOR

[redacted]

Source: The Panel

Annex 9: Certificates of origin containing false information

Certificate of origin for coal on board the *Wise Honest*



1. Exporter (name, address, country)
OPT-UGOL
RUSSIA, KEMEROVO OBLAST, KEMEROVO
KOMMERCHESKAYA STREET BUILDG 22 OFFICE 1

ORIGINAL № 7001014541

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN
Issued in the Russian Federation

2. Consegnee (name, address, country)
PT BARA MAKMUR SADAYANA.
GEDUNG WISMA MONTEX 9TH FLOOR.
ASIA AFRICA ROAD, NO 133-137, JAKARTA, INDONESIA.

3. Means of transport and route
Transport: WISE HONEST
Route: Loaded Nakhodka Russia
Discharged Samarinda Port in Indonesia

4 For official use

5 Country of origin
Russian Federation

6. Supplementary details
Bill of lading No 20180316 dd 16.03.2018

7 Item number	8. Description of goods	9 Number and kind of packages	10. Gross weight or other quantity
	ANTHRACITE COAL	IN BULK	26 500 M/T

11. Certification
It is hereby certified that the declaration by the exporter is correct
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY NAKHODKA CITY
Place, date, signature, name and stamp of certifying authority

12. Declaration by the exporter
The undersigned hereby declares that the above details and statements are correct, that the goods are of origin of the country shown ib box No 5: that the goods are exported to
INDONESIA
(importing country)
Place, date, signature, name and stamp of certifying authority

Source: The Panel

Reply from the Russian Federation on the Certificate of origin for coal on board the *Wise Honest*

Постоянное представительство
Российской Федерации
при Организации
Объединенных Наций

Phone: (212) 861 4900
Fax: (212) 628 0252

Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67th Street
New York, NY 10065

No. 2928/n

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and referring to the inquiry by the Panel dated 24 June 2019 (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.45) has the honour to transmit the following.

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the city of Nakhodka has never issued the Certificate of Origin # 7001014541, mentioned in your inquiry. Moreover, the copy of the document attached to your letter contains definitive signs of forgery and lacks a form number for the Certificate.

The Russian Federation has no information on the submission of applications by "OPT-I GOL" to Federal agencies for the issuance of any Certificates of Origin, as well as of the participation of this company in the transportation (export) of coal from the territory of the Russian Federation onboard of the "Wise Honest". Russian competent authorities also do not have any information on the issuance of any Certificates of Origin with the mentioning of this ship in line 3 ("Means of transport and route").

Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Source: Member State

2

Given the above the Russian Federation has no information on the contact details of the individuals in "OPT-I GOL" or any other company that have requested a Certificate for the purposes of transporting coal onboard of the "Wise Honest". The ship itself from 1 January 2018 until June this year has not entered the region of activity of the Nakhodka customs authorities or of the Far East Customs Directorate.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation takes this opportunity to convey to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, "29" July 2019

Certificate of origin carried for coal transshipped from the *Wise Honest* on board the *Dong Thanh*

建龍(香港)國際贸易有限公司

JIANLONG (HONGKONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED

ADD.: ROOM 1201, 12/F., SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT BUILDING,
48 - 62 HENNESSY ROAD, WANCHAI, HONG KONG

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN

TO WHOM MAY CONCERNS

DESCRIPTION OF GOODS:	INDONESIAN COAL
LOADING PORT:	TELUK BALIKPAPAN, INDONESIA
DISCHARGING PORT:	KEMAMAN PORT, MALAYSIA
VESSEL NAME:	MV.DONG THANH VOY.03-19
BILL OF LADING DATE:	12 APRIL, 2019
BILL OF LADING WEIGHT:	26,400 MTS

WE HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ON BOARD THE **MV.DONG THANH VOY.03-19** WHICH SALED FROM **TELUK BALIKPAPAN, INDONESIA** ON **12 APRIL, 2019** THERE WERE SHIPPED **26,400 MTS** OF **INDONESIAN COAL** WHOLLY ORIGINATED FROM **TELUK BALIKPAPAN, INDONESIA.**

For and on behalf of:

JIANLONG (HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED

For and on behalf of
JIANLONG (HONGKONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED
建龍(香港)國際貿易有限公司

Authorized Signature(s)

Source: The Panel

Explanation from Jianlong (Hong Kong) International on the certificate of origin issued for the coal on board the *Dong Thanh*. The company had issued its certificate of origin based on and in addition to a certificate of origin issued by Eko Setyamoko’s company Pt Bara Makmur Sadayana for the coal on board the *Dong Thanh*.

JIANLONG (HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED
ROOM 1201, 12/F., SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT BUILDING, 48-62 HENNESSY ROAD, WANCHAI, HONG KONG

The Panel of Experts established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874
[redacted]

12 July 2019

Dear Sirs,

Enquiry Regarding Coal On-board M/V DONG THANH (the “Vessel”)

We refer to your letter dated 21 June 2019 in relation to this matter and write in order to reply and address the issues raised therein.

Jianlong (Hong Kong) International Trade Co., Limited is a trading company which trades commodities (mainly iron ore, coke, coal and steel) on an international basis.

In this instance, we were in the middle of a series of sale contracts. The coal which was ultimately carried on-board the Vessel was sold to us by a company called Well Fortune (HK) Industrial Ltd (“**Sellers**”). We, in turn, had a contract to sell the cargo on to Eastern Steel Sdn. Bhd (“**Buyers**”). We are a procurement arm of the Buyers. The full contact details of those parties as gleaned from our correspondence and contracts with them, are as follows:

Sellers

Company name:	Well Fortune (HK) Industrial Ltd (裕昌（香港）实业有限公司)
Address:	Room 5008, Sports Science and Technology Center, Nanjing Olympics Sports Centre, Nanjing, China
Telephone:	(86) 02587781285
Contact persons:	Mr. Shen Gaoman - Managing Director & CEO (Mobile: (86) 13913823488; Email: shengm@wfortune-nj.com) Ms. Li Bo, Helen – Business Manager (Mobile: (86) 15051630742; Email: lb@wfortune-nj.com) Ms. Wang Mengting, Olivia – Business Assistant (Mobile: (86) 18602576797; Email: wangmt@wfortune-nj.com)

For and on behalf
JIANLONG (HONGKONG) INTERN
建龙(香港)国际
....
Auth

Buyers

Company name:	Eastern Steel Sdn. Bhd (东钢集团有限公司)
Address:	Lot 6293 & 6294, KawasanPerindustrianTeluk Kalong, MukimTeluk Kalong, 24000 Kemaman, Terengganu DarulIman, Malaysia
Telephone:	(609) 8604000
Fax:	(609) 8604065
Contact persons:	Mr. Yang Matao – Procurement Executive, Iron Ore Division (Email: yangmatao@ejianlong.com)

JIANLONG (HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED
ROOM 1201, 12/F., SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT BUILDING, 48-62 HENNESSY ROAD, WANCHAI, HONG KONG

Our understanding at the time we entered into the contracts referred to above was that the cargo was of Indonesian origin. That remained our understanding until 22 April 2019, as further detailed below. That understanding was based on several documents provided to us by the Sellers, notably the following:

- The Sellers' initial Offer;
- The sale contract we concluded with the Sellers;
- The Bills of Lading;
- The Certificate of Origin provided by the Sellers; and
- The Certificate of Sampling & Analysis at the Load Port provided by the Sellers.

Copies of all of those documents are enclosed for your reference.

It was on the basis of those documents and that understanding that our company issued the Certificate of Origin and related documents referred to in your letter.

We trust you can see that our understanding of the position was a genuine one, based on a number of documents provided to us by our counterparty. It was only on 22 April 2019 that we became aware of any suggestion that the cargo was not of Indonesian origin. We immediately investigated the position and subsequently cancelled our contract with the Sellers in view of this development.

We hope it is clear from the above / enclosed that our company never had any intention of becoming involved in any activity which might expose our company to the risk of being in breach of the sanctions imposed on the DPRK. Rather, our company was, in this instance, misled by our counterparty and took immediate steps to reverse the situation once that came to light.

We trust this is helpful. If there is anything further we can do to assist, please do not hesitate to contact us and we should be glad to oblige.

Yours faithfully,

TIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED
貿易有限公司
rized Signature(s)

Jianlong (Hong Kong) International Trade Co., Limited

For and on behalf of
JIANLONG (HONGKONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED
建龍(香港)國際貿易有限公司
Authorized Signature(s)

Well Fortune(HK) Industrial Limited
裕昌（香港）实业有限公司

报盘

1、**COMMODITY:** Indonesian Coal origin
货物名称：印尼煤

2、**QUANTITY: 11,000MT,** more or less 10%
数量：11000 吨+/-10%

3、**SPECIFICATION:** NET CALORIFIC VALUE 6000 KCAL / KG

指标：低位发热量 6000 千卡/千克

PARTICULARS 规格	TYPICAL 参考标准	REJECTION 拒收标准
Total Moisture (ARB) 全水分（收到基）	10%	≧ 14%
Ash Content (ADB) 灰份（空干基）	≦ 9%	
Volatile Matter (ADB) 挥发份（空干基）	≦ 9%	
Total Sulphur (ADB) 总硫（空干基）	<0.5%	≧ 0.8%
Net Calorific Value (ARB) 低位发热量（收到基）	≧ 6000 kcal/kg	≦ 5800 kcal/kg;
Size of Coal (0-50 mm) 粒度（0-50 毫米）	>90%	
Hard Grove Index (points)	45	

4、**DISCHARGE PORT:** KUANTAN port, MALAYSIA
卸货港：马来西亚关丹港

5、**PRICE:** The unit price for the Indonesian Coal purchased hereunder is USD 118.00 /MT (SAY ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN DOLLARS ONLY) CFR KUANTAN port, MALAYSIA, basis Net Calorific Value 6000 Kcal/kg (ARB), Total Moisture (ARB) 10%.
价格：本合同约定的印尼煤价格单价为基于下述条件：在买方指定的港口交货，收到基低位发热量 6000 千卡/千克，收到基全水分 10%为基准，货到马来西亚关丹码头 CFR 118 美元每吨。

6、**QUANTITY and QUALITY ADJUSTMENT:** 数量、质量调整

A. Total Moisture (as received).

If the Total Moisture on an as received basis of a shipment of Coal belows or exceeds 10%, then the price for invoicing shall be adjusted as follows:

1 / 2

Well Fortune(HK) Industrial Limited
裕昌（香港）实业有限公司

WELL FORTUNE

Weight shown on Invoice = BL Weight × [(100%– Actual TM (ARB))] / (100% 10%)

A.全水分（收到基）

如果该批煤炭的收到基全水分，低于或超过 10%，则发票的重量应作如下调整：

发票重量 – 提单重量×（100% - 实际水份）/（100%-10%）

B. Net Calorific Value (as received)

The Price shall be USD118/ MT DIVIDED BY 6000kcal/kg AND MULTIPLYING THE ACTUAL net Calorific Value(ARB) RESULTS AS STATED ON THE RELATIVE CERTIFICATE OF QUALITY.

B. 低位发热量（收到基）

价格按照 118 美元/吨除以 6000 大卡乘以相关品质检验报告的实际发热量计算。

7、**PAYMENT**：100% irrevocable, documentary LC at sight

Within 3 days after contract signed Buyer issue an operative irrevocable at sight documentary Letter of Credit in favor of Seller covering 100% of the shipment value by Swift to the Seller.

90% shipment value should be paid by LC against receiving the full set of B/L documents.

Balance payment based on CCIC at discharging port

付款方式: 100%不可撤销、即期信用证

合同签订后 3 日内买方开出不可撤销、100%船载货值、以卖方为受益人的即期信用证。

收到全套提单单据信用证议付 90%货款。

卸货港 CCIC 结果结算尾款。

This offer is valid before the cargo is sold, subject to the final confirmation of the seller.

此报盘货物未出售前有效，以卖方最终确认为准。

WELL FORTUNE (HK) INDUSTRIAL LIMITED
2019.3.19

2 / 2

Page 2
B/L No. BPN/KTN-01

CODE NAME : "CONGENBILL" EDITION 1994

BILL OF LADING

TO BE USED WITH CHARTER PARTIES
Reference No.

Shipper
PT. BARA MAKMUR SADAYANA

Consignee
TO ORDER OFWELL FORTUNE (HK) INDUSTRIAL LIMITED

Notify address
EASTERN STEEL SDN. BHD.LOT 6293 AND 6294,
KAWASAN PERINDUSTRIAN TELUK KALONG,
MUKIM TELUK KALONG,
24000 KEMAMAN TERENGGANU DARUL IMAN,, MALAYSIA

NON NEGOTIABLE COPY

Vessel
MV. DONG THANH VOY.03-19

Port of loading
TELUK BALIKPAPAN, INDONESIA

Port of discharge
KEMAMAN PORT, MALAYSIA

Shipper's description of goods

INDONESIAN COAL
CLEAN ON BOARD
FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY

Gross Weight
SAID TO WEIGHT
26,400 MTS

(of which on deck at Shipper's risk; the Carrier not being responsible for loss or damage howsoever arising)

Freight payable as per
CHARTER-PARTY dated ....

FREIGHT ADVANCE.
Received on account of freight:

....

Time used for loading .... Days .... Hours.

SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above.
Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown.
IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of this tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.
FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF

Freight payable at	Place and date of issue :
AS PER CHARTER PARTY	TELUK BALIKPAPAN, INDONESIA 12 APRIL 2019
Number of original Bs/L	Signature
3/3	[redacted]

Printed and sold by
Fr. G. Knudtzons Bogtrykkeri A/S, 61 Toldbodgade, DK-1253 Copenhagen K.
Telefax + 4533931184
by authority of the Baltic and International Maritime Council
(BIMCO), Copenhagen.

71703874304C

Original

1. Goods Consigned from (exporter's business name, address, country) PT. BARA MAKMUR SADAYANA	Reference No: 0001965/SMD/2019 ASEAN TRADE IN GOODS AGREEMENT ASEAN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION SCHEME CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN (Combined Declaration and Certificate) FORM D Issued in INDONESIA (Country) See Overleaf Notes
2. Goods Consigned to (Consignee's name, address, country) TO ORDER	
3. Means of transport and route (as far as known) Departure date: APRIL 12th, 2019 Vessel's name/Aircraft etc: MV. DONG THANH VOY.03-19 Port of Discharge: KENAMAN PORT, MALAYSIA	4. For Official use ☐ Preferential Treatment Given Under ASEAN-CHINA Free Trade Area Preferential Tariff ☐ Preferential Treatment Not Given (Please state reason/s) Signature of Authorised Signatory of the Importing Country

5. Item number	6. Marks and numbers on packages	7. Number and type of packages, description of goods (including quantity where appropriate and HS number of importing country)	8. Origin criterion (see notes overleaf)	9. Gross weight or other quantity and value (FOB)	10. Number and date of invoice
1	NO MARK IN BULK	INDONESIAN COAL	WO	26,400 TNE US$ 2,772,000	JLHK-ES-190302 IC APRIL 12th, 2019

11. Declaration by the exporter The undersigned hereby declares that the above details and statement are correct that all the products were produced in INDONESIA (Country) and that they comply with the origin requirements specified for these products in the Rules of Origin for the ACFTA for the products exported to MALAYSIA (Importing Country) SAMARINDA, APRIL 16, 2019 Place and date, signature of authorised signatory	12. Certification It is hereby certified, on the basis of control carried out, that the declaration by the exporter is correct. ISSUING OFFICE IN PROVINSI KALIMANTAN TIMUR [Stamp: Republic of Indonesia Certificate of Origin 16.00] Al Wardana SAMARINDA, APRIL 16, 2019 Place and date, signature and stamp of certifying authority
13. ☐ Issued Retroactively ☐ Exhibition ☐ Movement Certificate ☐ Third Party invoicing	

Form D Serial : D - GBD - 3691

CARSURIN Laboratory

Coal, Mineral, Petrochemical

TANAH MERAH : LP-225-IDN
E : cm-tanahmerah@carsurin.com
BERAU
E : cm-berau@carsurin.com

SAMARINDA : LP-352-IDN
E : cm-samarinda@carsurin.com
PALEMBANG
E : cm-palembang@carsurin.com

BANJARBARU : LP-353-IDN
E : cm-banjarbaru@carsurin.com
JAMBI
E : cm-jambi@carsurin.com

CIKARANG : LP-415-IDN
E : cm-cikarang@carsurin.com
KENDARI
E : cm-kendari@carsurin.com

BONTANG : LP-494-IDN
E : cm-bontang@carsurin.com
MEDAN
E : medan@carsurin.com

190922.0382

CERTIFICATE OF SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS

Description of Goods	: 26,400 MT INDONESIAN COAL
Quantity	: 26,400 MT
Vessel	: **MV. DONG THANH VOY.03-19**
Shipper	: **PT. BARA MAKMUR SADAYANA**
Port of Loading	: TELUK BALIKPAPAN, INDONESIA
Port of Discharge	: KEMAMAN PORT, MALAYSIA
Consignee	: **TO ORDER**
Notify Address	: **EASTERN STEEL SDN.BHD.LOT 6293 AND 6294** KAWASAN PERINDUSTRIAN TELUK KALONG, MUKIM TELUK KALONG, 24000 KEMAMAN TERENGGANU DARUL IMAN,, MALAYSIA
Date of Attendance	: APRIL 07 UP TO 12, 2019

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that we have performed the inspection, sampling and analysis of the coal consignment nominated above. Samples were taken in accordance with ASTM D 6883-17 and analyzed as per ASTM standard methods.

The following results were obtained

Parameter	Designation	Basis		Results	
Total Moisture	ASTM D 3302M-2017	(As Received Basis)	:	8.27	PCT
Inherent Moisture	ASTM D 3173M-17a	(Air Dried Basis)	:	2.21	PCT
Ash Content	ASTM D 3174-12	(Air Dried Basis)	:	11.18	PCT
Volatile Matter	ASTM D 3175-17	(Air Dried Basis)	:	6.43	PCT
Fixed Cabon	ASTM D 3172-13	(Air Dried Basis)	:	80.15	PCT
Total Sulfur	ASTM D 4239-17	(Air Dried Basis)	:	0.33	PCT
Gross Calorific Value	ASTM D 5865-13	(Air Dried Basis)	:	6,365	Kcal/Kg
Gross Calorific Value	ASTM D 5865-13	(As Received Basis)	:	5,972	Kcal/Kg
Net Calorific Value	ASTM D 5865-13	(As Received Basis)	:	5,810	Kcal/Kg
HGI	ASTM D 409 / D40M-16		:	58	
Size 0-50 MM	ASTM D 4749-87		:	95.76	PCT
AFT (IDT)	ASTM D 1857 / D1857M 17		:	1,270	°C
Na_2O in Ash	ASTM D 3582-13	(Dry Basis)	:	0.97	PCT
K_2O in Ash	ASTM D 3582-13	(Dry Basis)	:	1.50	PCT

SAMARINDA, APRIL 16, 2019
Signed on behalf of
PT CARSURIN

TAJAT SUDRAJAT
Laboratory Manager

For verification of authenticity of certificate or reports, please contact us at coal.sales@carsurin.com.

| Wisma 77 - Tower 2, 19th Floor, Jl. Letjen S. Parman Kav.77 - Slipi, Jakarta 11410, INDONESIA |
| P : +62.21.2967 5868 | F : +62.21.2967 5818 / 28 | E : coal@carsurin.com ; headoffice@carsurin.com | www.carsurin.com |

19077651

This report is made and issued by the Company upon the Principal/Applicant's request and the analysis contained therein reflects the Company's findings on the analysis sample submitted by Principal/Applicant and or sample drawn by the Company at the time and place of performing the inspection/testing only. Furthermore, the Company shall not be responsible to any parties on any business and or any legal consequences for any transaction by using this report/analysis.

Source: The Panel

Annex 10: Cargo documents prepared for *Ken Orchid* for the original transshipment of coal onboard the *Wise Honest* in April 2018

REQ Vessel for 26,500 MT Coal ex. Indonesia to Korea

发件人： WAHYU KUSDIANTORO
收件人： JOE YU
抄 送： chartering ; wahyu.kusdiantoro
时 间： 2018-04-07 11:34

To : Global Qingdao Shipping Co Ltd
Fm : Wahyu Kusdiantoro/PT Karana Line
Subj: REQ Vessel for 26,500 MT Coal ex. Indonesia to Korea
Dd : 07/04/2018

Dear Mr Joe Yu and team,

Can you assist in providing vsl for following firm?

Shipper: PT Bara Makmur Sadayana
Charterer: To be nominated
Commodity: Steamed coal in bulk
Quantity: 26,500 MT
Loading port: 1SA Teluk Balikpapan Kalimantan Indonesia
Discharging port: 1SA 1SB Pohang Korea
Loading/discharging rate: 8000/10000MT Perday
Laycan: Prompt
Freight: USD14.50/MT FIOST Bss 1/1
Grabber vsls is preferable
Other as per gencon cp
Subj to further details
Substem to be lifted 24 hrs working day
END

Kind regards,
Wahyu Kusdiantoro
Marketing Staff PT Karana Line
Mob: +62812-132-8025 E: wahyu.kusdiantoro@karana.co.id Web: www.karana.co.id
Sent from my mobile
--

QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

青 岛 环 球 航 运 有 限 公 司

FREIGHT DEPOSIT INVOICE - MV KEN ORCHID CP 09 APRIL 2018

INV NO. QGS-180418-1 **DATE: 18TH APRIL 2018**

TO : PT. KARANA LINE

JL MELATI NO 123 KOJA TANJUNG PRIOK JAKARTA 14230 INDONESIA

FM : QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

CGO/QTY: MIN/MAX: 26500MT BLK COAL

1SAP BALIKPAPAN / 1SBP POHANG LAYCAN 21-22 APRIL 2018

FRT RATE: USD 15.75/PMT FIOST 1/1

FREIGHT DEPOSIT AMOUNT: (26500MT X USD 15.75) X 20PCT = **USD 83475.00**

KINDLY PLS REMIT THE SAID AMOUNT IN **USD 83475.00** TO THE OWNERS BANK A/C ASF:

BENEFICIARY'S BANK:

[redacted]

INTERMEDIATIARY BANK:

USD: CITIBANK, NEW YORK

SWIFT: CITIUS33

IN FAVOUR OF: QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

ROOM 2105 QD TREND CENTRE 29-31 CHEONG LEE STREET CHAI WAN, HK

USD A/C: OSA11014552905006

For and on behalf of
QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED
青島環球航運有限公司

Authorized Signature(s)

QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

[redacted]

IKAROS SHIPPING & BROKERAGE LTD

LETTER-01

NOTICE OF READINESS

M/V	**" KEN ORCHID "**	Port :	**BALIKPAPAN**
To:	**PT.WIRATRANS SAMUDERA**	Date:	**22 April 2018**
To:	**Whom it may concern**		

This is to advise you that MV "KEN ORCHID" under my command arrived Port of BALIKPAPAN

On 22 April 2018 at 15:42 hours local time / 07:42 hours UTC

and she is ready in all respects to load her cargo in accordance with all terms conditions, provisions and exemptions of the governing Charter Party.

Please consider this as a Notice of Readiness and notify all parties concerned accordingly.

Master of the m/v " KEN ORCHID

Cpt.OleksandrTereschenko

Tendered on: Date: **22 April 2018**Time: **15:42Hrs LT/ 07:42 hours UTC**

Nor Accepted by (For and behalf of the Charterers)

....

On Date............................ Time .... Hrs (LT)

Source: The Panel

Annex 11: Iran's reply to the Panel

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 www.Iran-UN.org Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: Iran@un.int

In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

No. 110731 30 July 2019

Dear Sir,

I am writing in response to your letter dated 1 July 2019 (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.50) with regard to the implementation of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) for the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Having carefully reviewed your letter, Iranian authorities affirmed once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran has no military-related cooperation with the DPRK.

In our letter dated 19 December 2018 (No.106192), it was stated that "no entity or individual, designated pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on the DPRK, is present or active in the Islamic Republic of Iran". The latest available data confirms the very same fact for the period of the past seven months.

Consistently, the Korea Mining Development Technology Corporation and Saeng Pi'l (aka Green Pine Associated Corporation) do not maintain offices in Iran and have no activity therein.

Moreover, no "representatives of the Korea Mining Development Technology Corporation" were in Iran "under cover of diplomatic assignments" in the past seven months, contrary to a claim by "a Member State".

The diplomatic activities of the DPRK in the Islamic Republic of Iran have so far been in line with the relevant conventions or resolutions, and the Iranian authorities have not observed any illicit activities. Additionally, the activities of the DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran have been in conformity with the relevant applicable rules and international obligations.

It shall be further reiterated that there are no DPRK nationals registered to be residing in the Islamic Republic of Iran other than its diplomats.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to constructive engagement and full cooperation with the Panel and Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and would review any viable evidence and credible information with regard to alleged actions in violation of the relevant Security Council sanctions.

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 www.Iran-UN.org Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: Iran@un.int

The United Nations mechanisms, especially those related to Security Council sanctions, shall not allow any misuse for provocative political aims, but rather need to act in an objective, impartial and professional manner. Hence, the Panel is advised to avoid inclusion in its reports of such claims that are evidently transmitted based on political motivations.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

m. T. R.

Majid Takht Ravanchi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Alastair Morgan
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Source: Member State

Annex 12: Passport information and recent entry/exit record of Kim Tong Chol to Namibia

Date	Entry/exit to/from Namibia	Passport number	Passport type
23/09/2017	Exit	927234267	Ordinary
24/08/2018	Entry	108120258	Service
30/04/2019	Exit	108120258	Service
07/05/2019	Entry	108120258	Service
17/05/2019	Exit	108120258	Service

Source: The Panel, Member State

Annex 13: List of DPRK Trading Corporations subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028) reported by a Member State

Kuryonggang Trading Corporation (구룡강무역회사)

Ryungseng Trading Corporation (륭성무역회사)

Tangun Trading Corporation (단군무역회사)

Hangryon Trading Corporation (항련무역회사)

Ryonbong General Corporation (련봉총회사)

5 Trading Corporation (5 무역회사)

Pugang Trading Corporation (부강무역회사)

Mirae Trading Corporation (미래무역회사)

Ryonhap Trading Corporation (련합무역회사)

Advanced Technology Trading Corporation (첨단기술무역회사)

Jinhung Joint Production Corporation (진흥합작회사)

Sobaeksu United Corporation (소백수련합회사)

Pihosan Trading Corporation (비호산무역회사)

Sinhung IT Trading Corporation (신흥정보기술무역회사)

Chonryong Trading General Corporation (천룡무역총회사)

Taesong Trading Corporation (조선태성무역회사)

Peace Motors Corporation (평화자동차회사)

Taeryonggang Trading Corporation (대령강무역회사)

Source: Member State

Annex 14: Vodka seizures

1. A Member State informed the Panel that it seized two shipments of vodka, which it classified as luxury goods, on the grounds of being destined for the DPRK.

2. The first seizure on 20 November 2018 was of 15,600 bottles of Belarusian vodka acquired for USD 14,160. The producer was the same as in a previous vodka seizure investigated by the Panel in 2018.[1] Documents accompanying the shipment identified the consignee as Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. Limited[2]. An addendum dated 28 September 2018 to the contract signed six months earlier on 28 March added a Singaporean company, Aspen Resources Pte Ltd[3], a human resource agency, as a payer. The owner of the company, Sai Keong Cheang, a.k.a. Jordan Cheang[4], replied to the Panel that the USD 14,160 payment had been made at the request of an acquaintance, known to him only as "Ms. Li", for the purchase of red wine. However, the amount of payment and payment reference number listed on the payment confirmation is the same as for the vodka shipment contract. Furthermore, an e-mail address on this payment confirmation indicated that one of his other companies, Mekong International Pte Ltd,[5] had been used to make this payment on behalf of Cheang (Figure). The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. Limited.

[1] S/2019/171 paras 105 and 106.


[2] 香港杰明實業有限公司. Address listed on Hong Kong Companies Registry acquired in May 2019: Room 1506, 15/F, Loon Kee Building. No. 267-275, Des Voeux Road Central, Hongkong, China. This company has frequently changed its registered address and management.

[3] Address: 190 Macpherson Road, #07-01, Singapore 348548

[4] Singaporean citizen, born in 1972.

[5] This company shares an address with Aspen Resources and his seven other companies; Aspen Corporation Pte ltd, Aspen Incorporation Pte Ltd, Baron & Baron Pte Ltd, Galaxy Energy Service Pte Ltd., Le Tong Resources Pte Ltd, Xtrada Pacific Pte Ltd. Autech Pte Ltd.

Figure: Payment confirmation



[redacted]

Outgoing Payment Confirmation

Confirmation Number: SOTR3639262

Account Number: [redacted]
Order Commit Date & Time: 01-10-2018 14:59:56

ASPEN RESOURCES PTE LTD
Miss [redacted]
190 MACPHERSON ROAD UNIT 07-01 WISMA GULAB
SINGAPORE, 348548
Singapore

Order Instructions:
EMAIL CLIENT
[redacted]@mekongintl.com

Transaction Details

Item Number	Description	Amount	Exchange Rate	You Sold	Fee
SOTR3639262-1	Electronic Funds Transfer	USD 14,160.00	1.0000	USD 14,160.00	23.08

Beneficiary: *CJSC "MINSK GRAPE WINES FACTORY"
Account Number: XXXXXXXXXX[redacted]
Beneficiary Bank: [redacted]
Beneficiary Bank Address:
SWIFT Code: [redacted]
Value Date: 01 Oct 2018
Release Date: 01 Oct 2018
Payment Reference: Contract #29/03/18 (Ob Jordan)

*Standard Beneficiary

Items: 1

Total of Items 14,160.00

Source: The Panel

3. In a second case, a shipment of 90,000 bottles of Russian vodka for a total of USD 27,125 was seized on 21 February 2019. The consignee was a company in Inner Mongolia, Manzhouli Kesheng Trade Co., Ltd.[6], which promotes itself as a Russian food importer. To the Panel's inquiry on the shipping company of this vodka, China replied that "Based on the information obtained by the Chinese side, DPRK-related factors are not found in this case. China proposes that the Panel request relevant Member State to provide solid evidence to show that the DPRK is the final destination of the goods. Besides, vodka is not clearly specified as prohibited item by the Security Council, and the Panel's investigation on this case lacks sufficient legal basis." The Panel has yet to receive replies to its inquiries from the consignee[7]. Investigation continues.

[6] 满洲里科圣贸易有限责任公司, Room 170, No. 17 Building, The North Port, Gemini West Tower, Manzohuli City, China.

[7] On 29 July 2019, the Russian Federation replied to the Panel's inquiry to an entity which is the producer and sender of the vodka.

Annex 15 : DPRK bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)

Names	Title and activities	Location	DOB / Passport number / expiry UN Security Council designations where applicable
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang Pom Su, Jang Hyon U) 장범수	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative. Also operates in and travels to Lebanon under various aliases	Syria	22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020 UN res 2270 (2016) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria" on 2 March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KPi.016
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a. Cho'n Myo'ng-kuk, Jon Yong Sang) 전명국 (전영상)	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative in Syria. Also travels to and operates in Lebanon under various aliases.	Syria	25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number 836110035, expires 1 January 2020
Ryom Huibong (aka Ryo'M Hu'I-Pong) 렴희봉	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank (aka KKG bank, 금강은행 Kumgang Export and Import Bank, 金刚银行)	Dubai, UAE	18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20 January 2020)
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song Chol) 리선철 (리성철)	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank Transported money of DPRK laborers in the Middle East to the DPRK	Dubai, UAE	28 March 1964 PP No.:836132137
Kwak Chongchol (Aka Kwak Jong-Chol) 곽정철	Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank	Dubai, UAE	1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533
Ro Il Gwang 로일광	Korea Kumgang Group Bank	UAE	26 May 1983 PP No.: 836434467
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-il 김경일	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office opened at least 5 accounts at Banque International Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia. Two of them are in the name of a front company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been involved in transactions undertaken by Daedong Credit Bank in China.	Libya	1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "FTB deputy chief representative in Libya" on 22 December (KPi.067)
Choe, Un Hyok 최은혁	Unification Development Bank (or Korea Unification Development Bank, UDB or KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un'So'ng. Choe Un Hyok's KUDB business card with his title of "Representative of KUDB,	Moscow, Russia	19 October 1985 PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)

	Moscow Russia" with the same address as the Embassy in Moscow is available in the Panel's 2017 Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251. *Russia replied in a letter of 25 January 2018, "We will inform you accordingly in case we receive additional information on the whereabouts of Choe Un Hyok." The Panel has not received any additional information in reply to its two follow-up letters.*		
Chu Hyo'k (Aka Ju Hyok) 주혁	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *Russia replied Chu Hyo'k is not currently residing in Russia. (see below)*		23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct. 2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an "overseas FTB Representative" on 22 December (KPi.065)
Ri U'n-so'ng (aka Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song) 리은성	Korea Unification Development Bank representative *Russia replied that Ri U'n-so'ng is not currently residing in Russia.*		23 July 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Korean Unification Development Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.078)
Han Jang Su (aka Chang-Su Han) 한장수	Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank The Russian Federation replied, *Mr. Han Jang Su is the Third Secretary of the Commercial Counsellor's Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation and has been officially accredited by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He entered the Russian Federation on 23 June 2017 and is staying in the country legally. No information is available concerning activities that are inconsistent with his official status.*	Russian Federation	8 Nov. 1969; PP No.: 745420176 (expires 19 Oct 2020 Designated by Resolution 2371 (2017) as "Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank"
Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku Cha-hyo'ng) 구자형	Foreign Trade Bank Representative	Libya (also travelled to Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia 2015-2017)	8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 - used in July 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "FTB chief representative in Libya" on 22 December 2017 (Kpi.070)
Ch'oe So'k-min 최석민	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016, Ch'oe So'k-min was the deputy representative at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has been associated with cash transfers from that FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK special organizations and RGB located overseas. *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang China	25 July 1978 Res 2397(2017) designated him as "overseas FTB Representative" on 22 December (KPi.064)

Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim Tong-ch'o'l) 김동철	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang, China	28 Jan 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires 26 Sept 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.068)
Ko Chol Man (aka Ko Ch'o'l-man) 고철만	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang, China	30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.069)
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka Mun Kyo'ng-hwan) 문경환	Bank of East Land Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Dandong, China	22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March 2016 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Bank of East Land representative" on 22 December (KPi.071)
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae Wo'n-uk) 배원욱	Korea Daesong Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Beijing, China	22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb 2017 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Daesong Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.072)
Pak Bong Nam (aka Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam) 박봉남	Ilsim International Bank representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang, China	06 May 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Ilsim International Bank representative" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.073)
Pak Mun Il 박문일	Korea Daesong Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Yanji, China	1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509 (expires 27/8/2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.079)
Ri Chun Hwan (Aka Ri Ch'un-hwan) 리춘환	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Zhuhai, China	21 August 1957' PP No: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.074)

Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri Ch'un-so'ng) 리춘성	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a Euro account at International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of "Secretary's Delegate of the DPRK's Mission to Tripoli" (closed on 22 August 2013. *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Beijing, China	30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (expires 11 March 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.075)
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li Cheng He) 리성혁	Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Beijing, China	19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (expires 19 May 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank" on 22 December (KPi.077)
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang So-Nam, Pang Sunam) 방수남	Ilsim (ILSIM) International Bank Representative *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Zhuhai, China	1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch'a Su'ng-chun) 차승준	Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative. Has held several accounts in his name at Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a cover company. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Beijing, China	4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355
Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-hyo'k) 김경혁	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Bank *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Shanghai, China	5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14 September 2016)
Pak Ch'O'l-Nam 박철남	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the name "Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)"in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China" China replied, *"The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK*	Beijing, China	16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)

	financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."		
Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho Ch'o'l-So'ng) 조철성	Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as "Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限公司)" and "Golden Tiger Investment Group (金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司)", both registered in Hong Kong. *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Dandong, China	25 September 1984 PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019) Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.058)
Ho Young Il (Aka Ho' Yo'ng-il) 허영일	Hana Bank Representative In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a high volume of USD transactions for the FTB. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Dandong China	DOB: 9 September 1968
Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim Mun-ch'o'l) 김문철	Representative for Korea United Development Bank. Uses false entity names including "Chongryu Technical Company" or "Kyong Un Trading Company" China replied "that as a designated individual he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested the freeze of his assets.	Dandong, China	DOB 25 March 1957 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.060)
Choe Chun Yong (Aka Ch'oe Ch'un-yo'ng) 최천영	Ilsim International Bank Representative		PP no: 654410078 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Ilsim International Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim Myong Gi) 고태훈 (or 고대훈) (aka 김명기)	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative	Transited China, Ethiopia, UAE, visited Sudan[1]	25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March 2018) UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 2 March (KPi.025)

[1] See S/2017/150, p. 64

Kang Min 강민	Daesong Bank representative who, in late 2016, held Chinese bank accounts. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Beijing, China	07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February 2018)
Kim Sang Ho 김상호	Representative, Korea Daesong Bank As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39 official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading Company representative in Yanji, China. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Yanji, China	16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26 September 2018)
Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim Cho'ng Man) 김정만	Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office 39 official posted to Hong Kong. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Zhuhai, China	16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780
Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim Hyo'k-Cho'l, Hyok Chol Kim 김혁철	Deputy Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Zhuhai, China	9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June 2017)
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-nam) 리호남	Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch representative (2014 to present) *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Beijing, China	DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires 21 February 2019
Ms. Kim Su Gyong 김수경	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips around Europe, especially in France and Italy, with	Europe, also	DOB: 16 Jan 1973; PP 745120374

	the assistance of her father, Kim Yong Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB agents who used their status as staff members of international organizations to help her obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See: S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187.	transited UAE and the Russian Federation [2]	
Mun Cho'ng-Ch'o'l 문정철	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative. Has facilitated transactions for TCB.		Res 2094 (2013) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 7 March (KPi.012)
Jong Song Ho	President of the Jinmyong Joint Venture Bank/Jinmyong Joint Bank – 진명합영은행. Jong Song Ho helped arranged the sale of a shipment of DPRK coal aboard the *Wise Honest* through an Indonesian broker with the final listed recipient being the ROK company, Enermax. See S/2019/171, para 36 (business card at Annex 19).	Indonesia	
RI, Jong Won (a.k.a. RI, Cho'ng-Wo'n; a.k.a. RI, Jung Won) 리 정 원	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Russia replied to the Panel, "Mr. Ri Jong Won arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an officially accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation. It is not known what information was used to determine that he is the Moscow-based deputy representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. Moreover, according to the available information, he returned to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 8 October 2018."		DOB 22 Apr 1971; PP PS654320421 (exp 11 Mar 2019)
Choe Song Nam CHOE, Song Nam (aka CH'OE, So'ng-nam) 최성남	Representative of Daesong Bank		DOB: 07 Jan 1979; Passport 563320192 expires 09 Aug 2018
Kim Chol KIM, Chol (a.k.a. KIM, Ch'o'l) 김철	Representative of Korea United Development Bank		DOB 27 Sep 1964

[2] The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were "not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory".

Paek Jong Sam PAEK, Jong Sam (a.k.a. PAEK, Chong-sam) 백종삼	Representative of Kumgang Bank		DOB 17 Jan 1964
Ko Il Hwan KO, Il Hwan (a.k.a. KO, Il-hwan) 고일환	Representative of Korea Daesong Bank. According to a Member State, he engaged in transactions for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018 while acting as representative of Daesong Bank in Shenyang.		DOB 28 August 1967 Passport 927220424 expires 12 Jun 2022
Ri Myong Hun RI, Myong Hun (a.k.a. RI, Myo'ng-hun) 리명훈	Representative of Foreign Trade Bank		DOB 14 Mar 1969; Gender Male; Passport 381420089 expires 11 Oct 2016
Kim Nam Ung 김남웅	Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.		Passport no.: 654110043 Res 2371(2017) designated him as Representative for Ilsim International Bank
RI, Jong Won (a.k.a. RI, Cho'ng-Wo'n; a.k.a. RI, Jung Won)	The Russian Federation replied, *Mr. Ri Jong Won arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an officially accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation. It is not known what information was used to determine that he is the Moscow-based deputy representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. Moreover, according to the available information, he returned to the DPRK on 8 October 2018.*		DOB: 22 Apr 1971; Passport no 654320421 expires 11 Mar 2019

Source: The Panel, Member States and UN documents

Annex 16 : DPRK financial institutions with overseas representatives

Names, alias, Korean and Chinese spelling	HQ address / phone / fax/ SWIFT	Security Council designations and information provided to Panel by Member States and United Nations resolutions
Bank of East Land 동방은행 aka: Haedong Bank (해동은행), Dongbang Bank, Tongbang U'Nhaeng, Tongbang Bank, (朝鲜）东方银行	BEL Building, Jonsung-Dong, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814410	Res 2087 (2013) on 22 January 2013 (KPe.013) Info in UN Panel reports: S/2017/150; pp 76-77 and S/2017/742, para 61. Facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation. Has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions.
Credit Bank of Korea 조선신용은행 aka Korea Credit Bank, International Credit Bank, 朝鲜信用银行	Munsu Street, Central District, Pyongyang +850 2 3818285 +850 2 3817806	
Daedong Credit Bank [JV] 대동신용은행 大同信用银行 Aka Taedong Credit Bank, Dae-Dong Credit Bank, DCB Finance Ltd, Perigrine-Daesong Development Bank	Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, (b) Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, +850 2 3814866 SWIFT: DCBK KPPY	Res 2270 (2016) on 2 March 2016 (KPe.023) Representative offices and front companies in China according to Panel: S/2017/150, paras 225-230 and S/2017/742, paras 51-56. Clients include: T Specialist International (Singapore) Ltd, OCN (Singapore) International Distribution Ptd Ltd; Pan Systems; Dalian Daxin Electron Co Ltd, Hongdae International, Yueda International Trading Co, Hing Heng, Korea Sinheung Trading Co, Hana Electronics. Joint venture with Korea Daesong Bank; majority stake acquired by a Chinese company. See current report, paragraphs XX.
Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] 대성신용개발은행 Koryo Credit Development Bank (고려글로벌신용은행), Koryo Global Trust Bank, Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Korea Credit Investment Company (조선신용투자회사)	Daesong Credit Development Bank [Joint Venture] +850 2 381 4100 +850 2 341 4013	
First Eastern Bank	Rason, DPRK	Affiliated with Central Bank and Unaforte (Italy and Hong Kong, China). See Panel report S/2017/150 para 221.

Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) 조선무역은행 朝鲜贸易银行 aka: Mooyokbank, Korea Trade Bank, Mooyokbank	FTB Building, Jungsong dong, Central District, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814467 SWIFT/BIC FTBD KP PY	Res 2371 (2017) on 5 Aug 2017 (KPe.047) State-owned bank which acts as the DPRK's primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. See para X on registered office abroad.
International Consortium Bank (ICB) 국제합영은행 Hi-Fund Bank International Consortium Bank (ICB), Sungri Hi-Fund International Bank, Sungri Economic Group	Sungri Exhibition Hall, Pyongyang	
Jinmyong Joint Venture Bank/Jinmyong Joint Bank 진명합영은행	Pyongyang Tel: +85-02-18111-381-8161 Fax: +85-02-381-4410 Associated Factory: Address: Room No. 2204, 3211 Pyongyang Information Center, Kyonghung-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang	Appears to be owned by the Jinmyong Trading Group. Advertisement presented at 19th Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair (2016). Designated by OFAC in September 2017 pursuant to E.O. 13810, which targets, in part, persons determined to be operating in the financial services industry in the DPRK. The President, Jong Song Ho arranged the sale of a shipment of DPRK coal aboard the *Wise Honest* through an Indonesian broker with the final listed recipient being the ROK company, Enermax. See S/2019/171, para 36 (business card at Annex 19).
Koryo Bank 고려은행 高丽银行	Koryo Bank Building, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Res 2356 (2017) on 2 June 2017 (KPe.045) Associated with Office 38 and Office 39 of the KWP. Operated by Korea Myohyang Economic Group; joint venture partner in Koryo-Global Bank.
Koryo Credit Development Bank / Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] (Aka. Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Koryo Global Trust Bank) 고려신용개발은행 대성신용개발은행 (aka 고려글로벌신용은행)	Yanggakdo International Hotel, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 381 4100 Fax: +850 2 341 4013	Res 2371 (2017) on 5 August 2017 (KPe.049) Joint venture with Koryo Bank
Korea Daesong Bank 대성은행 / 조선 대성은행 大成银行 aka: Choson Taesong Unhaeng, Daesong Bank, Taesong Bank	Segori-dong, Gyongheung Street, Pyongyang Tel +850 2 818221 Fax +850 2 814576 SWIFT/BIC: KDBKKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.035) Owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party

According to a Member State, in 2018 the bank has used the following false names when processing transactions for ship-to-ship transfers: 조선녹색산업무역 (*Chosun Noksaek Sanop Muyok*, Korea Green Industry Trading Company/Corporation 朝鲜绿色产业贸易) and 조선신용투자회사(Chosun Sinyong Tuja Hoesa, Korea Credit Investment Company/Corporation 朝鲜信用投资公司 or 朝鲜信用投资会社).		According to a Member State, Ko Il Hwan engaged in transactions on behalf of Korea Daesong Bank from Shenyang for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018.
Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation 조선광선은행 朝鲜光鲜银行, Korea Kwangson Finance Company, 朝鲜 蔡鲜金金朝朝, Korea Kwangson Finance Company	Jungsong-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang	Res 2370 (2016) on 2 March 2016 Provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving KOMID-related funds. For more info see PoE report S/2017/150, p. 63.
Korea National Insurance Corporation 조선민족보험총회사 Korea Foreign Insurance Company, 朝鲜民族保险总会社	KNIC Building, Central District Pyongyang +850 2 18111/222 Ext:3418024 +850 2 3814410	
Korea Joint Venture Bank 조선합영은행 Korea Joint Bank, Korea Joint Operation Bank, Chosun Joint Operation Bank, Habyong Bank, 朝鲜合营银行	KJB Building, Ryugyong 1 dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang +850 2 381-8151, 850-2-18111-381-8151 +850 2 381-4410	
Ryugyong Commerical Bank (RCB) 류경상업은행/류상은행 Ryusang Bank, 柳京商业银行, 柳商银行	Changgwang Hotel, 5th Floor, Pyongyang Beijing, China Dandong, China	Two ATMs at Pyongyang Airport and one in the lobby of Changgwang Inn. *Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM lists an address in the Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24* Joint Venture with OCN Pyongyang Office and Koryo Commercial Bank
Korea Unification (United) Development Bank	KUDB Building, Pyongyang	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.033) USA on 16 March 2016

(조선) 통일발전은행 (朝鲜)统一发展银行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T'ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank	SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY	See Panel of Experts report (S/2017/150, p 62)
Hana Banking Corporation 하나은행 aka Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank,	ISB Building, Pyongyang; Haebangsan Hotel, Jungsong-Dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, Dandong, China SWIFT/BIC BRBKKPPIXXX	Partial Ownership by Central Bank. Overseas several Bank Card product lines for domestic use
Ilsim International Bank 일심국제은행 日心国际银行 aka. Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank, 日心国际银行	ISB Building, Pyongyang Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea SWIFT: ILSIKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.034) Affiliated with the DPRK military and has close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) and has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
First Credit Bank. (JV) or Cheil Credit Bank 제일신용은행 第一信用银行 aka: First Trust Bank Corporation, Jeil Credit Bank, Kyongyong Credit Bank	a) 3-18 Pyongyang Information Center, Potonggang District (as of 2016). b) i Rakrang District, Jongbaek 1-dong Tel: +850 2 433-1575 (02-433-1575) SWIFT: KYCBKPPYXXX Rakrang Tel: 961-3331, 961-0003	Belongs to Workers Party of Korea. It was established in 2008 as JV venture with Singapore's Miracle Commerce Pte. Ltd., and its CEO William Toh (aka Toh Hwee Howe) who has been involved in trade with the DPRK using his other two companies, I-Tech Intelligence Resources and Sinsar Trading Ltd.
Koryo Commercial Bank 고려상업은행 高丽商业银行 aka Korea Commercial Bank	KCB Building, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang; ; Beijing, China; Shenyang, China; SWIFT/BIC KCBKKPP1	Joint Venture with OCN and Ryugyong Commerical Bank
Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商业银行 AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003) Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.

(조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)		
Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) 조선통일발전은행 (朝鲜）统一发展银行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T'ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank	KUDB Building, Pyongyang SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.033) Information in UN POE report: S/2017/742, p. 22
Kumgang Group Bank / Kumgang Bank (KKG) Korea Kumgang Bank (조선) 금강은행 金刚银行 aka: Kumgang Export and Import Bank	Kumgang Bank Building, Central District, Pyongyang (The North East Asia Bank building in Pyongyang became the KKG Bank building)	Associated with Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (under External Economic Committee of the Cabinet) and Korea Pyongyang Trading Company
Kumgyo International Commercial Bank 금교국제상업은행		Affiliated with Korean Chongsong Mining Company and Changgwang Shop. See Panel report S/2017/150 para 220.
Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商业银行 AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003) Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.

Source: The Panel, Member States and UN documents

Annex 17 : Payment for Wise Honest transshipment costs arranged by DPRK bank representative

mandiri

Rekening Koran
(Account Statement)

Periode	: From	01 March 2018
	To	31 March 2018
Account No	: 1260007369969 - ARBAA ENERGY RESOURC	
Currency	: USD	
Branch	: KCP Jkt Permata	
Opening Balance	: 972.79	

Date & Time	Value Date	Description	Reference No.	Debit	Credit	Balance
27/03/2018 14:44:29	27/03/2018	SWIFT CODE. BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	149,958.00	150,930.79
28/03/2018 15:58:28	28/03/2018	SWIFT CODE BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	159,958.00	310,888.79
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Biaya Adm		5.00	0.00	310,883.79
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Bunga		0.00	3.82	310,887.61
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Pajak		0.76	0.00	310,886.85
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Biaya Meterai		0.44	0.00	310,886.41

No of Credit	3
Total Amount Credited	309,919.82
No of Debit	3
Total Amount Debited	6.20
Closing Balance	310,886.41

mandiri

Rekening Koran
(Account Statement)

Periode	: From	01 April 2018
	To	30 April 2018
Account No	: 1260007369969 - ARBAA ENERGY RESOURC	
Currency	: USD	
Branch	: KCP Jkt Permata	
Opening Balance	: 310,886.41	

Date & Time	Value Date	Description	Reference No.	Debit	Credit	Balance
02/04/2018 10:30:18	02/04/2018	BG 383751- Transfer 20383751		50,000.00	0.00	260,886.41
03/04/2018 08:28:34	03/04/2018	SWIFT CODE BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	219,958.00	480,844.41
06/04/2018 11:12:55	06/04/2018	BG 383752- Transfer 20383752		10,000.00	0.00	470,844.41
10/04/2018 12:11:52	10/04/2018	BG 383754- Transfer 20383754		30,000.00	0.00	440,844.41
10/04/2018 12:13:30	10/04/2018	BG 383753- Transfer 20383753		20,000.00	0.00	420,844.41
12/04/2018 12:19:54	12/04/2018	BG 383756- Transfer 20383756		90,000.00	0.00	330,844.41
12/04/2018 12:22:59	12/04/2018	BG 383755- Transfer 20383755 KE ERY THURSINA		30,000.00	0.00	300,844.41
12/04/2018 19:58:23	12/04/2018	/RFB/ST13011804120222 Debit InTTSusp HUANG HE MINERALS (HONG KONG) CO STANDARD CHARTERED BANK		0.00	119,409.36	420,253.77
13/04/2018 10:32:31	13/04/2018	PAYMENTS FOR GOODS Debit Nostro TRADE PIONEER LIMITEDFIRST COMMERCIAL BANK		0.00	74,585.00	494,838.77
13/04/2018 11:19:42	13/04/2018	BG 383758- Transfer 20383758		100,000.00	0.00	394,838.77
13/04/2018 16:14:28	13/04/2018	/RFB/ST13011804130288 Debit InTTSusp HUANG HE MINERALS CO., LIMITEDSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK		0.00	39,391.83	434,230.60
16/04/2018 10:15:21	16/04/2018	BG 383757- Transfer 20383757		150,000.00	0.00	284,230.60
17/04/2018 11:18:15	17/04/2018	BG 383759- Transfer 20383759		60,000.00	0.00	224,230.60
18/04/2018 11:10:48	18/04/2018	SWIFT CODE BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	4,814.00	229,044.60
27/04/2018 10:06:47	27/04/2018	BG 383760-PAYMENT INV NO QGS-180424-1 Transfer TT 20383760 QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED		20,054.00	0.00	208,990.60
27/04/2018 11:00:32	27/04/2018	BG 383761- Transfer 20383761		40,000.00	0.00	168,990.60
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Biaya Adm		5.00	0.00	168,985.60
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Bunga		0.00	26.60	169,012.20
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Pajak		5.32	0.00	169,006.88

Page 1 of 2

Source: Annex 19 of Panel's report S/2019/171 of 5 March 2019.


b. Supplementary information on payment for Wise Honest from US Court documents

Excerpts from Case 1:19-cv-04210 filed on 9 May 2019, United States District Court, Southern District of New York

43. In connection with the March 2018 shipment of coal on board M/V Wise Honest from North Korea, see supra 11 28- 30, payments totaling more than $750,000 were transmitted through the correspondent accounts of another U.S. financial institution ("Bank-2"), which was specifically listed as being located in "New York, USA."

Source: Case 1:19-cv-04210 filed on 9 May 2019, United States District Court, Southern District of New York

Annex 18 : Screenshot of media coverage of a Republic of Korea Parliamentary Committee Press Conference on Detention of *DN5505* for importing DPRK-origin coal



English Translation:

Current Status of Vessel Suspension of Departure (or Detention) (Edited 2019.04.17)			
Ship Name	**Current Status**	**Reason**	**Date**
DN5505	Departure Delayed/Pending	Importing North Korean coal	Action Taken 2019. Feb.
KATRIN	Departure Delayed/Pending	Illegal Transshipment of Refined Oil	Action Taken 2019. Feb.
P PIONEER	Departure Suspended	Illegal Transshipment of Refined Oil	Action Taken 2018. Oct.
LIGHTHOUSE WINMORE	Departure Suspended	Illegal Transshipment of Refined Oil	Action Taken 2017. Nov.
KOTI	Departure Suspended	Illegal Transshipment of Refined Oil	Action Taken 2017. Dec.
TALENT ACE	Departure Suspended	Carrying North Korean coal	Action Taken 2018. Jan.
LUNIS	Departure Delay Revoked	Illegal Transshipment of Refined Oil	Departure Delayed/Pending Action Taken 2018. Sep. Revoked 2018. Oct.

Source: Meeting of the special committee on the investigation of sanctions against North Korea, YouTube, 18 April 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e7ldPPMeIN4

.

Annex 19 : International Shipping News, "Ship Suspected of Carrying N.K. Coal Is Under Probe: lawmaker", 19 April 2019



A Togo-flagged ship has been under probe in South Korea on suspicion of carrying North Korean coal in a potential violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions, an opposition lawmaker said Thursday.

The vessel, believed to have come from Russia's Nakhodka, entered the South Korean southeastern port of Pohang in February to unload 3,217 tons of North Korean coal and its departure was suspended, according to Rep. Yoo Ki-june of the main opposition Liberty Korea Party (LKP).

The DN5505 vessel also unloaded 2,588 tons of coal in South Korea in November, he said.

"The government grudgingly recognized that the vessel was shipping North Korean coal and kicked off the investigation," Yoo claimed.

North Korea is banned from exporting coal, iron ore and other mineral resources under Resolution 2371, passed in August, 2017. U.N. sanctions call for a country to capture and look into a vessel suspected of engaging in prohibited activities with North Korea.

The DN5505 has become the sixth ship whose departure from a South Korean port was suspended or denied due to suspected shipments of North Korean coal or ship-to-ship oil transfer in international waters.

Yoo said the name of the ship was changed in January 2018 and its original name is Xiang Jin.

Source: "Ship suspected of carrying N.K. coal is under probe: lawmaker" in International Shipping News, 19 April 2019.

Annex 20: Austria's reply to the Panel

PERMANENT
MISSION
OF AUSTRIA
TO THE UNITED
NATIONS IN NEW YORK

New-York-ÖV/RECHT/0140/2019

The Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to transmit the following:

With reference to the Panel's letter dated 28 June 2019 (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.75) Austria would like to provide the following information in addition to the letters dated 23 March 2017 as well as 26 October 2017:

A. Korea Ungum Corporation

As the Panel of Experts is aware, the Austrian Authorities have been dealing with the Korea Ungum Corporation since 2012 and seeking cooperation with the panel concerning this matter on several occasions. Based on the investigations of the Austrian Authorities, the facts may be summarized as follows:

1. Korea Ungum Corporation held the following bank accounts with Meinl Bank AG:

- **No. 100493444**: balance USD 768,168.24
- **No. 100493445**: balance EUR 1,127,465.35

2. The following persons were registered as authorised signatories of the bank accounts:

- **Mr. HYON Yong Il**, DOB March 1964 (no known permanent residence in Austria)
- **Mr. KIM Yu Jin**, DOB 23 September 1963 (member of the administrative and technical staff at the DPRK Embassy in Vienna, registered from 10 May 2007 until 11 February 2010)
- **Mr. RI Yong Su**, DOB 10 June 1959 (member of the administrative and technical staff at the DPRK Embassy in Vienna, registered from 6 October 2004 until 2 May 2007)

3. In July 2012, Mr. HYON Yong Il intended to close the accounts of Korea Ungum Corporation with Meinl Bank AG and transfer the balance via West Landesbank in Germany to an account of the Foreign Trade Bank of the DPRK (FTB).

4. On 26 July 2012, Meinl Bank AG submitted a suspicious transaction report to the Criminal Intelligence Service of Austria, because the Bank had suspected Korea Ungum of money laundering. The report was forwarded to the Vienna Public Prosecutor's Office, which on the same day ordered the freezing of the accounts due to suspected money laundering activity.

5. On 17 July 2015 the Vienna Public Prosecutor's Office closed the money laundering proceedings due to lack of evidence and lifted the freezing order.

6. However, no moneys were released, since the Austrian National Bank, as the competent Austrian authority to monitor the implementation of financial sanctions, confirmed to Meinl Bank that the bank accounts remained frozen pursuant Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

7. In February 2016, the Korea Ungum Corporation, requested a cash withdrawal from the bank accounts which supposedly should have been made available to a member of the DPRK Embassy in Vienna. However, this request was refused.

8. In October 2016, in order to achieve legal certainty for freezing the accounts in the view of potential lawsuits, Austria proposed the listing of Korea Ungum Corporation under EU sanctions legislation, after it had asked the Panel of Experts for additional information. However, no consensus among EU member states could be reached on the listing proposal.

9. On 9 January 2017, the DPRK Embassy requested the release of funds from the above-mentioned bank account No. 100493444, allegedly in order to pay an outstanding salary to Mr. JO Kwang Chol based on a fabricated labour contract with Korea Ungum Corporation (for further details see Part B below). Again, the request was refused.

10. In February 2017, in order to solve the matter in conformity with the sanctions measures against the DPRK, Meinl Bank AG bought DPRK promissory notes to the value

of the balance in the above-mentioned accounts from Winter Bank, another Austrian private bank, which held DPRK promissory notes of several million Euros. The accounts were set off against the promissory notes, thereby avoiding that any funds were made available to FTB or any other entity of the Government of the DPRK.

11. On 28 February 2017, both bank accounts of Korea Ungum Corporation with Meinl Bank AG were closed, well before the listing of FTB by the Security Council on 5 August 2017.

B. JO Kwang Chol

1. Mr. JO Kwang Chol (DOB 5 August 1975, Passport No 745420418, see attachments 1 and 2) has been accredited since 2 February 2016 as a member of the administrative and technical staff of the DPRK Embassy in Vienna. His current accreditation card is valid until 3 November 2020. Mr. JO's private address is not known to the Austrian authorities. There is no legal obligation for accredited members of Embassies in Austria to register their private addresses.

2. In December 2016, the DPRK Embassy request the release of funds in the amount of EUR 33,600.00 from the bank account No. 100493444 with Meinl Bank AG, allegedly in order to pay an outstanding salary to Mr. JO for his work as an agent of Korea Ungum Corporation in Vienna from February to September 2016. However, the Austrian authorities came to the conclusion that this request was an imposture, based on a fabricated labour contract. When the DPRK Embassy was confronted with the suspicion that the contract and supposed work of Mr. JO potentially violated Article 42 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, OP 33 of Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016) as well as Austrian tax and labour laws, it withdrew its request and no funds were released.

3. After careful analysis of all available facts, the Austrian authorities determined – in line with the discretion afforded to Member States in OP 33 of Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016) – that there was no sufficient and reliable evidence to conclude that Mr. JO was actually working on behalf of or acting at the direction of the FTB during his posting

in Vienna. The alleged labour contract was poorly fabricated and there was no evidence of any activities of Mr. JO as supposed agent of Korea Ungum Corporation and/or FTB before or particularly after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016. This conclusion was corroborated by the fact that, unlike previous staff at the DPRK Embassy, Mr. JO was never registered as an authorised signatory of the above-mentioned bank accounts of Korea Ungum Corporation. Mr. JO is also not registered in the Austrian business register, nor in the Austrian company register or in the Austrian land register.

C. Implementing measures

1. Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 which was later replaced by Council Regulation (EU) No. 2017/1509 of 30 August 2017 transposed the obligation to freeze assets of individuals or entities under paragraph 8 (d) of Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) and subsequent relevant Security Council Resolutions.

2. According to the Austrian National Bank, as the competent national authority, action taken pursuant to Art. 28 and 29 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 of 30 August 2017 implementing UNSC-Resolution 2321 (2016) has led to the closure of 12 bank accounts held by persons affiliated with the DPRK Embassy in Austria. According to available information, the DPRK Embassy no longer holds any bank account in Austria at all, as local banks refuse to do business with the Embassy. Due to very strict national banking secrecy legislation, more detailed information could only be acquired by a court order.

3. In this context it is noted that the personal scope of Art. 28 of said EU Regulation goes beyond the scope of OP 16 of Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016), which only refers to diplomats and consular officers, whereas Art. 28 of the EU Regulation includes all members of DPRK diplomatic missions. According to the well-established definitions in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), which both reflect customary international law, the terms "diplomatic agent" (cf. Art. 1 (e) VCDR) and "consular officer" (cf. Art. 1 (d) VCCR) do not encompass "members of the administrative and technical staff" nor the family members

of such diplomat agents and consular officers, who are therefore outside the scope of OP 16 of Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016).

4. In accordance with Art. 28 and 29 of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 the obligation to close the accounts of DPRK diplomats departing/having departed their posting is with the credit and financial institutions.

The Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 31 July 2019

To the
Panel of Experts
established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

DPRK service passport held by Jo Kwang Chol 조광철



Letter from the DPRK Embassy in Beijing requesting visa for Jo Kwang Chol and his family

조선민주주의 인민공화국
대 사 관

Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

№ 540

The Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Beijing presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Austria and has the honor to kindly request the latter to issue the D-visas in favor of following newly appointed staff member of the DPR Korea Embassy to the Republic of Austria and his family who will stay in Austria for 4 years from January 25, 2016, who names, dates of birth, passport numbers are as follows:

1. Mr. Jo Kwang Chol. Born: 05-Aug-1975. Passport No-PS745420418
2. Mrs. Choe Hyang Mi. Born: 23-Jan-1976. Passport No-PS745420419
3. Mr. Jo Ju Ryong. Born: 22-Apr-2000. Passport No- PS745420420
4. Ms. Jo Ju Hyang. Born: 18-Aug-2003. Passport No- PS745420421

Please be informed that Mr. Jo Kwang Chol is the replacement of Mr. Ri Jong Chol, the staff member of the DPRK Embassy to the Republic of Austria and the application forms, copies of applicants' passports and original passports are enclosed herewith.

The Embassy of the DPRK avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of Austria the assurances of its highest consideration.

December 03, Juche104(2015)

To: Embassy of the Republic of Austria
Beijing

Source: Member State

Annex 21 : Suspected DPRK cyber-attacks on financial institutions (including banks and cryptocurrency exchanges) investigated by the Panel

A. Banks

Date	Location	Details
Dec 2015	Guatemala	Reported loss of 16 million USD.
Dec 2015	Vietnam	Attempted theft of more than 1 million Euro ($1.1 millions) of funds through fraudulent SWIFT messages according to statement Tien Phong Bank later issued.[1]
Feb 2016	Bangladesh	Attempted theft of $951M
May 2016	South Africa / Japan	Reported theft of $18M from Standard Bank that caused a malfunction of the system shortly before the cash was withdrawn from ATM machines at convenience stores in Tokyo and 16 prefectures across Japan with forged cards made with data stolen from credit cards issued by the bank. A reply from the Government of Japan to the Panel dated 25 July 2019 stated, "As of 9 July 2019, approximately 260 suspects, including organized crime group members, have been arrested, and the total amount of the cash illegally withdrawn from the ATMs across Japan was approximately 1.86 billion yen. The suspects used forged cards with data of roughly 3,000 pieces of customer information stolen from the Standard Bank in the Republic of South Africa, in order to withdraw cash from approximately 1,700 ATMs located in Tokyo and 16 prefectures across Japan. The case is still under investigation."
July 2016	India	Attempted theft of $166M using tactics and techniques similar to February 2016 attack on Bangladesh Bank. Funds were transferred to the Canadia Bank Plc and RHB IndoChina Bank Ltd in Cambodia, the Siam Commercial Bank in Thailand, Bank Sinopac in Taiwan Province of China, and a bank in Australia (routed by Citibank New York and JP Morgan Chase New York).
July 2016	Nigeria	Attempted theft of $100M[2]
Oct 2017	Tunisia	Attempted theft of $60M

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/business/dealbook/north-korea-linked-to-digital-thefts-from-global-banks.html

[2] *APT38: Un-usual Suspects*, October 2018, p.7, mentions 'an African bank that appears to have been targeted in early 2016 […] and involved an attempted theft of approximately $100 million'. https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38

Oct 2017	Taiwan Province of China	Attempted theft of $60M from Far Eastern International Bank; all but $500,000 recovered by the bank[3]
Jan 2018	Mexico	Attempted theft of 110M USD from Bancomext[4]
Jan 2018	Costa Rica	Attempted theft of 19M USD[5]
Feb 2018	India	Attempted theft of 16.8 USD from City Union Bank using techniques similar to February 2016 attack on Bangladesh Bank.
March 2018	Malaysia	Attempted theft of 390M USD 29 March 2018 cybersecurity incident involving attempted unauthorized fund transfers using falsified SWIFT messages
May 2018	Chile	Theft of approximately 10 million USD from Banco de Chile through unauthorized transactions using SWIFT, mainly to Hong Kong. The hackers distracted bank employs from the theft by using malware to render 9000 bank owned computers inoperable.[6]
June 2018	Liberia	Attempted theft of 32M USD
Aug 2018	India	Reported theft of 13M USD through attack on Cosmos Bank through simultaneous ATM withdrawals across 23 countries in five hours as well as the transfer of 139 million Rupees to a Hong Kong-based company's account in three unauthorized SWIFT transactions. On 8 October 2018 the United States included this and other similar DPRK attacks in its alert regarding the "FASTCash Campaign"[7]
Oct 2018	Chile	Attack on Redbanc using malware called POWERRATANKBA. Sophisticated social engineering via LinkedIn, Skype.
Feb 2019	Malta	Attempted theft of 14.5M USD from the Bank of Valletta (BOV) on 13 February. Before being reversed, transfers were made to

---

[3] Article by *Reuters* dated 16 October 2016 on the DPRK likely behind SWIFT cyber-attack on Taiwan Province of China. https://reut.rs/2kVSmKO.

[4] FireEye APT38 report

[5] In a reply to the Panel dated 24 July 2019, the Mission of Costa Rica stated, "The Mission can confirm that a private financial institution experienced an alleged cyberattack in Costa Rica in January 2018. An investigation has been launched by the Office of the Public Prosecutor's Division on Fraud. On July 17, 2019, the Division delegated the investigation to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Telecommunication. Because the investigation is still ongoing, it is not possible for the Mission to provide the Panel with any result."

[6] FireEye APT38 report

[7] Alert (TA 18-275A) "Hidden Cobra – FASTCash Campaign", US-CERT (United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team), 8 October 2018. The general pattern of such attacks targeting financial institutions has been well documented in a criminal complaint issued by the U.S. Government. Criminal Complaint filed to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Park Jin Hyok https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download

		banks located in the UK, the US, Czech Republic, and Hong Kong, China. "phishing" activity using the same digital fingerprint had been detected since October 2018.
Feb 2019	Spain	Attempted theft of 10.8M USD[8]
March 2019	Gambia	Attempted theft of 12.2M USD
March 2019	Nigeria	Attempted theft of 9.3M USD
March 2019	Kuwait	Reported theft of 49M USD

Source: Information from Member States, Statements by Government agencies, corporate statements, reports by cyber security firms and media articles

B. Cryptocurrency

Date	Location	Details
Feb 2017	ROK	Theft of 7M USD in first attack on Bithumb
22 April 2017	ROK	Theft of 4.8M USD in first attack on Youbit (3618 Bitcoin)
12 May 2017		Global WannaCry attack resulted in Bitcoin laundered through Monero 144,000 USD (52 Bitcoin)_[9]
July 2017	ROK	Reported theft of more than 7 million USD in second attack on Bithumb including: 870,000 USD in Bitcoin and 7 million USD in Bitcoin and Ethereum. [10] National Intelligence Services attributed to the DPRK.

[8] Spain's National Cryptologic Centre (CCN), under the National Intelligence Centre stated in its 2019 Cyberthreats and Trends report that hackers associated with the DPRK government conducted the largest number of reported cyberattacks against Spain in 2018.

[9] United States District Court, Central District of California, *United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK*, Case No. MJ18-1479, Criminal Complaint, 8 June 2018, para. 6. Available at www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download.

[10] Nikhilesh De, "Police Confirm North Korean Connection in Bitcoin Exchange Phishing, Coindesk, 2 October 2017 https://www.coindesk.com/police-confirm-north-korean-connection-bitcoin-exchange-phishing; and Stan Higgins, North Korea Is Targeting South Korea's Bitcoin Exchanges, Report Claims, 12 September 2017, https://www.coindesk.com/report-north-korea-targets-south-koreas-bitcoin-exchanges-cyber-attacks. The Korean Internet Security Agency reportedly thwarted an attempted hack on 10 Korean exchanges back in October.

Summer 2017	ROK	25,000 USD (70 Monero) [11] through Monero cryptojacking / mining through illegal seizure of a Republic of Korea company server
23 Sept 2017	ROK	Theft of undisclosed amount of Bitcoin (possibly 2.19 million USD) in attack on Coinis. Total of 6.99M USD reported in losses from this and the April 2017 Youbit attack combined

[11] According to a news article, an assessment by Kwak Kyoung-ju at the Republic of Korea Financial Security Institute attributed the seizure of a server at an ROK to a hacking unit called "Andariel". Sam Kim, "North Korean Hackers Hijack Computers to Mine Cryptocurrencies" Bloomberg, 31 December 2017.

May-Sept 2017 23 September 2017	ROK	ROK Police reported attacks on three cryptocurrency exchanges by DPRK actors and detailed that 25 employees at four different exchanges were targeted in 10 separate "spear phishing" attempts since July 2017[12] Coinis attack – undisclosed amount of Bitcoin, possibly 2.19 million USD[13]
19 Dec 2017	ROK	Theft of 17 percent of Youbit assets in second attack on Youbit. Youbit later declared bankruptcy as a result of hack.[14]
Dec 2017	Slovenia	Reported theft of 70+M USD from the bitcoin mining company, NiceHash, which reported "a highly professional attack with sophisticated social engineering" that resulted in approximately 63.92M USD of Bitcoin being stolen.
June 2018	ROK	Third attack on Bithumb. Bithumb announced in a since deleted tweet that hackers stole approximately $31 million. Proceeds were laundered through a separate crypto-currency exchange called YoBit.
Aug 2018	India	Reported theft of 13M USD
Oct 2018	Bangladesh	Attempted theft of 2.6M USD
March 2019	Thailand/Singapore/Hong Kong, China [15]	Reported theft of 9M USD from DragonEx

[12] Republic of Korea Police https://www.coindesk.com/police-confirm-north-korean-connection-bitcoin-exchange-phishing; https://www.coindesk.com/report-north-korea-targets-south-koreas-bitcoin-exchanges-cyber-attacks. Korean Internet Security Agency reportedly thwarted an attempted hack on 10 Korean exchanges back in October.

[13] Republic of Korea Intelligence Service as reported by Yonhap News, 16 December 2017. "Spy agency suspects N. Korean involvement in recent hacking into cryptocurrency exchange", https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20171216027100014.

[14] "Youbit statement announcing closure following hack" (Korean). 19 December 2017.

[15] According to the company's Twitter and LinkedIn accounts, it is based in Singapore. The LinkedIn page states, "Registered in Singapore, Operation Department headquartered in Bangkok." However, Singapore indicated to the Panel that it does not currently have any registration information for a company under the name of DragonEx. Singapore further stated, "We note that DragonEx's announcement of 27 March 2019 on its Telegram channel states that the Hong Kong Cyber Security and Technology Crime Investigation Bureau is investigating the incident." DragonEx stated in its announcement of the cyberattack that it informed the judicial administrations of Estonia, Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong. For more information on the attack, see http://www.coinwire.com/360-security-warns-about-lazarus-hacker-group and https://www.secrss.com/articles/9511

March 2019	ROK	Reported theft of 20M USD in fourth attack on Bithumb (3M EOS and 20 million Ripple coins stolen worth $13.4M USD and 6M USD, respectively)
28 May 2019	ROK	UpBit attacked. No losses reported.

Source: Information from Member States, Statements by Government agencies, corporate statements, reports by cyber security firms and media articles

Annex 22 : Information on patterns and methods of DPRK cyber attacks

1. After selecting a target, malicious DPRK cyber actors research employees and organizations looking for vectors of attack. Attacks frequently involve one or more of the following tactics employed against a single target: engaging in spear phishing attacks; engaging in Watering Hole attacks whereby hackers compromise sites likely to be visited by a particular target group; and exploiting existing, well known software vulnerabilities which the target is believed to have left unpatched. After establishing an initial foothold, DPRK hackers then work to move laterally and elevate their privileges within a system; establishing as much control as possible before attempting to execute a cyber-theft. These patterns of attack are not unique to DPRK hackers, what distinguishes them are the targets they select (such as financial institutions) and that following completion of their goals (or upon discovery) DPRK hackers are often willing to destroy large amounts of data to cover their tracks or distract targets while the theft is in process.[16]

2. Examples of these tactics include spear phishing attacks in the form of job applications which were sent to employees of the Bangladesh Bank in the February 2016 attack and used to compromise computers controlled by the bank.[17] In 2017, DPRK cyber actors infected the website of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority with malware programed to only download onto computers which visited the site if they were from 104 pre-selected financial institutions and telecom companies.[18] In March 2017 the security vulnerability known as CVE-2017-0144 which affected computers running some versions of the Windows operating system became known. Patches were not initially available for Windows XP though and in May 2017 DPRK hackers deployed the WannaCry ransomware worm targeting older computers running Windows XP which had not patched the vulnerability.[19] Finally, in 2018, as part of a cyber-heist targeting a Chilean bank, DPRK hackers destroyed data on approximately 9,000 bank-owned computers in order to distract bank employees from the theft of $10 million.[20]

---

[16] Nalani Fraser, Jacqueline O'Leary, Vincent Cannon, Fred Plan "APT38: Details on New North Korean Regime-Backed Threat Group", 3 October 2018. Accessed at https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/apt38-details-on-new-north-korean-regime-backed-threat-group.html on 11 July 2019.

[17] United States District Court, Central District of California, *United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK*, Case No. MJ18-1479, Criminal Complaint, 8 June 2018.

[18] Symantec Security Response, "Attackers target dozens of global banks with new malware", Symantec. 12 February 2017.

[19] Criminal Complaint filed to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Park Jin Hyok.

[20] Dave Sherwood and Felipe Iturrieta, "Bank of Chile trading down after hackers rob millions in cyberattack". *Reuters*. 11 June 2018.

Annex 23 : Actions taken by Member States to counter losses due to attacks by DPRK cyber actors

Costa Rica

In its reply to the Panel of 24 July 2019, Costa Rica stated the following:
In terms of our country's cybersecurity strategy, we have strengthened the capabilities of the Response Center for Information and Technology Incidents of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Telecommunications. The Center's main purpose is to provide quick IT response services to the public sector. Although the Center does not handle prosecutions, the government has implemented response and coordination protocols between the Center and other state agencies. Furthermore, the Government has created a National Strategy for Cybersecurity; it has improved the monitoring capabilities of public websites by the Response Center; and it has provided training in technical and logistical cybersecurity to government officials. Lastly, the government has increased international cooperation in terms of cybersecurity with governments and international organizations such as the Government of South Korea and the Organization of American States, among others.

India

In its reply to the Panel of 7 June 2019, India stated the following:
In the light of SWIFT related incidents and frauds like the cyberattacks in August 2018 on Cosmos Bank based in Pune, the banking regulator of India has undertaken various preventive measures which include:

(a) Issuing circulars on cyber security controls and on the controls that are required to be put in place for trade finance transactions to avoid misuse of the SWIFT ecosystem, advising the banks to implement controls for strengthening the security environment of the SWIFT infrastructure and to take steps to manage the operational risk surrounding the usage of the SWIFT system, in a time bound manner.

(b) Conducting special scrutiny of select banks to assess their operational control framework to safeguard against the risk of misuse of the SWIFT ecosystem.

(c) Issuing a circular to banks advising them to undertake a comprehensive audit of their SWIFT system covering the controls prescribed by the banking regulator.

(d) Sharing of market intelligence on the SWIFT ecosystem gathered from various sources with banks through the issuance of Advisories, which include information on indicators of compromise affecting the SWIFT payment ecosystem and measures prescribed to check for compromise and plug these immediately.

Japan

In its reply to the Panel dated 25 July 2019, Japan stated the following:
Preventing and addressing cyberattacks is a common challenge for the international community in terms of national security and crisis management. The GoJ will continue to take necessary actions while collaborating with other countries. Regarding the Panel's inquiry of 8. in its letter, the specific measures already taken by the relevant Ministries and Agencies to prevent and address the similar kinds of attacks in general are exemplified as follows:

- The Police of Japan and the relevant authorities have been making their utmost efforts to strengthen the cooperation with foreign security authorities and relevant organizations as well as the public-private partnership, while enhancing the collection and analysis of cyber-threat information.

- The Financial Services Agency (FSA) has urged financial institutions that have ATMs accepting the cards issued overseas to take preventive measures such as developing and introducing a system to detect unusual dealing patterns and abnormal transactions, and the FSA has been following up by conducting annual research to the financial institutions concerned, for instance.
- The FSA has also been strictly carrying out on-site and off-site inspections/monitoring of crypto-assets exchange service providers, and when the FSA identified issues/problems, it took appropriate measures including administrative dispositions. Moreover, the relevant acts have been updated and will come into force by June 2020 at the latest, in order to strengthen regulations on crypto-assets exchange service providers, for example, by imposing on the providers new obligation to store the customers' crypto-assets in much more secure manners such as Cold Wallets, except the minimum amount needed for the smooth execution of their businesses.

Republic of Korea

In its reply to the Panel of 28 July 2019, the ROK stated the following:

In order to effectively address and deter cyberattacks on cryptocurrency exchanges, the ROK government has been taking active measures. Most importantly, an inter-agency coordination mechanism is in operation for the sharing of information and countering cyber threats. Also, security checks on cryptocurrency exchanges, the Information Security Management System (ISMS) Certification, capacity-building of the private sector serve as key tools for enhancing cyber security and preventing future attacks.

European Union

On 17 May 2019, the Council of the EU established a framework which allows the EU to impose targeted restrictive measures, such as asset freezes or travel bans, in order to deter and respond to cyber-attacks.[21] The EU also published and has begun implementing the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMDL5) which extends the scope of anti-money laundering rules to include cryptocurrencies.[22]

FATF

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) proposed strict new guidelines with respect to cryptocurrencies and member states are expected to begin implementing these rules in June 2019.[23]

---

[21] European Council Council of the European Union. “Cyber-attacks: Council is now able to impose sanctions”. EU. 17 May 2019.

[22] European Union. “Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU”. EU. 19 June 2018.

[23] FATF. “Outcomes FATF Plenary, 17-19 October 2018”. FATF. 19 October 2018.

Annex 24 : Marine Chain description according to company documents

<u>Excerpts from Marine Chain Investor Deck:</u>

Challenge:
Ship ownership, management and industry specific problems

- The shipping industry is specialized and parochial.
- It is risky with high capital barriers to entry.
- It is sensitive to the influence of macroeconomic and geopolitical developments, the unpredictability of the forces of nature and ever-changing human appetites and behavior
- There is a tight knit community of dedicated owners and service providers who have developed a highly specialized understanding of the dynamics of the industry and its inherent financial risks.
- Major growth in demand for modernization of vessels to meet evolving standards of environmental sustainability.
- Mounting pressure on vessel owners to invest hard capital into vessels to meet fast approaching deadlines for sustainability enhancements.
- Shipowners have access to a limited segment of the financial community to meet the high industry capital demands

The Shipping Industry is Facing Headwinds

Solution

Marine Chain Business model overview

- The Marine Chain business model is based on the key principles of Efficiency, Transparency & Sustainability (ET&S),
- Marine Chain platform will offer next generation tokenization technology to monetize portions of the vessel by conversion into digital units (tokens)
- Digital tokens, supported on the Blockchain, represent fractional ownership of individual vessels permitting investment from the full spectrum of the investment community.
- Marine Chain will be introducing asset backed security tokens enjoying proprietary ownership of the underlying vessel.
- Investors, as token holders will gain exposure to the economics of the vessel ownership, i.e. income generation and capital appreciation from the underlying vessel.
- These crypto assets will follow the ERC20 Token Standard and will be available for integration with other services on the Ethereum blockchain.

Opportunity

- Marine Chain has identified the unique and timely use of blockchain technology and asset tokenization as a significant business opportunity for vessel owners giving access to the blockchain technology platform and tokenization of Marine Chain qualified vessels.
- The vessel owner can use the proceeds of the tokenization to retire debt and boost operating margins.
- The impact of the successful tokenization of a portion of a specific vessel will be to:
- Boost operating margins
- Enable essential investment in the vessel to meet sustainability requirements

- Potentially boost the value of the vessel
- Enable any third party as a token holder to take fractional ownership of a vessel and participate in the potential financial benefits of ownership
- Enable token holders to trade the fractional ownership of the vessels on a secure trading platform
- Enable token holders to liquidate for other crypto or fiat currencies.
- Marine Chain believes that the Marine Chain blockchain tokenization model for the global maritime industry will have wide application into global industry and commerce

---

Utility vs Security Tokens

Regulators around the financial services industry globally are increasingly defining crypto currencies into two distinct categories; utility token and security token.

Utility token: a currency style token issued and used to facilitate a currency type function (such as Bitcoin).

Marine Chain Tokens (MCT) are utility tokens.

Security token: issued in exchange for the ownership of tangible assets with certain finacial rights pertaining to those assets attached to the token.

Marine Chain Vessel Tokens are security tokens.

Utility token coin offerings seem likely to remain unregulated but the issue of security token and the action of trading them will likely be considered a regulated activity under the various financial regulatory bodies governing global financial markets.

Capital Requirements

Stage l financing:

- Initial Coin Offering of Marine Chain Tokens (MCT).
- May-July 2018
- Soft Cap US$20m

Utility token tradable on recognised exchanges

Use of proceeds:

- Development of MCP trading platform and operating systems
- Establishment of the operating team and related expenses Liquidity buffer

---

I. Marine Chain Platform

- MCP Key Process: MCP is designed to enable the tokenization of vessels. It is built on the Ethereum blockchain enables fractional ownership of vessels. Token holders will be able to participate in the financial benefits of vessel ownership.
- MCP Token Introduction: MCP will create Marine Chain Token (MCT) - an ERC20 compliant, MCP specific currency - as a proof of contribution to the platform that is transferable. Once token sale starts any Ethereum (ETH), Bitcoin (BTC), or Litecoin (LTC) wallet can purchase Marine-Chain Tokens. Fiat currencies will also be accepted.
- Marine-Chain Token Usability and Transferability: The MCT Token Sale has the purpose to raise funds for the platform development. MCT holders can later purchase Vessel Tokens with their MCT when the platform has been built and is in operation. MCT holders can use their MCTs to pay any fees (Vessel listing fee, trading fee, transfer fee etc.) or since MCT is an ERC20 token, they can freely transfer their MCTs and trade it anywhere on the Ethereum eco-system.
- Tokenization of Vessels: Marine-Chain allows vessel builders, owners, or sellers to sell their vessels on the platform digitally. Marine-Chain will work with partnered maritime organizations to identify the potential vessels to be digitized on the platform. There will be strong due diligence before confirming the listing on the platform of any vessel.
- Vessel Token Lifecycle Events: Upon successful creation of the vessel digital assets, all the token holders are rightful owners of the vessel and will be entitled to a profit generated by the vessel. Marine-Chain also aims to create value for the token holders by allowing secondary transactions to occur where the vessel token ownership can be transferred to another person.

Blockchain for the Marine Industry

- Blockchain History: Blockchain is a compound word, literally meaning putting blocks in chains. Each block contains unique information about a transaction, i.e. who it's from, how much it's for or where it's going. The genius of blockchain is the solving of what has been referred to in the industry as the double spend problem. Effectively being able to spend the same money twice. This problem was formerly solved by putting a trusted 3rd party in the middle of the transactions to prevent this from happening. Cryptographers sought to solve this problem without the need for third party intervention.
- Blockchain Technology: The blockchain which is the technology at the heart of Bitcoin creates blocks and inserts each block into an immutable chain. Meaning a chain of blocks or records that can never be changed. Each block has a timestamp and the data from the transaction. The chain is built on a peer to peer distributed system that allows each node or person the full access to every transaction that has even been recorded on the chain. This process is done through what is called mining. Once this process is complete that newly form block can never be removed or altered.
- New applications of blockchain: Blockchain can be used for many more application other than currencies. Record keeping on the blockchain allows for an immutable record trail that is in the hands of many people all with the same information. The advancement and rapid adoption of blockchain technology has enabled a fundamental change in paradigm for many industries where democratization and subdivision of ownership were previously impractical and inefficient. Marine-Chain aims to fulfill a growing market need by utilizing the blockchain.

• Applying blockchain to the marine Industry: Although the marine vessel market has plenty of opportunities for making significant gains, buying and owning a vessel is out of reach for most. When joint ownership exists, it is usually with just a few select individuals under written agreements which are slow and cumbersome to execute. Marine-Chain is applying blockchain technology for the "tokenization" of vessel 19 ownership. In a simple, fast, efficient and transparent process, these tokens can then be

---

Revenue Model:

Marine Chain Platform

Revenue occurs when a vessel is tokenized, and any amount of those tokens are sold.

Marine Chain collects <1% of value traded on our platform on every transaction. This can occur many times

over for each vessel because tokens can be exchanged easily. Additionally, each

time a vessel is listed/delisted on the Marine Chain Platform, there is a small fee collected. All transactions are paid for by Marine Chain Tokens. Increasing the number vessels on our platform and sales

will increase revenue; our partnerships are important for this reason. Note that many vessels are worth many millions of dollars.

By comparison, the Marine Chain Platform will attract sellers because we offer a reduction in the traditional broker fee of 1%, thus resulting in money saved for the seller.

Marine Chain Exchange

Revenue is derived from a small fee on each and every transaction that occurs on the platform. Increased trading volume and users bases drive this number up. Additionally, Marine Chain Exchange may charge a considerable fee for alt coins/tokens that want to be listed on tradable on the exchange. Furthermore, a licensed exchange will allow us to list other Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) for a hefty fee, likely to be charged as a percentage of the amount of capital raised.

ICO Brokerage

Revenue from ICO. Brokerage are excluded at this stage.

Marine Chain: SWOT analysis

<u>Strengths</u>

Core team with massive amount of expertise and experience

Very strong advisors and partners

High-level design and architecture have been laid out

White paper and business plan

350-page report by SCMO on maritime industry leading to target segments

Top lawyers as advisors

In terms of execution, there is significant experience in the ICO space, so very high confidence to be able to deliver the platform and exchange within the specified timeframe

Opportunities
Shipowners are desperate for cash
Perfect timing on the sustainability theme
Access to huge asset class to a new investors
Expansion to other hard asset sectors
Once the exchange is up, we can expand in various areas creating futures, indices or others
On sustainability, we can potentially do scoring, measure the impact and can change the industry for the better

In the shipping industry:

- Tonnage is cheap now and expect to gain in the next 5 years; Reversing the depreciation factor of the vessel
- Projecting that ships' tonnage will be increasing gradually down the road

Annex 25 : Excerpt from « Marine Chain Team members » document

MARINE CHAIN TEAM MEMEBRS :

Brain Child and Main Investor:

Julien Kim aka Tony Walker : +12068665574
Tony Walker tonywalker@marine-chain.io
Tony Walker tnywalker3@gmail.com

Source: The Panel

Annex 26 : Information on Consultancy contract signed between Julien Kim and Captain Foong dated 18 January 2018

A. Contract details

The contract stipulated the following responsibilities: “Party B, under the consultant with Party A and under his consent shall register the company with name Marine-Chain Foundation to the country where it is helpful for company’s development”; “shall open corporate bank account(s) in the bank where it is helpful for company’s development”; “shall attend the Company’s business-related event”: and “shall sign on the company’s business-related document i.e. agreement, contract, payment proposal and etc” Foong could propose “ideas and plans for company’s development” for Kim’s consideration, but was given no specific responsibilities typical of a CEO.

B. Julien Kim’s signature on last page of contract:


Signature:

I, Julien Kim, hereby accepts and agrees on the agreement:

Name: Julien Kim

Signature:

Date: 18th January 2018


I, Captain Jonathan Foong, hereby accepts and agrees on the agreement:

Name: Jonathan Foong

Signature:

Date: 18th January 2018

<u>Julien Kim's signature on other pages of contract:</u>



Source : The Panel

Annex 27 : Additional findings in Marine Chain case investigation

1. After signing the consultancy contract on 18 January 2018, Kim indicated to Foong in a text message that he was to hold 100% of the company's shares. Foong objected to this on the grounds that it was "too much responsibility" for him and "not much time to look after the operation aspect". Kim replied that he should not worry about the company's operations, stating, "you can simply write me authorization letter to handle operation." (See next Annex)

2. Despite Kim's role in directing company operations, Foong was unable to answer basic questions about or provide basic information, contacts or biodata for him. When pressed, Foong produced some email and text correspondences with "Tony Walker" as well as his alleged address in the US (which misspelled the city "Denver"). Another of the consultants hired by Marine Chain as "Chief Strategist and Development Officer" also complained about the orders emanating from "Tony Walker" who was supposed to be just advising Foong and who was never seen in person. Kim issued directions over email and text and joined meetings via Skype or chat, claiming to be in various countries where he was meeting "potential investors", including in Italy, China and the US.


3. Despite the opacity around his identity, Kim appears to have been unimpeded in his ability to conduct business globally, hiring more than a dozen well-reputed consultants and law firms across Europe, the US, and Asia with decades of international business experience (See Annex entitled, "Consultants and Law Firms retained by Marine Chain"). Kim dealt directly with most of the consultants and law firms he hired, presenting Foong with bills to pay for services and phone calls for services the substance of which Foong was not aware.


4. After ceasing to make payments into Foong's Singapore account, Kim disappeared completely in July, leaving Foong to deal with all of the fall-out including unpaid invoices, unpaid consultants etc. Foong tried multiple times to get in touch with Kim, as did other team members. The company was closed in September 2018.

Source: The Panel


Annex 28 : Text communications between Julien Kim (« Tony Walker ») and Captain Foong on Marine Chain operations

A. Registration of Hong Kong company and allocation of shares





B. Financial instructions from Kim ("Tony Walker") to Foong



Singtel WiFi Calling 6:49 AM 98%

Chats Tony Walker


let me check with sender's side.


Pls resolve. Onboard plane now no more correspondence for the time being 11:55 AM

Dear Capt, Would you please make a payment to Floyd first or assure Floyd about the payment? There must be a mistake from sender's side however, I have to wait to contact due to different timezone.

It is extremely important payment that determines the future of the project. I will settle with the sender soonest.

At least I would like you to assure Floyd for the payment. I made a promise with Floyd that the payment will be made by today however, due to the issues we are facing now, it seems impossible at this moment. Would you please at least call him to give him assurance?


Singtel WiFi Calling 6:56 AM
99%
Chats
Tony Walker
last seen within a month
2. Adam
3. Aaron
Ok 10:47 AM
Can u resend Aaron invoice pls 10:49 AM
okay take time for Aaron.
Will send out Ophir's invoice now. This has to be settled by today
Pls send ASAP so that can make trip to bank at a go 10:50 AM
Best is to send all the invoices that need to remit today so as not to miss any as u send by piece meal and hard to track 10:51 AM
Amount to be settled by Today:
1. Nicolas
2. Adam
3. Ophir
Okay



Singtel WiFi Calling 6:56 AM 99%

Chats

Tony Walker


last seen within a month

To get Clarkson agreed, we need to finalised our procedures n then proposed to Martin n convince him that this is the new way of SNP in the Broadchain methodology. He also needs to convince his HQ for acceptance.
They are earning far less n doing more work here. They hv to find the buyers that can accept our procedure n is not easy. 4:41 PM

Capt Jonathan, would you please send me the accounting file for MC? I would like to know how much balance i have at this moment of time

Ok - will revert the summary fyr. 8:54 AM

Capt Jonathan. Good morning. Would you be able to join our call for business



Source: The Panel

Annex 29 : Selected transfers to and from Singclass bank account

A. Transfers by Julien Kim to Captain Foong's corporate account in Singapore

Company	Date	Amount transferred (in USD)	Payment details / notes
HONGKONG JOOLEE GROUP CO., LIMITED	26 February 2018	59,940.63	None listed
SOUTHING TRADING CO., LIMITED	7 March 2018	55,731.64	None listed
BLUE VEENUS LIMITED	27 March 2018	33,493.30	None listed
TOTAL GOLD LIMITED	10 April 2018	149,973.18	Payment details: "payment for goods"

B.Selected recipients of transactions undertaken by Captain Foong

Foong processed many payments on behalf of Julien Kim through Singclass International Pte Ltd but some of the accounts with possible links to the DPRK include:

1. "郑成守" (resembles a DPRK name) at an account at the [redacted]

2. LIN YUN JING (a possible DPRK name)
Bank Name: [redacted]
Branch Name: [redacted]
Branch Address: [redacted]
Swift Code: [redacted]
Account No: [redacted]

Note: To record financial transactions undertaken on behalf of Kim, Foong used an Excel document as a ledger which he shared with Kim (who referred to it as an "accounting file") See previous Annex.

Source : The Panel

Annex 30 : Consultants and Law Firms retained by Marine Chain

- An advisory firm headed by a French national specialized in logistics, transportation, and supply chain management, with specific experience in blockchain was hired to lay the groundwork and assist with hiring the rest of the team of consultants.

- A Chief Financial Officer of French nationality residing in Hong Kong, with 18+ years of building, leading and advising some of World's leading corporations & Fortune 500 companies across multiple industry and geographical settings of the Asia-Pacific & Europe.

- A Chief Technology and Security Officer based in the US with a wide scope of experience in building enterprise software and products for Fortune 500 companies. This person established the website domain, www.marine-chain.io in March 2018.

- An Operations & Sustainability Officer of Finnish nationality residing in Finland with a doctorate in science in construction project management.

- A Chief Blockchain Architect of Singaporean nationality but residing in Hong Kong, with years of international blockchain expertise and specialties in Fintech, product portfolio management, cloud, blockchain and program management.

- A consultant of German nationality living in Hong Kong with 17+ years experience in Banking, Finance Trading through work in London, New York, Tokyo and Hong Kong. This consultant developed a business plan and investor deck.

- One of the largest global integrated shipping services companies was hired to attract clients for Marine Chain and undertake shipbroking and shipping research.

- A high-level industry expert company providing advisory in logistics, transportation and supply chain management was hired to produce a 350-page extensive feasibility study for Marine Chain and ongoing industry advice and expertise.

- Four legal teams in different firms in Hong Kong were retained to provide legal advice in various fields. One provided advice on the structure and proposals for Marine Chain; another provided advice on blockchain technology and cryptocurrency; another was retained to provide advice on the structure and planning of the project and to apply for the SFC license. A further team undertook preliminary analysis of possible Marine Chain token models from a regulatory standpoint.

Annex 31: "Choke-point" items survey

Stemming from its ongoing investigation on the procurement of pressure transducers by two DPRK agents, the Panel is conducting a survey of the world's manufacturers of "choke-point" items: items whose procurement remains critical or important for the DPRK's illicit programmes.[1] Based on its analysis of past investigations and information from Member States, the Panel notes that the DPRK's procurement routes are not only directly from producers but also through retailers, second-hand markets, "business to business" websites, and even through the industrial scrap market[2]. Although producers' control over and oversight of the aftermarket is limited, they still face reputational risk from subsequent diversion and there are precautionary measures they can apply. Some producers are new entrant manufacturers of advanced-specification items looking to establish internal screening systems, while others are looking to enhance their existing systems. Therefore, as part of its "choke point" items survey, as well as identifying critical items and the risk of diversion to the DPRK, the Panel is requesting information on the internal screening processes of producers, with a view to promulgating "best practices'. The Panel additionally continues to analyse new patterns and trends in DPRK illicit procurement.

[1] S/2019/171, paragraph 66.

[2] Also see section 6, Annex 30.

Annex 32: Strengthening the ballistic programme's capacity

1. According to one Member State the DPRK is actively engaged in indigenous R&D and the production of missiles with solid propellant, *inter alia* at the industrial complex of Hamhung. According to another Member State, there is a clear development progression from propellant for artillery rockets/SRBMs to solid propellant for ICBMs (see section 4 of this annex).

   Figure I shows two similar distinctive white containers (11m x 2.40m) moving in two diffent areas of the Hamhung-Hungnam industrial complex. The first container moved from the location 39°49'11.81"N 127°35'17.93"E, 400m from the solid fuel propellant production facility of the Hungnam 17 Factory (39°49'27.00"N 127°35'13.55"E), as observed during the following dates in 2019: 20 February, 25 February, 1 March, 4 March, 25 March, 26 March and 3 April.

   The second white container moved from location 39° 57′ 27″ N 127° 33′ 37″ E, at the new production area of the Chemical Material Institute CMI (production of missile casing), as observed during the following dates in 2018: 29 July, 18 August (1h56; 4h50) and 15 September. This type of white containers (11m x 2.40m) could transport rocket motor casings (wound from composite fibers).

Figure I: Similar white containers moving at the solid fuel facility (first seven pictures) and the rocket casing production facility (last four pictures)



Source: Images courtesy of Planet Labs, Inc, and image@2019DigitalGlobe Google Earth (5th picture fron the left)

2. Mobility and versatility through the use of different types of Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) was demonstrated in the SRBM launch tests on the 4 May with a wheeled TEL and 9 May with a caterpillar TEL (see section 3 of this annex). Moreover, the caterpillar TEL (9 May) used the same cabin as was seen during a test of the Pukkuksong-2 (KN-15) MRBM on a wheeled TEL.

Figure II: Wheeled TEL on 4 May (left), caterpillar TEL on 9 May 2019 (right)



Source: KCNA (left), Rodong Sinmun (right)


3. According to one Member State, the DPRK's capacity to penetrate ballistic missile defense systems has increased with the new SRBM tested on 4 and 9 May 2019 (see Figure II above) because its trajectory is flatter than that of a traditional SCUD missile. According to another Member State, the DPRK has achieved indigeneous capabilities in the production of guidance systems. For the 4 May SRBM test launch the estimated range was 230-240 km and for the 9 May test 270-420 km. The 9 May test took place from the launch site near the area of Kilchu-kun (40°57'23.81"N 129°19'4.83"E). According to this Member State, the missile system tested on 4 May and 9 May was the same and the launches were supervised by the DPRK's conventional command. According to the first Member State, the DPRK has upgraded its SCUD-D missile systems with better guidance and electronics. The DPRK has exported the SCUD-D to Syria which has been its long-term customer and partner. Despite its active attempts, it is increasingly difficult for the DPRK to secure new customers.

4. The DPRK's BM programme is comprehensive and autonomous. Systems integration and internal synergies ensure that developments on the SRBM programme benefit MRBM/IRBM and ICBM programmes. With regard to missile engine development[3], according to one Member State, the DPRK's current goal appears to be to develop a solid-fueled first stage for its ICBM. Another Member State observed the deployment of solid fueled missiles Pukkuksong-2 (KN-15) MRBM in the missile bases close to the northern border where the liquid fueled missile Nodong also remained deployed.

5. The dispersed, concealed and underground infrastructure of the BM programme has been continuously improved (see Figure III: Sakkanmol missile operating base). There has been continuous construction of storage galleries (see Figures III and IV) and support structures accompanied by increasing natural concealment of facilities by vegetation. Regular activity has been observed at the ICBM bases located in areas close to the northern border. Site and infrastructure work is in progress. According to a Member State, the DPRK's priority is to secure the railway network dedicated to support its ICBM brigades which is essential for the ICBM bases network. There are stations within 5 km of each missile brigade and storage site. Development was observed at the Hoejung-ri ICBM site, 25 km from the northern border (see S/2019/171, Annex 84-3). The DPRK has a total of 5200 km of partially electrified rail track, much in a poor state.


[3] See reference to propellant in paragraph 1

Figure III: Concealment, protection and underground gallery entrance of two galleries in the area of Sakkanmol missile operating base, located at 38°34'15.23"N 126° 7'18.12"E and 38°34'14.31"N 126° 7'21.64"E, respectively.



Source: The Panel.

Figure IV: underground facility development in progress on 9 November 2017, 2 November 2018, 9 March 2019 and 23 June 2019 in Hoejung-ri ICBM Base, located 41°21'56.17"N 126°55'42.32"E



Source: Images courtesy of Planet Labs, Inc and image@2019DigitalGlobe Google Earth (bottom left corner)

6. The DPRK's development of the BM programme benefitted from active cooperation with third countries, including in sales and procurements in the missile field. One Member State reported to the Panel on such activity particularly during 2018. According to a second Member State, the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (subordinate to the 2nd Economic Committee) changed its names to 'Academy of National Defense Science' (ANDS). Both names are listed: respectively as KPe.018 and KPe.021. ANDS controls a network of overseas front companies tasked with collecting scientific information. Moreover, ANDS plays a key role in the DPRK's R&D efforts related to chemical and biological weapons.

   According to the first Member State, ANDS (see Figure V) manages most missile-related procurement and export activities through overseas agents and front companies. These include the Pusong Trading Corporation and the Korea Habjanggang Trading Company which have been involved in procurement of chemical process equipment related to missile technology from East Asia (Figure VI).

   A procurement agent in Europe working with Pusong Trading Corporation sought to acquire used mixing machinery that could be deployed in the BM programme (see Figure VII). Such used machinery has no warranty and is subject to less stringent export controls than new equipment. The market for used equipment (and related scrap) is less visible. This procurement attempt by the DPRK agent was unsuccessful, but the Panel was told that the agent has diplomatic status and is still in Europe.
   In Syria, DPRK technicians still appear to be present and in contact with Pyongyang, according to the first Member State. DPRK representatives in Syria are also in contact with procurement agents

in a third country who can acquire specialized technological equipment. Such exports are arranged by DPRK agents right from the market to the customer in a manner that is difficult to track.


Further, according to the first Member State, in February 2019 in East Asia, DPRK procurement agents procured high-tech communication equipment for missile-to-ground communication that can operate at very high altitudes. The DPRK regularly procures Glonass/GPS sensors at intervals of around two months.

The 221 General Bureau of the designated Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) (KPe.031) is charged with generating hard currency through exports of prohibited goods (see Figure VIII) in order to support the listed entity KOMID (KPe.001) (see Figure VIII), aka External Economic General Bureau. The funds generated by these weapon sales remain outside the DPRK where they are transferred from trade agents to procurement agents for the acquisition of sought-after commodities. These commodities are then transferred and sold in another country to generate hard currency, allowing the DPRK to launder and conceal revenues from arms sales without using the international banking system.

Instead of exporting full missile systems, the DPRK is sending technicians to a buyer country and establishing a complete supply chain. Such activities are ongoing in Iran, Syria and Egypt according to the first Member State. The Panel was told that the 221 GB is represented at the DPRK Embassy in Teheran with by least three individuals. The number of DPRK procurement agents overseas is decreasing and those remaining are focusing on the procurement of critical missile related components as well as dual-use and below-threshold items. In order to circumvent sanctions, the DPRK changes its import/export-related organization structures every eight months.


According to the first Member State, there are DPRK students involved in international scientific collaboration in East Asia who have studied issues including advanced composites in special environments and space material behavior and evaluation. Intangible transfers of technology are key to the DPRK’s move towards self-reliance.

Figure V: Academy of National Defense Science (ANDS)



Source: Member State


Figure VI: Korea Habjanggang Trading Company



Quantity	Equipment	Specification	CoC
10units	Digital Indicating Controllers	UT35A	[redacted]
200kgs	Lithium Carbonate	CAS 554-13-2	
100bags	Sodium Fluoride	CAS 7681-49-4	
100bags	Epichlorohydrin	CAS 106-89-8	
1mt	Activated Charcoal	CAS 7440-44-0	


Source: Member State

Figure VII: Mixing machine



Source: Member State

Figure VIII: 221 General Bureau of RGB



Source: Member State

7. Dismantlement of the Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite rocket launch site was interrupted. The vertical missile-engine test stand is now renovated and possibly operational.

Figure IX: Sohae vertical test site on the 28 December 2018, with the roof of the structure partially dismantled (left). The roof of the structure was rebuilt by March 2019, and only limited changes had been made since then, as observed on 2 May 2019 (right).



Source: Images courtesy of Planet Labs, Inc.

Figure X: Sohae satellite launch site on 28 December 2019, with the rail mounted structure dismantled (left); it was rebuilt as observed on 8 March 2019 (right).



Source: Images courtesy of Planet Labs, Inc.

Annex 33: Status of Member States reporting on implementation of relevant resolutions

As of 31 July 2019, 37 Member States have submitted reports on the implementation of paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), 75 Member States have submitted reports on the implementation of paragraph 17 of resolution 2397 (2017), 90 Member States have submitted reports on the implementation of resolution 2375 (2017), 87 Member States have submitted reports on the implementation of resolution 2371 (2017), 104 Member States have submitted reports on the implementation of resolution 2321 (2016) and 113 Member States on the implementation of resolution 2270 (2016).

Source: The Panel